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Abstract
This thesis analyses the impact of job and unemployment protection on unemploy-
ment duration, wages, and fertility. The first chapter provides an extensive literature
review on the impact of potential duration of unemployment benefits on unemployment
duration, which is compared to a survival analysis that accounts for unobserved hetero-
geneity. The second chapter makes use of control function approach, with selection on
treatment and outcome variables, to evaluate the impact of unemployment duration on
re-employment wages. The third chapter uses both reduced-form and structural mod-
elling approaches to evaluate the impact of job security on labour supply and fertility
decisions.
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In response to the rapid increase in unemployment rates during the 1970s, the Eco-
nomics literature focused on the study of job and unemployment protection. During
that period, job search theory emerged with Mortensen (1977) developing a framework
that also accounted for the limited duration of unemployment benefits, and Nickell
(1978) developed a dynamic labour demand model which accounted for the costs of
employment protection. The consideration for the labour market institutions has in-
tensified in the 1980s, when most of the industrialized western countries were achieving
historic records of unemployment rate since the end of World War II – United States
reached 11% in 1983, United Kingdom, 12% in 1984, and Spain passed 20% for the first
time in 1985.
The heterogeneity in the (un)employment adjustment to the aggregate (oil) shocks
triggered a new literature in the 1990s, devoted to study which institutional features
and their differences across labour markets act as main drivers of the differential rates
of adjustment. Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Nickell (1997), and Blanchard and Por-
tugal (2001) concluded that some characteristics of the European labour markets were
important determinants to explain the lower flows into job creation and job destruction,
or the so called Eurosclerosis (Giersch, 1985), which resulted in longer unemployment
duration (Layard et al., 1991). Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) nominated the two most
important institutional drivers very clearly: “Europe has continued to have stronger
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employment protection and more generous unemployment insurance than the United
States”.
As documented by Nickell et al. (2005), during the 1980s, Europe has increased fur-
ther the generosity of the benefit level and duration of unemployment insurance, as well
as the protection of employment. In an apparently opposite direction, the introduction
of fixed-term contracts with low severance payments was aimed at increasing the rates
of job hiring (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002). This setting lead to the emergence of
dual labour markets, especially in Southern European countries, where the perman-
ent (or open-end) contracts with high severance payments contrast with fixed-term (or
temporary) contracts with restrictions on duration and renewals (Booth et al., 2002a).
Portugal was no exception in following the European trends. Until the major labour
market reforms during Troika1 supervision, the country was constantly occupying the
leading position in the OECD employment protection legislation (EPL) index regarding
dismissals, especially due to the high severance payments for short tenure duration. For
all the contracts starting in 2012, the minimum 3-month payment was eliminated and
the 1-month severance for each full year of seniority was reduced to 20 days. In 2013,
the severance payment was further reduced to 12 days.
The high protection of employment until recent years has motivated the increasing
use of temporary contracts. Since early 2000s, the share of temporary contracts has
been consistently around 20%, ranking among the top 5 in Europe. Even with such trial
of increasing the flows out of unemployment, the long-term unemployment in Portugal
reached its peak in 2013, with 9.3%. In consistency with the empirical and theoretical
literature, Portugal had indeed the longest (limited) unemployment benefit potential
duration until 2012 – up to 3 years and 2 months, excluding potential subsequent
1Term attributed to the team, composed of Economists of European Central Bank, European Com-
mission and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was responsible to monitor the countries
that received financial loans provided for by the European Union and the IMF in early 2010s.
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unemployment assistance.
Considering the labour market institutions in Portugal, it is with no doubt an inter-
esting case of study. This thesis focuses on the study of two institutional features that,
albeit analysed separately, are both important in shedding light about the design of
optimal joint policies that have already been discussed (Blanchard and Tirole, 2008). I
analyse their consequences on labour market outcomes, such as unemployment duration,
re-employment wages, and (female) labour supply, but also the unintended consequence
of dual labour markets on fertility decisions.
In chapter 1, I do an extensive literature review on empirical studies that studied
the impact of unemployment insurance, and its potential duration, on the hazard rate
to employment and on the unemployment duration. I then evaluate the same effects
using administrative data from the Social Security in Portugal between 2005 and 2012.
I estimate complementary log-log survival models with unobserved heterogeneity. The
identification relies on a policy reform introduced in 2007 that induced exogenous vari-
ation of potential durations across time age, career history and behaviour during the
insured spells. The main results indicate that an increase of one month in potential dur-
ation of unemployment insurance leads to an average decrease of 9% in re-employment
probability. The unobserved heterogeneity estimates indicate that about 20% of the
individuals in the sample are characterized as long-term unemployed. Finally, recur-
ring to a temporary non-anticipated extension of the potential duration of subsequent
unemployment assistance in 2009, I estimate that eligible individuals have a 4% lower
re-employment probability.
The main goal of unemployment insurance is to help individuals to find a better
match in the job market. As the potential duration of unemployment benefits leads
to longer unemployment duration, it is therefore important to also evaluate the con-
sequences that longer spells of unemployment might have on re-employment outcomes.
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In chapter 2, I estimate the impact of unemployment duration on re-employment
wages. Using the same source of data (administrative data from the Social Security
in Portugal between 2005 and 2012), I take a control function approach to overcome
the difficulty raised by the simultaneity issues that arise in naive approaches. In the
first stage I consider three alternative instruments to account for the endogeneity of the
unemployment duration: the first, is based in the potential duration of unemployment
benefits, the second, explores the age discontinuity in the potential duration rules of
unemployment benefits; and the third, takes advantage of the change in the rules of the
potential duration introduced by a reform in 2007. The main results show that each
additional month in unemployment duration is expected to decrease the re-employment
wage by around 0.5%. The effect seems to be robust when I control for selectivity on un-
employment durations, and also when I control for selectivity on re-employment wages,
either by considering the conventional Heckman two-step approach or the augmented
inverse probability of censoring weighted estimation.
In both previous studies I exclude the women that took advantage of long dura-
tion entitlement to unemployment insurance to take maternity leave and come back
to a constant inflow of income. Thinking of these dynamics into a broader sense, I
redirect my research towards the different types of job contracts in Portugal, which
differ significantly in terms of job security. This research is motivated by the facts: 1)
the restrictions on duration and number of allowed renewals implied by fixed-term con-
tracts generate lower job security; 2) in many countries, these contracts are particularly
common among young women.
In chapter 3, I study the impact of job security on fertility decisions. Using a policy
reform, which took place in Portugal in 2003, I show that the lower job security asso-
ciated with fixed-term contracts decreases the likelihood of giving birth. The negative
effect is particularly strong for shorter contracts. To identify the different channels that
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explain these results, I build and estimate a dynamic life-cycle structural model where
women decide both labour supply and fertility, conditional on the characteristics of
the job contract. I then simulate two different labour market policies that have been
discussed in the public debate. Imposing an automatic conversion into permanent con-
tracts, with higher job security, at the end of the fixed-term contract limit, decreases
the number of childless women by 8.3%. In contrast, applying contract-specific tax
rates, penalizing fixed-term contract wages and subsidizing permanent contract wages,
induces 20% of the women who are already mothers to have their second child. These
results corroborate the reduced-form evidence, showing that job security is especially





Revisiting the Impact of Potential
Duration of Unemployment
Benefits on Joblessness Duration
1.1 Introduction
Under imperfect information (Stigler, 1961, 1962), the optimal strategy for a job
seeker consists of refusing all proposals for which the value is lower than her reservation
wage, thus accepting all the others. According to job search theory (Mortensen, 1977),
unemployment benefits affect individuals search behaviour by lowering the opportunity
cost of being unemployed, thus increasing the reservation wage of insured individuals.
This reaction decreases the job search effort and the number of acceptable jobs for the
beneficiaries and, as a consequence, increases the probability of remaining unemployed
for a longer period of time (Nickell, 1979; Lancaster, 1979).
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To foster re-employment, unemployment benefits have a pre-determined potential
duration associated.1 Therefore, when the unemployment benefits approach the point of
exhaustion, the reservation wage decreases sharply generating spikes in the unemploy-
ment escape rates which may triple, when compared with the rest of the spell (Moffitt,
1985). Since the 1980s, several authors have devoted their research to investigate the
impact of potential duration of unemployment benefits on the spikes at the end of the
unemployment spells.
In the first part of this chapter, I revisit the literature and present an exhaustive
survey of the empirical evidence on the impact of potential duration of unemployment
benefits on the unemployment duration (and on the hazard rate into re-employment).
Filges et al. (2015) attempted a similar literature review but the authors adopted a
different strategy, by replicating the results of 12 studies, following the Campbell Col-
laboration guidelines. This chapter complements this attempt by exposing a careful
comparison of 48 empirical studies in 5 different groups: the impact of i) unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) recipiency, ii) potential duration of UI benefits, iii) time to exhaust
the potential duration of UI benefits, and iv) exhaustion of potential duration of UI be-
nefits, on the hazard rate into re-employment, and v) the impact of potential duration
of UI benefits on unemployment duration.
The main contributions of this literature review are twofold. Firstly, it provides the
reader with an important source of information regarding the current stand point of
the empirical literature. Secondly, the inclusion of detailed information on the coun-
try, period, data and restrictions on each selected sample, and the indication of the
estimation model adopted in each study, make it a useful tool for future researchers
in understanding how different sample and estimation choices might lead to different
results.
1Only Belgium puts no limit on the duration of unemployment benefits but compensates the in-
centive with large cuts on the amount of the benefit along the spell.
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In the empirical part of this chapter, I use administrative data from Portuguese
Social Security records, between 2005 and 2012. The dataset contains very rich inform-
ation on the career history of the individuals and the different types, potential duration
and amount of unemployment benefits. Additionally, the period of the data includes
two reforms that changed the potential duration of unemployment insurance. These
reforms are a crucial source of variation to estimate the impact of the unemployment
benefits recipiency and potential duration on the hazard rate into re-employment.
Hence, this study also adds up to the literature by analysing a country with generous
unemployment benefits (Stovicek et al., 2012), during a period which has not been the
focus of any study at present, as it is more recent than what was used in other published
studies. Addison and Portugal (2008a,b), and Portugal (2008) found a substantial
negative impact of UI recipiency on the hazard rate into re-employment in Portugal in
the 90s and early 2000s, but very little is know on the impact of the potential duration.
Only Addison and Portugal (2008b) have studied such impact and the estimate is
remarkably lower than other studies that have used the same empirical specification.
In this chapter I extend the analysis of the authors by studying a more recent period
and by including the impact of subsequent unemployment assistance (UA), which has
also been many times neglected in the literature.
In this study I use variation across time, age, and working experience as exogenous
shifters of potential duration, hence enabling to identify and estimate the causal impact
of potential duration on re-employment rate. I explore two policy reforms that changed
the potential duration of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance in
2007 and 2009/2010, respectively. By strengthening the link between unemployment
insurance potential duration and working experience, the policy change in 2007 has
increased the potential duration of some of the new beneficiaries, decreased the potential
duration for others, while still leaving a (control) group unaffected with respect to
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its potential duration. Furthermore, the policy change in 2009/2010 increased the
potential duration of unemployment assistance with no additional means testing, age
or experience requirements.
The main results from the estimation of complementary log-log hazard models, with
two mass points of unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman and Singer, 1984), reveal that
UI recipiency decreases the hazard rate of re-employment by 73%, and that an increase
of one month in potential duration of unemployment insurance leads to an average
decrease of 9% in the hazard rate. Both results are larger than what was previously
found in the literature (the upper bound estimates were on a magnitude of 50% and
8% for changes in recipiency and duration, respectively). When unobserved individual
heterogeneity is taken into account, the estimates indicate that around 20% of the
individuals in the sample have a substantially lower hazard rate to employment. This
result is below of what has been reported in the literature (around 40%).
Taking advantage of a non-anticipated temporary extension of 6 months (at a lower
benefit amount) on the potential duration of subsequent unemployment assistance in
2009 and 2010 I observe that recipiency of such an extension decreased the hazard rate
into employment by 10%. Overall, the results show that both unemployment insurance
and subsequent unemployment assistance have an important impact on the shape of
the re-employment rates, especially in scenarios with large long-term unemployment
rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2 I provide the
literature review of 48 studies. Section 1.3 explains the rules of potential duration of
unemployment benefits in Portugal during the period of study. Section 1.4 describes
the data. Section 1.5 provides descriptive evidence on the research question. Section
1.6 details the identification model and the estimation procedure. Section 1.7 presents
the main results and discusses the empirical findings of the hazard models including
10
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the results for the temporary policy change. Finally, section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
In this section I provide a literature review of the empirical studies that evaluated
the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) and its potential duration on the transition
rate to employment and on the unemployment duration.2 The selection of studies is
based on the availability of estimates’ interpretation, given that the usually non-linear
estimation requires additional computation to obtain the average effects.
Even though most of the studies were already mentioned on the review by Filges
et al. (2015), only 12 of them were actually analysed, as the authors wanted to re-
compute the effects using the same methodology. The survey in this chapter provides
a clear comparison of the original estimates on 48 studies, thus offering the reader
an important source of information regarding the current stand point of the empirical
literature in this topic.
1.2.1 Overview of Data and Methodologies
Table 1 reviews the studies that provide an estimate for the average effect on the
transition rate to re-employment. Each panel focuses on each independent variable –
UI recipiency, potential duration of UI, time to exhaust UI, and the moment of UI
exhaustion. Table 2 reviews the average effect of potential duration of UI on the dura-
tion of unemployment. In each table/panel, the studies are organized by chronological
order.
In total, 15 countries were analysed by the studies in this review. There is a major
2Katz and Meyer (1990a); Hunt (1995); Addison and Portugal (2008b) also studied the impact on
the hazard rate to other exits than employment. This literature review focuses on the hazard rate into
re-employment to be in line with the research question of this paper.
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emphasis in the United States (14 out of the 48 studies), but Austria, Germany, and
Spain, have also a reasonable share (6, 5 and 4 studies, respectively).
Not surprisingly, in this topic, 72% of the studies used administrative data. When
studying unemployment benefits it is important to get precise data on the length of their
potential duration. However, almost all studies that evaluate the impact of UI recipi-
ency use surveys – in order to compare recipients with non-recipients. Only Vodopivec
(1999), in this group of studies, uses administrative data which, in the case of Slovenia,
contains information about both recipients and non-recipients of UI.
Most of the studies included both genders in their analysis. However, it should be
emphasized that no study focused solely on women and some of studies (16) restricted
their sample to men only, due to gender differences in job search behaviour. The
period of the analysis used in the male-only studies started, on average, roughly 6
years before than the studies that included both genders, which indicates the literature
is accommodating for the increasing female labour force participation in more recent
years.
Four main types of estimations were used: semi-parametric hazard models, para-
metric hazard models, the linear probability model (LPM), and OLS. In the first case,
I distinguish between continuous (Cox (1972) or piecewise) and discrete (cloglog or
logistic) proportional hazards. In the second case, I present the distribution that was
assumed for unemployment duration (exponential, logistic, normal, or weibull). In
the last case, I distinguish the studies that adopted an regression discontinuity design
(RDD).3.
3Note that Lalive (2007, 2008) and Schmieder et al. (2012) also presented robustness to the RDD























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Most of the studies opted for the estimation of hazard models as the lack of large
longitudinal datasets leads to high proportion of censored observations. Throughout
time, the proportional hazards (PH) models were the mostly used ones in these studies.
The PH method is popular because it does not require any assumption on the baseline
hazard function. The continuous version (Cox PH) is even more handy as it also does
not demand the hazard to be constant in each interval of time, which is required when
estimating discrete proportional hazard models or piecewise-linear models. Among
the parametric models, the logistic distribution is the most popular. As Jenkins and
Garćıa-Serrano (2004) justify, this distribution facilitates the estimation of duration
models with large datasets.
In a separate column, I indicate whether the study has tested for the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity and if so, which type was used.4 In most of the cases, a
mixing discrete distribution of mass points (Heckman and Singer, 1984) was applied,
and in that case I also report the number of mass points chosen. 16 out of the 27
selected studies, that have controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, have chosen this
methodology. More than half of the studies have chosen two mass points, which were
typically associated with short- and long-run unemployment. 10 studies have opted to
use the gamma distribution and the 20 studies that have not controlled for it at all
display a “no” in the respective column of the table.
For Table 2, I have also included the exogenous sources of variation in the potential
duration of unemployment benefits that were used in each study. This column shows
the letter P, if the study used a policy reform, S, if the study used spacial variation,
A, if the study used age variation, and E, if the study used experience variation. Most
of the studies relied on policy reforms. The second mostly used source of variation
was space variation as many policies, like in the USA and in Austria, are state- or
4Note that the average effects, however, are not necessarily the ones that accounted for unobserved
heterogeneity as I have rather chosen the most preferred specification reported by the authors.
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county-specific. Finally, some other studies also used variation in age and experience,
as in many countries, the potential duration varies (discontinuously) with these two
determinants.
1.2.2 Review on the Impact of UI Potential Duration
Before analysing the intensive margin of the impact unemployment benefits (poten-
tial duration), it is important to know what is the extensive margin of unemployment
benefits (recipiency) on the transition from unemployment to employment. Accord-
ing to the first panel of Table 1 the average effect ranges between -27% and -50%,
where studies that account for unobserved heterogeneity, on average, present a higher
magnitude of the estimated effect.
In the second panel of Table 1, I have listed the studies that study the impact of one
additional month of potential duration on the transition rate into employment. Note
that different studies report different measures of time, either because of differences in
the frequency of the data or because of different policy changes that implied different
changes in the potential duration of UI. For these reasons, I have scaled the average
effects to the impact of one month, but maintained the original changes in potential
duration used by the authors in the last column of the table.
The impact of each additional month of potential duration of UI on the transition
into employment is most of the times negative. The larger (negative) effects seem to
be around the period when the unemployment rates were higher – in particular the
-8% found by Katz and Meyer (1990a). The estimates of more recent studies, between
2000 and 2012, lie within a narrower range, between -5.7% and -2.6%. Only Farber
and Valletta (2015) finds a non-significant effect (n.s.) for the period between 2007 and
2012. This result might in part be explained by the type of data (Displaced Workers
Survey from the Current Population Survey), which presents some measurement error
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in the duration and transitions out of joblessness. Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008)
presents a positive effect for men but note that the outcome variable in the study is
the transition rate into a permanent job rather than a temporary one. As it will be
discussed in the third chapter of this thesis, males are more likely to get permanent jobs
than females, so this fact can help to explain such results. Consistently, both Lalive
(2007) and Caliendo et al. (2013) also find larger negative results for female samples.
Most of the studies that study the impact of the potential duration of UI on the
transition rate to employment take a different perspective and analyse how much time
is left until the exhaustion of the potential duration. In the third panel of Table
1, I present the 4 studies that have studied the linear impact of time to exhaustion
on the transition rate to employment. The average effects reported in the studies
about Spain and USA report similar magnitudes (between 11.2% and 13.7%), whereas
the study about Portugal reports smaller estimates (-4.1% for exiting into dependent
employment and -9.7% for exiting into self-employment) . The range of estimates
can be explained by different types of exits that the authors study, being the exits
into self-employment and part-time the ones with the largest effects and the exit to
full-time contracts the ones with the smallest effects. As discussed in these studies,
most of the individuals that leave unemployment for the self-employment or part-time
reveal different job search preferences. The authors emphasize that individuals leaving
unemployment to self-employment or part-time at the very last months of the potential
duration of unemployment benefits typically search for full-time dependent employment
until they approach the end of the benefit span – either because the reservation wages are
much larger than part-time wages, or because they never engaged into self-employment
before, as this type of job is not entitled to UI.
The vast majority of studies explores the time-varying dynamics of the unemploy-
ment benefits, as there is wide evidence that the transition rate into employment is not
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uniform along the spell but rather U-shaped along the potential duration of the un-
employment benefits. That explains why the last panel of Table 1 contains the largest
number of studies in this literature review. As the potential duration of UI varies
substantially between countries and periods of study, not all points along the UI spell
would be comparable across studies. In this table I give preference to the last measured
effect before exhaustion, which still presents a wide heterogeneity, between 1 week and
3 months before exhaustion. The spike in the hazard to employment ranges from non-
significance (n.s.) to 6 times more, relative to the last point at where it is measured.
In general, the closer to exhaustion is the point, at which it is measured, the larger is
the average effect. The average across all studies with significant estimates predicts the
hazard rate to more than double (2.5) near the benefits exhaustion.
Once again, in the panel for the spike analysis, the larger effects are associated
with studies that analyse the period of the 1980s, when unemployment was the highest
in most of the countries.5 Note also that, once again, in 4 out of the 6 studies that
presented results by gender, the spike in benefit exhaustion is larger for female than for
male – these studies included Slovakia, Poland, Norway, and Slovenia. For the studies
about Germany and Spain, actually the male sample seems to present a higher spike
in the transition to employment at the point of exhaustion, which might be related to
the lower female attachment to the labour market – especially in Germany, where the
incidence of full-time employment on women is much lower than that of men, according
to the OECD.
Finally, Table 2 presents the impact of potential duration of unemployment benefits
on unemployment duration. The range of the average effect is widely spread, and lies
between 0.02 and 1 additional months of unemployment duration, for each additional
month of unemployment benefits.
5Note that the studies in this panel did not include the latest crisis yet, as the latest date in the
data to be used was 2007.
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A few things should be highlighted in the last table. Most of the studies report
an estimate below 0.4. The outliers have two factors in common: both did not use
any policy reform, selected only specific regions in the country of study, and applied
alternative estimation methods. Holen (1977) did not account for the censoring in
the data, by using an ordinary least squares model. Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993)
applied a piecewise model, which assumes a constant hazard in each interval of time (a
week in this case). On the other hand, it should also be noted that the studies that
reported the smallest estimates have used survey data – also the case in Table 1.
1.3 Institutional Background
I dedicate this section to the rules of the potential duration of unemployment be-
nefits in Portugal during the period of the analysis, January 2005 to March 2012.
The description of the remaining rules (funding, entitlement requirements, monetary
amounts and training) is presented in the Appendix of this chapter.
Until January 2007, the potential duration of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits
in Portugal was solely determined by age, except for individuals at age of 45 and over.
Since January 2007, the entitlement for individuals below age 45 also depended, to a
minor extent, on contributions to Social Security (since last spell of unemployment) and
working experience.6 As a consequence of the reform, some individuals were entitled
to a longer potential duration, others to a shorter potential duration, and others had
no changes in their entitlement. Note that individuals at age of 45 and over were also
affected by the reform. In Table 1.4 I summarize the potential duration for each group
of individuals.
6The number of months of contributions to Social Security (SS months) might not correspond to
number of months with labour market experience as, for example, receiving disability benefits also
counts for contribution purposes.
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Table 1.4: Potential Duration Rules of UI (all values in months except age)
Before Jan 2007 After Jan 2007
Age at Potential Extra Potential Social Security Potential Extra Potential










≥45 30 2 ≤72 24 -
>72 30 2
† for each 5 years of working experience in the 20 years preceding the date of unemployment
‡ Social Security contributions since last spell of unemployment include both the recipiency of
wages as well as other benefits such as the ones to insure parental leave and disability.
Before January 2007, beneficiaries aged less than 45 years old were entitled to a
fixed potential duration of UI benefits, regardless of the number of months they have
contributed to Social Security. Beneficiaries that were younger than 30 years old would
be entitled to 12 months; beneficiaries aged between 30 and 40 years old would be
entitled to 18 months; beneficiaries aged between 40 and 45 years old would be entitled
to 24 months; and beneficiaries aged 45 or more would be entitled to at least 30 months.
Only for the last group of beneficiaries the working experience mattered. If they had
working experience of at least 5, 10, 15 or 20 years, then the potential duration of UI
would increase to 32, 34, 36, or 38 months, respectively.
For beneficiaries unemployed after January of 2007 the working experience became
more important in the determination of their UI potential duration. A beneficiary
younger than 30 years old would be entitled to: 9 months if she worked 2 years or less;
12 months if she worked between 2 and 5 years; 13, 14, 15, or 16 months if she worked
at least 5, 10, 15, or 20 years, respectively.7 A beneficiary aged between 30 and 40
7Note that even though the legal minimum age to work in Portugal is 16 years, it is however allowed
to start working before, as long, as the individual is supervised by an adult. In the dataset there are
very few individuals that are entitled to 16 months, and this should be no surprise as in the Portuguese
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years old would be entitled to: 12 months if she worked 2 years or less; 18 months if
she worked between 4 and 5 years; 19, 20, 21, or 22 months if she worked at least 5,
10, 15, or 20 years, respectively. A beneficiary aged between 40 and 45 years old would
be entitled to: 18 months if she worked 5 years or less; 24 months if she worked more
than 5 non years ; 25, 26, 27, or 28 months if she worked at least 5, 10, 15, or 20 years,
respectively. A beneficiary aged 45 years old or more would be entitled to: 24 months
if she worked 6 years or less; 30 months if she worked more than 6 years; 32, 34, 36, or
38 months if she worked at least 5, 10, 15, or 20 years, respectively.
During the entire period in analysis, the unemployed in Portugal could also be
entitled to Unemployment Assistance (UA) in two cases. First, if the individuals did not
fulfil the minimum requirements to receive UI benefits, especially in terms of working
experience – Initial Unemployment Assistance. Second, if the individuals exhausted the
potential duration of UI benefits – Subsequent Unemployment Assistance. Both types
of benefits provided a lower amount than that of UI benefits.8
Before 2007, the subsequent UA beneficiaries were entitled to half the potential
duration of UI, according to the working experience they had when they started the
UI, and to their age at the end of UI. After the reform, the potential duration of
UA beneficiaries also changed. The changes were applied to all the individuals that
claimed UA after January 2007, regardless of when they started UI. Therefore, the
reform affected both individuals that were affected in the potential duration of UI, and
individuals that were not affected by the reform in the potential duration of UI, but
were affected in the potential duration of the subsequent UA. In the Appendix of this
chapter I provide extensive tables on all the possible entitlement situations according to
Labour Force Survey of the first quarter of 2005, when the dataset in this study starts, there were
7.3% of the individuals aged below 30 years old responding they started their first job before they were
16 years old.
8Once again I focus here on the description of the potential duration of the benefits and I write the




the age and starting date of UI and UA. The following table summarizes the potential
duration of UA recipients for each group of individuals, according to their age and
experience.
Table 1.5: Potential Duration Rules of subsequent UA (all values in months except age)
Before Jan 2007 After Jan 2007
Age at Potential Extra Potential Social Security Potential Extra Potential










≥45 15 1 ≤72 12 -
>72 15 1
† for each 5 years of working experience in the 20 years preceding the date of unemployment
‡ Social Security contributions since last spell of unemployment include both the recipiency of
wages as well as other benefits such as the ones to insure parental leave and disability.
In an unprecedented year (2009) in terms of long-term unemployment in Portugal –
4.4% of the active population was unemployed for one year or more –, the Portuguese
Government, decided to extend the UA potential duration (both initial and subsequent)
for six months in order to give extra support to the long-term unemployed. Contrary
to the job experience and age pre-requisites necessary to be a UI or UA beneficiary, the
extended benefit program only required the beneficiaries to exhaust their UA potential
duration, without any type of means-test. In the subsequent year, when the long-term
unemployment rate kept rising to 5.8%, the same Government renewed the measure, un-
der the same conditions. However, considering the large expenditure in 2009, the policy
renewal was forcibly cancelled in July 2010. Such decision was carried out under the
Stability and Growth and Program 2010-2013, by the tripartite committee responsible





The database used in this chapter is a 1% representative sample (39 972 individuals)
of the panel data entitled Microdados do Sistema de Informação da Segurança Social,
which contains monthly administrative records of the unemployment beneficiaries inflow
between January 2005 and March 2012.
Regarding the unemployment information, this dataset contains the reason for un-
employment, the type of benefit, the daily amount received, the potential and actual
duration of each spell, and the reason for the end or interruption of the unemployment
benefit when the spell is not censored.
The same dataset also contains information on employment registers. For each indi-
vidual’s working experience, the dataset includes the type of job (employee or employer)
and the duration of the job spell. In case the employment register occurred between
January 2005 and March 2012, the dataset also includes the earnings and the economic
activity of that job.
Finally, the dataset also includes some demographic variables, such as gender, age,
region of residence and nationality.
1.4.2 Sample construction
From the 39 972 individuals available, 105 are excluded due to irregularities in their
process.9 Additionally, I exclude those individuals (8 283) that benefited from train-
ing, occupational programs or parenthood benefits during the period of unemployment
9Those individuals were in one of the two situations: either not following the rules for receiving the
unemployment benefit and therefore had to give back the benefit; or without information during some
months of the period of unemployment being impossible to distinguish if the two moments observed
were disjoint unemployment spells or not.
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insurance, as I do not model those decisions in this study.10
This chapter focuses on the study of Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Subsequent
Unemployment Assistance (UA). Therefore, I exclude unemployment spells of altern-
ative unemployment insurance / assistance benefits (initial unemployment assistance,
partial benefits, benefit associated to wage arrears, benefit of public school professors,
benefit of emigrant workers, etc.) due to differences on the eligibility conditions.11
Finally, I exclude the individuals that had no complete information on all the vari-
ables of interest. The final sample accounts for 22 000 beneficiaries. From this group I
select 3 623 that were also observed as subsequent UA beneficiaries and create another
sample. The second sample is particularly useful to study the impact of the temporary
increase in the potential duration of unemployment assistance in Portugal during the
whole year of 2009 and first half of 2010.
1.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics on the variables of interest and some demographic character-
istics for all individuals that benefited from UI are provided in Table 1.6.
The first panel shows that joblessness duration is, on average, 5 months longer
than the UI subsidized duration. In fact, 38% of the individuals that received UI have
experienced some joblessness period without UI benefits. Less than half (43%) of these
individuals also received UA after exhausting UI potential duration. Therefore, in the
estimation I use the joblessness duration (i.e., time until re-employment) as measure of
duration of the unemployment spell.
The second panel shows that the average level of benefits matches roughly the
general rule of 65% of gross wage. The same panel shows that approximately 50%
10For more details on the interruptions see the sample selection note in the Appendix of this chapter.
11These types of benefits account for 30% of the unemployment spells recorded in the sample.
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Table 1.6: Descriptive statistics of UI beneficiaries
Mean Std Min Max
Benefit duration (UI) (in months) 13.51 10.85 1 38
Joblessness duration (in months) 18.48 18.28 1 87
Benefit dur. = Joblessness dur. 0.62
Level of benefits (e/month) 496.15 207.18 43.5 1257.6
Reference wage (e/month) 1 745.59 584.54 48.9 14407.5
1 < minimum guaranteed benefits 0.20
1 Minimum guaranteed benefits 0.29
1 Maximum level of benefits 0.01
Tenure (in years) 4.74 5.22 1 45
Number of jobs 2.30 1.85 1 28
Reason of unemployment
end of fixed-term contract 0.38
redundancy 0.23
mutual agreement 0.17










2012 (until March) 0.04








Azores and Madeira 0.05
Re-employed (any job) 11 335 (10 762 as employees)
Retired, disabled, dead 903
Censored spells 9 762
Transited to UA 3 626
Sample 22 000
1 Reference wage is calculated as the sum of the earnings received within the first 12 months of
the 14 months previous to the date of unemployment, divided by 12.
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of the beneficiaries received either the minimum guaranteed amount or below that if
their net wage was already below that defined amount, and that only 1% received the
maximum allowed amount. The first fact is in line with the average reference wage
being below the average monthly-basis gross wage in Portugal during the period in
analysis, approximately 893e. The second fact might be explained by the low average
tenure length in the sample – less than 5 years – and by the previous switch between
jobs, which potentially left scars on their previous wages, in case of non-consecutive job
spells.
In line with a labour market characterised by a high share of temporary contracts
and a low conversion into permanent contracts, which are heavily protected, it is not
surprising that the termination of a fixed-term contract is the main reason for job
loss, representing 38% of the individuals.12 After that, redundancy (i.e., the employer
claimed the job no longer existed or the individual was not suited for the job anymore)
and mutual agreement are the most representative ones with 23% and 17%, respectively.
The distribution of unemployment inflows along time is approximately uniform with
the exception of 2007, when the inflow decreased, which might be explained by the
enforcement of the new rules. However, during the following years, with the onset
of the financial crisis, the inflow quickly caught up the previous level, reaching the
peak of inflows in 2011, 0.18 (note that 2012 is not fully contained in this dataset).
The high average age (39 years old) should be related with the low attachment to
the labour market of older workers.13 Finally, the spatial distribution of unemployed
individuals along the different regions of Portugal, matches roughly the one of employed
individuals.14
12The share of temporary contracts in Portugal is 22% of dependent employment, double of the
OECD average, and the yearly conversion rate is less than 15%, which is one of the lowest in European
Union, as pointed out by (Boeri et al., 2011).
13Even eliminating the individuals whose age is above the minimum required for retirement the
average age of the sample is still high.
14If any difference, the North has a higher proportion of unemployed relative to employed and Lisbon
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In the last panel of Table 1.6 I present descriptive statistics on the last observed
status for each individual in the sample. Roughly half of the individuals in the sample
are observed in a new job before March 2012, whereas 44% of the spells of joblessness
are censored. Note that such a high rate of censoring is both explained by the high
proportion of long-term unemployment in Portugal (around 51% during the period in
analysis), as well as by the onset of the crisis that increased the flows into unemployment
in the last years of the sample. As 95% of the individuals that are observed to transit
into employment find a dependent employment job, I restrict the analysis, of hazard
rates to employment, to this type of work only.
Table 1.7 presents similar descriptive statistics for UA beneficiaries. As only the
first two panels are substantially different from the full sample, the remaining of the
descriptive statistics for UA beneficiaries are presented in the Appendix of this chapter.
Table 1.7: Descriptive statistics of subsequent UA beneficiaries
Mean Std Min Max
Benefit Duration (UI) 21.85 8.89 9 38
Benefit Duration (UA) 9.20 4.87 1 19
Joblessness Duration 39.48 18.27 10 87
UI benefits (e/month) 14.91 5.36 4.18 41.92
UA benefits (e/month) 12.38 1.62 4.18 13.97
Reference wage (e/month) 614.6 369.9 132.3 5 943.3
Re-employed (any job) 1 702 (1 584 as employees)
Retired, disabled, dead 166
Censored spells 1755
Sample 3 623
Note: Additional descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix of this chapter.
In comparison with the previous table, the individuals that benefit from subsequent
UA have, on average, much longer subsidized (UI) spells and still experience some
has a lower proportion, which might be in line with the fact that in the North a third of the unemployed
had their jobs extinct, whereas 43% of the unemployed individuals in Lisbon lost their job due to the
end of a fixed-term contract.
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period with no unemployment income support. Note also that not only the average
UA benefit amount if lower, but also that the previous wage is roughly 100eless, which
combined leads to a lower average amount of UI benefits for these individuals, relatively
to the full sample.
1.5 Descriptive Evidence on the Impact of the Po-
tential Duration of Unemployment Benefits
Preceding the regression analysis, it is helpful to firstly analyse the descriptive evid-
ence of outflows into employment along the spell of unemployment. In the following
figures I plot the average behaviour of two groups of beneficiaries, the ones entitled to
12 and 24 months of unemployment insurance, as these are two of the most common
entitlements in the data.15























Month to UI Exhaustion
Note: dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals woth boostrapped
standard errors from 1000 sample size and 100 repetitions




In figure 1.1, until the moment of UI exhaustion, two patterns stand out. The
first one is that, irrespective of the potential duration, re-employment rates fall sharply
after the first months of unemployment. The second one is that the spike at benefit
exhaustion is larger for beneficiaries entitled to the shorter potential duration. 16
In both series there is also a (smaller) spike at the point of subsequent UA exhaustion
– 6 months after UI exhaustion for the series of 12 months entitlement, and 12 months
after UI exhaustion for the series of 24 months entitlement, marked with short vertical
lines. The spike is more evident on the shorter series as a larger proportion of individuals
had also benefited from subsequent UA (19% vs 16%). After the point of subsequent UA
exhaustion, a decay is observed in both series. However, the re-employment rate for the
beneficiaries entitled to 24 months does not decrease as much as for the counterpart
series, due to the statistically significant larger proportion of individuals that have
access to RSI (Rendimento Social de Inserção, or minimum guaranteed income, an
income support provided to Portuguese families with severe economic distress), after
the exhaustion of subsequent UA (25% vs 20%).
Even though the previous figure shows a clear difference in the transition rate into
employment for the different groups of individuals, the transition rate statistic does not
incorporate the fact that many individuals are still jobless at the end of the dataset.
The censoring may either come from the long unemployment spells or by the late entry
into the dataset. In Figure 1.2, I plot the empirical Kaplan-Meier survival functions for
the same two groups of potential duration entitlement, as before (12 and 24 months).
16The fact that there is a spike in both series is in line with the optimization strategy of the
beneficiaries that rationally delay the starting date of re-employment in order to benefit from subsidized
leisure (Boone and van Ours, 2012).
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where dj stands for the number of exits to employment on month tj, nj indicates the
number of unemployed “at risk” of becoming re-employed on that month, and j indexes
the month number for individual i. In other words, this survival rate can be interpreted
as the probability that an individual did not find a job in each month tj, included in
the period until t.
The pattern illustrated in the graph shows that, even after 80 months of unemploy-
ment, almost 25% of the individuals entitled to two years of UI potential duration did
not find a job, whereas only 5% of those entitled to one year of potential duration were
in that situation.
This graphical analysis shows evidence that the potential duration of unemployment




1.6 Estimation and Identification
1.6.1 Discrete Proportional Hazard Model
To estimate the impact of potential duration of unemployment benefits on re-
employment rates I use an hazard model, accounting for the fact that many of the
unemployment spells in the data are censored. In particular, I choose the discrete time
representation of the proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) – a complementary log-log
(c-log-log) hazard model. Its discrete feature is particularly convenient in the case of
this study as the data is grouped in months (Jenkins, 2005).17 Accordingly, it is as-
sumed that only one event occurs at each month (from tj−1 to tj). To account for that,
the c-log-log (extreme value) function is asymmetrical in the sense that it approaches
zero slowly and converges to one quickly, opposed to the balanced distributions of the
logit and probit alternatives. In other words, the probability of an event to occur at a
specific period in time is either very large or negligible.
In this model, the probability of surviving until t, i.e., staying unemployed until t,









where t denotes the time (in months) elapsed since the beginning of the spell of un-
employment; h0(t) is defined as the baseline hazard function capturing the duration
dependence; x′it is the vector of explanatory variables (both constant and time vary-
ing) for individual i in time t; and β is the corresponding regression coefficient vector.
17The data is actually provided in days, but given the long spells of unemployment (in the limit,
more than 30.000 days of duration), I convert them to a monthly basis for purposes of estimation.
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The discrete conditional probability that an individual i gets out of unemployment























The complementary log-log transformation, is applied into two steps (logs), firstly:
log[1− h(t|x′itβ)]) = log[1− (1− exp[− exp(x′itβ)(Ht−1 −Ht)])])
= exp(x′itβ)(Ht−1 −Ht) (1.4)
and secondly:
log(−log[1− h(t|x′itβ)]) = log(− exp(x′itβ)(Ht−1 −Ht) = x′itβ + log(Ht −Ht−1)
(1.5)
Note that instead of Ht−1 −Ht there is now Ht −Ht−1.
Rewriting the last expression:
h(t|x′itβ) = 1− exp[−exp(x′itβ + γt)] (1.6)
where γt stands for log(Ht − Ht−1), which summarizes the duration dependence pat-
tern. The likelihood for estimation is based on the general likelihood for right-censored





δi [Pr(Ti > t)]
1−δi (1.7)
where δi is an individual censor indicator, which takes the value 0 if the duration spell of
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individual i is complete, and 1 otherwise, and Ti is the month in which individual i finds
a job. By definition, the hazard rate defined in 1.6 represents Pr(Ti = t|Ti ≥ t,xit).
Using the properties of conditional probabilities, the likelihood can be written as a























which is estimated by maximum likelihood.
1.6.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Even controlling for age, gender, reason of unemployment among other covariates,
the econometric model may be misspecified if some explanatory variables are inap-
propriately omitted. Following Heckman and Singer (1984), I use a semi-parametric
estimator with respect to the distribution of the individual-specific effects. Namely,
to complete the specification of the likelihood function presented above, I include a
binomial-mixture distribution function which approximates the unknown probability
distribution for two support points, whose location and probability mass associated are
estimated according to the data.
With this approach I consider that a sub-population of the unemployed will take
much longer to get a job (slower exiters18), which ends up being more realistic than as-
suming that all individuals, with similar observed characteristics, exit into re-employment
at the same rate.19 This generates two different intercepts in the equation to estimate,
18Adopting the terminology by (Jenkins, 2005)
19This type of model is usually denoted as split-population model (Schmidt and Witte (1989). It
is also associated to the concept of ”defective risks” - see Addison and Portugal (2003) for a detailed
explanation and Portugal (2008) for another empirical application, with more recent data.
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one for each group. The group with the larger intercept leaves unemployment at a
faster rate than the other group (faster exiters). The hazard rate becomes:
h(t|x′itβ) =

1− exp[−exp(x′itβ + γt)], if i is a slower exiter
1− exp[−exp(mz + x′itβ + γt)], if i is a faster exiter
(1.10)
with mz > 0. In this context likelihood function becomes:
L = π × Lslowerexiter + (1− π)× Lfasterexiter (1.11)
where π ∈ (0, 1) is the proportion of unemployed in group of slower exiters, and
Lslowerexiter is the expression in (1.8) evaluated at the hazard rate for slower exiters,
and Lfasterexiter is the analogous for faster exiters.
1.6.3 Identification
When estimating the models described above, one should pay attention to common
factors that might determine both the potential duration of unemployment benefits and
the re-employment rates. The period of time used in this chapter allows the exploitation
of three different sources of variation in the potential duration of both UI and UA, which
helps to identify the causal impact of an additional month of unemployment benefits
on the re-employment probability.
First, there is variation across ages. For example, before 2007, an individual that
was 45 years old and had 20 years of working experience, was entitled, to 14 additional
months of potential duration of UI than an individual with the same characteristics
except 1 year younger.
Second, there is variation across working experience. For example, after 2007, an
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individual that was 40 years old, but had 60 months or less months of contributions
to Social Security, was entitled to 18 months of UI potential duration, whereas in the
same period, for an individual with the same age, one additional month of contributions
would entitle her to 24 months of UI potential duration.
Third, there is variation across time. For example, an individual that was 40 years
old, with less than 5 years of working experience, and registered in the employment
center in December 2006, was entitled to 24 months of UI potential duration, whereas
an identical individual registered in the employment center in January 2007, was entitled
to only 18 months of UI potential duration. Note that unlike the previous sources of
variation, starting to receive UI benefits after the reform might yield less, the same, or
additional months of potential duration, when compared to pre-reform rules.
The three types of variation also apply in the same directions to the potential
duration of subsequent UA, with the caveat that the entitlement in this case is defined
as half of the corresponding UI potential duration. Additionally, there is another source
of time variation, as the individuals that exhausted the potential duration of UA in 2009,
or first half of 2010, were also entitled to 6 additional months.
Using these sources of variation, seven different specifications are estimated.20 Spe-
cification 1.12 includes the potential duration of the unemployment insurance benefits
at the start of the unemployment spell, which does not vary over time.
h(t|x′itβ) = 1− exp[−exp(α1 × UIPotentialDurationi + x′itβ + ln(t))] (1.12)
Considering the different sources of variation mentioned before, the initial potential
duration of unemployment benefits, together with the necessary controls, should identify
the impact of the institutional setting in the probability of re-employment. Then, in
20Note that all specifications are defined here without unobserved heterogeneity, but that will also
be taken into account in all of them in the Results section.
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1.13, I take advantage of the reform in 2007 and study the impact of the change in
the potential duration of the unemployment insurance benefits on the hazard rate to
employment.
h(t|x′itβ) = 1− exp[−exp(α1 ×∆2007UIPotential Durationi + x′itβ + ln(t))] (1.13)
If the joblessness duration of the individuals that were affected by the reform moves
in the same direction as the change in the potential duration of the unemployment
benefits, then this must be a good proxy for the potential duration of unemployment
benefits. Table 1.8 summarizes the average joblessness duration by each age group and
by whether the individuals were entitled to more, less, or the same potential duration of
unemployment insurance benefits, in comparison to what they would receive had they
started receiving the benefits before January 2007.
Table 1.8: Average joblessness duration (in months), by age group and difference
between the pre- and post-reform rules of potential duration of unemployment insurance
Age group Negative change No change in rules Positive change
<30 9.07 13.58 13.97
[30,40[ 9.81 12.84 16.11
[40,45[ 12.08 15.28 18.43
≥ 45 16.04 22.25 NA
Note: the reform of 2007 did not extend the potential duration of unemployment benefits for
individuals with age 45 or more.
As Table 1.8 shows, the individuals that were entitled to a longer (shorter) potential
duration of unemployment insurance benefits after 2007, had also a longer (shorter)
spell of joblessness. The advantage of using this proxy is that, unlike the potential
duration of unemployment insurance benefits, the effect of age and working experience
is less present in the values of this variable. For example, an individual might have
been entitled to one additional month of potential duration and either be 30 years old
or 50 years old; or an individual might have been entitled to 6 less months of potential
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duration and either have 20 or 55 months of Social Security contributions.
Specifications 1.14 and 1.15 are similar to 1.12 and 1.13, but also include the po-
tential duration, and the change, of unemployment assistance benefits. In these two
models, the sample was restricted to all individuals that have benefited from both un-
employment insurance and unemployment assistance, to evaluate the additional impact
of the latter.
h(t|x′itβ) = 1− exp[−exp(α1 ×UIPotentialDuri + α2 ×UAPotentialDuri + x′itβ + ln(t))] (1.14)
h(t|x′itβ) = 1− exp[−exp(α1 ×∆2007UI Potential Duri + α2 ×∆2007UAPotentialDuri + x′itβ + ln(t))]
(1.15)
Finally, specifications 1.16, 1.17, and 1.18 include the time-varying effects of unem-
ployment insurance and unemployment assistance on the hazard rate to employment.
Specification 1.16 includes two mutually exclusive dummies, UI and UA, which allow
to compare between the two states of insurance with the base group state being the
absence of both benefits.
h(t|x′itβ) = 1− exp[−exp(α1 × 1UIRecipientit + α2 × 1UARecipientit + x′itβ + ln(t))] (1.16)
Specification 1.17 includes the potential duration of unemployment benefits (UI and
UA) that was attributed to the individual at the beginning of the benefit recipiency,
for as long as the individual receives the unemployment benefits, thus combining both
recipiency and potential duration effects.
h(t|x′itβ) = 1− exp[−exp(α1 ×UIPotentialDurit + α2 ×UAPotentialDurit + x′itβ + ln(t))] (1.17)
Finally, specification 1.18 includes the time that is left to spend from the poten-
tial duration of unemployment benefits that was attributed at the beginning of the
recipiency period, i.e., the number of months until UI/UA exhaustion.
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h(t|x′itβ) = 1− exp[−exp(α1 × TimetoExhaustUIit + α2 × TimetoExhaustUAit + x′itβ + ln(t))] (1.18)
The interpretation of the associated coefficients allows to evaluate the impact of the
limited benefit duration feature in a non-stationary environment of job search (Van den
Berg, 1990). Using 12 months of potential UI duration as an example, the following
table illustrates the definition of time to exhaustion:21
Table 1.9: Definition of time to exhaustion variables
Month 1 2 3 4 . . . 11 12 13 14 . . . 17 18 19 20 21
UI 12 11 10 9 . . . 2 1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0
Subsequent UA 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 6 5 . . . 2 1 0 0 0
For each additional calendar month, the UI entitlement period decreases linearly
until the point of exhaustion when time to exhaust UI first assumes the value zero. In
that same month, in case the individual is entitled to subsequent UA, time to exhaust
subsequent UA assumes the value of the potential duration and then decreases linearly
until exhaustion. Therefore, in the case the individual does not transit to subsequent
UA, the second variable is always zero. As both benefits get exhausted, by month 19,
both variables assume the value zero from that point onwards.
All specifications account for a logarithmic duration dependence function (ln(t)),
assumed to be common to all individuals. Different specifications for the baseline
hazard function, such as dummies and splines, were also tried and the results were not
perturbed. When unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, the baseline hazard
changes discontinuously for the faster exiters.
21For the sake of the example, I assume that the individual age has not changed significantly such




To control for the age effects, and also for the age discontinuities in the rules for
the potential duration of unemployment benefits, I use linear splines with cuttoffs at
ages 30, 40 and 45. Note that the age that is used to define to potential duration
of unemployment benefits is the age at the beginning of the unemployment episode,
therefore this is the one I assume for the splines, which are not time-varying.
The replacement ratio is also defined using the first UI amount in the spell. The
reasons behind this choice are twofold: first, the UI benefit amount was constant in
Portugal, until the most recent law of 2012; and second, the amount earned in the UA
is linked to the one received in UI.22 Therefore, the amount of UA is excluded from
these specifications. Note that I use the logarithm of the replacement ratio, so that
the coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity. To be coherent with the concept
of replacement ratio used by the Social Security, the denominator of the replacement
ratio is the reference wage, instead of being the last wage observed in the data before
the individual become unemployed.23 This is defined as the average salary received
during the first 12 months of the 14 months preceding the unemployment rate. This
option brings two advantages: first, unlike the last wage before unemployment, I do
observe the reference wage for all the individuals; second, using this measure avoids
large penalizations to individuals that did not receive wages, or received large wage
cuts, in the last months of employment (as it is typical in plant closures).
Additional demographic controls are included in all specifications. A gender dummy
22See the Appendix of this chapter for the rules defining the UA monetary amount.
23See the Appendix of this chapter for a precise definition of the concept of reference wage. In
order to measure the balance between the benefit amount and the previous wage I run a different
regression considering the individuals for which I had access to the actual previous wage for the
purpose of robustness. The results on the other variables were roughly the same and the elasticity on
the replacement ratio has slightly decreased, showing evidence for the fact that with the current rule,
the individuals that have not worked during the whole reference period end up receiving less than a
counterpart with the same wage but working in all of these 12 months.
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(equal to one if the individual is male), a foreign dummy (equal to one if the individual
does not have Portuguese nationality), the quarterly unemployment rate, which is time-
varying, five regional dummies (four regions in mainland – Alentejo, Algarve, Centro
and Norte – and Azores and Madeira, which were included together due to the smaller
number of observations in these two regions), four reasons of unemployment dummies
(end of a fixed-term contract, redundancy, mutual agreement, and plant closure or mass
lay-off), tenure in the last job (measured in years), and the number of previous jobs
with contributions to the Social Security.
1.7 Empirical Results
1.7.1 Transitions from UI or Subsequent UA to employment
This subsection presents the estimates of the impact of unemployment benefits and
their potential duration on the hazard rate to (dependent) employment. All the follow-
ing tables account for unobserved heterogeneity with two mass points.24 The Appendix
A4 of this chapter presents the estimates without unobserved heterogeneity in the same
order. The estimates in Table 1.10 refer to specifications 1.12 and 1.13.
The first column of Table 1.10 shows that, for each additional month of potential
duration of unemployment insurance benefits, the hazard rate is expected to decrease
by approximately 9.1%. This estimate is close to the upper bound of the range that
was previously estimated in the literature – between 0.1% and 8% (for the studies that
reported a negative impact), summarised in the second panel of Table 1.
The large magnitude of the estimate of interest in column (1) of Table 1.10 might
be explained by two facts. First, like Katz and Meyer (1990a), this study uses a
24The specifications that account for unobserved heterogeneity were estimated using the Stata user-
written code hshaz by Stephen Jenkins.
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Table 1.10: Estimated c-log-log regression, with unobserved heterogeneity – the impact
of potential duration of unemployment benefits on the hazard rate to employment
Variables
(1) (2)
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
UI Potential Duration (in months) -0.0955 (0.0035)
∆2007 UI Potential Duration (in months) -0.1203 (0.0035)
Ln(Joblessness Duration) † 0.1218 (0.0163) 0.1112 (0.0168)
Age spline (in years)
min(age,30) 0.0128 (0.0052) -0.0244 (0.0049)
(age-30) ×1 (age ∈ [30,40[) + 10 ×1 (age ≥ 40) 0.0080 (0.0051) -0.0417 (0.0048)
(age-40) ×1 (age ∈ [40,45[) + 5 ×1 (age ≥ 45) 0.1816 (0.0133) -0.0372 (0.0113)
(age-45) ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.1123 (0.0053) -0.1438 (0.0055)
Ln(Replacement Ratio) ‡ -0.4331 (0.0659) -0.4299 (0.0654)
Past Career Information:
Tenure (in years) -0.0150 (0.003) -0.0187 (0.003)
Number of jobs 0.1364 (0.0071) 0.1363 (0.007)
1 Industry Yes Yes
1 Reason of Unemployment
end of fixed-term contract 0.0745 (0.0398) 0.0571 (0.0397)
redundancy -0.1791 (0.0430) -0.1829 (0.0429)
mutual agreement -0.3245 (0.0495) -0.3341 (0.0494)
plant closure or mass layoff 0.0986 (0.0534) 0.1000 (0.0531)
Other Controls:
1 Gender (Male=1) 0.2094 (0.0247) 0.2127 (0.0246)
1 Nationality (Foreign=1) -0.0674 (0.0342) -0.0701 (0.034)
Quarterly Unemployment Rate † -0.2847 (0.0065) -0.2853 (0.0065)
1 Region of Residence
North -0.1018 (0.0309) -0.1037 (0.0307)
Center 0.3092 (0.036) 0.3114 (0.0358)
Alentejo 0.5511 (0.0506) 0.5461 (0.0508)
Algarve 0.4573 (0.0584) 0.4458 (0.0583)
Azores and Madeira -0.2353 (0.0588) -0.2348 (0.0585)
Unobserved heterogeneity:
∆ intercept (faster exiters) 1.4603 (0.0774) 1.4239 (0.0774)
Intercept (slower exiters) -0.6156 (0.2054) -0.8256 (0.2059)
Proportion of faster exiters 0.7915 (0.0299) 0.7899 (0.0339)
Proportion of slower exiters 0.2085 (0.0299) 0.2101 (0.0339)
Log-likelihood -43462.6190 -43527.5360
Nr of observations 406 626 406 626
† Time-varying covariates ‡ The replacement ratio is defined as ln(monthly UI) - ln(reference wage).
Note: column (2) only includes observations of individuals that also received unemployment assistance.
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period/country when the unemployment rate was particularly high.25 Second, like the
studies in the literature that reported the largest effects, this study also accounts for
unobserved heterogeneity, which is proven to be non-negligible in all the specifications.26
In column (2) of Table 1.10, the total unemployment benefits potential duration is
replaced by the change in the potential duration of unemployment benefits that occurred
due to the reform in 2007. The main estimate of interest shows that each additional
month of potential duration for the affected individuals is expected to decrease the
hazard rate to employment by 12%.
The estimates in Table 1.11 include all the individuals that were also observed to
receive unemployment assistance. These specifications also account for the potential
duration of unemployment assistance, in a separate coefficient. The results reveal that
the impact of unemployment insurance in re-employment is larger than that for un-
employment assistance but the two coefficients are not statistically different from each
other, in both specifications.
The estimates that use the change in the potential duration of unemployment be-
nefits due to the policy reform (in columns (2) and (4)) are slightly larger than the
ones that use directly the potential duration of unemployment benefits (in columns (1)
and (3)). This result highlights that one should be careful when interpreting the main
coefficients in columns (1) and (3), given that the potential duration is defined by age
and experience, which also influence the hazard into re-employment.
The estimates in columns (5), (6), and (7), in Table 1.12, take into account the
time-varying impact of unemployment benefits. The first specification shows that the
recipiency of unemployment insurance is expected to decrease the hazard rate to em-
ployment by approximately 73%.
25The unemployment rate in Portugal during the period in analysis increased from 7.5% in the first
quarter of 2005 to 14.8% in the first quarter of 2012.
26Note that the estimates for the main coefficients of interest tend to be of smaller magnitude when
unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into account. See Appendix A4 of this chapter.
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Table 1.11: Estimated c-log-log regression, with unobserved heterogeneity – the impact
of changes in the rules of UB potential duration, on the hazard rate to employment
Variables
(3) (4)
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
UI Potential Duration (in months) -0.1288 (0.0172)
UA Potential Duration (in months) -0.1270 (0.0332)
∆2007 UI Potential Duration (in months) -0.1115 (0.0455)
∆2007 UA Potential Duration (in months) -0.1373 (0.0910)
Ln(Joblessness Duration) † 3.6414 (0.1002) 3.5324 (0.0992)
Age spline (in years)
min(age,30) -0.0812 (0.0151) -0.1476 (0.0136)
(age-30) ×1 (age ∈ [30,40[) + 10 ×1 (age ≥ 40) -0.0402 (0.0171) -0.1558 (0.0143)
(age-40) ×1 (age ∈ [40,45[) + 5 ×1 (age ≥ 45) 0.0418 (0.0503) -0.4146 (0.0451)
(age-45) ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.1036 (0.0247) -0.1402 (0.0263)
Ln(Replacement Ratio) ‡ -1.6398 (0.2974) -1.6471 (0.2437)
Past Career Information:
Tenure (in years) -0.0146 (0.0097) -0.0230 (0.0096)
Number of jobs 0.0989 (0.0351) 0.1083 (0.0355)
1 Industry Yes Yes
1 Reason of Unemployment
end of fixed-term contract 0.0350 (0.1186) 0.0799 (0.1177)
redundancy -0.1137 (0.1273) -0.0632 (0.1225)
mutual agreement -0.0984 (0.1399) -0.0617 (0.1395)
plant closure or mass layoff 0.3717 (0.1575) 0.4014 (0.1553)
Other Controls:
1 Gender (Male=1) -0.0767 (0.0802) -0.0888 (0.0754)
1 Nationality (Foreign=1) -0.0208 (0.1090) -0.0142 (0.1137)
Quarterly Unemployment Rate † -0.2608 (0.0186) -0.2634 (0.0188)
1 Region of Residence
North -0.1407 (0.0934) -0.0928 (0.0939)
Center -0.1800 (0.1280) -0.0301 (0.1284)
Alentejo 0.6335 (0.2002) 0.6917 (0.1757)
Algarve 0.0301 (0.2473) 0.1441 (0.2421)
Azores and Madeira -0.4199 (0.1518) -0.3472 (0.1560)
Unobserved heterogeneity:
∆ intercept (faster exiters) 4.4643 (0.1306) 4.3485 (0.1313)
Intercept (slower exiters) -11.3045 (0.5861) -11.8064 (0.6040)
Proportion of faster exiters 0.6594 (0.0133) 0.6559 (0.0138)
Proportion of slower exiters 0.3406 (0.0133) 0.3441 (0.0138)
Log-likelihood -7135.7812 -7188.5358
Nr of observations 141 183 141 183
† Time-varying covariates ‡ The replacement ratio is defined as ln(monthly UI) - ln(reference wage).
Note: column (2) only includes observations of individuals that also received unemployment assistance.
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Once again, the estimates reported in this study lie above the upper bound of es-
timates reported for UI recipiency in the first panel of Table 1.27 This is not surprising
as the base group in this study is the group of individuals that have exhausted the un-
employment benefits, and therefore it does not include individuals that are not eligible
to UI (as these are not identified in the records of administrative data). The group of
individuals that exhausted the benefits have, by construction, longer joblessness spells,
and therefore are expected to have a lower hazard rate into employment. Even though
the estimate for unemployment assistance is larger, once again that is not statistically
different than the estimate for unemployment insurance.
The main differences between column (6) and column (2) are twofold: the latter
is estimated for the entire sample, and the values of the initial potential duration of
unemployment benefits are zero whenever the individual is not receiving the unem-
ployment benefit. Therefore, the estimates in column (6) should lie between that of
column (2) and column (7). The coefficient estimates reveal a larger effect of the initial
potential duration of unemployment assistance, that is statistically different from that
of unemployment insurance. Such difference is exacerbated in the coefficient estimates
of column (7), which contains the time to exhaust unemployment benefits as main vari-
ables of interest. The estimated effect for each month further away from exhaustion is a
decrease of approximately 2.4% for unemployment insurance, and more than triplicates
for unemployment assistance. These estimates are in line with the results from Addison
and Portugal (2008b), which are summarized in the last panel of Table 1.
Summarising the coefficient estimates on the logarithmic baseline hazard, three as-
pects should be highlighted. For the full sample (columns (1), (2) and (5) to (7)), when
unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into account, the negative estimated coefficient
27Note however that when the dummy for UA receivers is omitted from column (5), the coefficient




Table 1.12: Estimated c-log-log regression, with unobserved heterogeneity – the time-
varying impact of unemployment benefits on the hazard rate to employment
Variables
(5) (6) (7)
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
1 Recipiency †
Unemployment Insurance -1.3179 (0.0437)
Unemployment Assistance -1.2390 (0.0524)
UB Initial Potential Duration †
Unemployment Insurance -0.0549 (0.0016)
Unemployment Assistance -0.1119 (0.0049)
Time to Exhaust UB (in months) †
Unemployment Insurance -0.0240 (0.0025)
Unemployment Assistance -0.0925 (0.0074)
Ln(Joblessness Duration) † 0.0323 (0.0157) 0.0480 (0.0161) -0.0462 (0.0223)
Age spline (in years)
min(age,30) -0.0163 (0.0056) 0.0003 (0.0054) -0.0183 (0.0048)
(age-30) ×1 (age ∈ [30,40[) + 10 ×1 (age ≥ 40) -0.0364 (0.0054) -0.0113 (0.0053) -0.0287 (0.0048)
(age-40) ×1 (age ∈ [40,45[) + 5 ×1 (age ≥ 45) 0.0061 (0.0126) 0.1109 (0.0128) 0.0268 (0.0117)
(age-45) ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.1567 (0.006) -0.1485 (0.0058) -0.1392 (0.0054)
Ln(Replacement Ratio) ‡ -0.3979 (0.0722) -0.4061 (0.0701) -0.4110 (0.0638)
Past Career Information:
Tenure (in years) -0.0254 (0.0033) -0.0208 (0.0032) -0.0228 (0.003)
Number of jobs 0.1610 (0.0086) 0.1540 (0.0077) 0.1359 (0.007)
1 Industry Yes Yes Yes
1 Reason of Unemployment
end of fixed-term contract 0.1382 (0.0446) 0.1256 (0.0433) 0.1252 (0.0382)
redundancy -0.1496 (0.0486) -0.1546 (0.0468) -0.1179 (0.0413)
mutual agreement -0.3498 (0.0551) -0.3341 (0.0537) -0.2993 (0.0479)
plant closure or mass layoff 0.1559 (0.0598) 0.1668 (0.0578) 0.1387 (0.0517)
Other Controls:
1 Gender (Male=1) 0.2529 (0.0277) 0.2350 (0.0267) 0.2255 (0.0239)
1 Nationality (Foreign=1) -0.0139 (0.0382) -0.0352 (0.0369) -0.0150 (0.0329)
Quarterly Unemployment Rate † -0.3578 (0.0072) -0.3393 (0.007) -0.2974 (0.0064)
1 Region of Residence
North -0.1132 (0.0347) -0.1031 (0.0335) -0.1072 (0.0298)
Center 0.3559 (0.0394) 0.3415 (0.0385) 0.3042 (0.0348)
Alentejo 0.5799 (0.0544) 0.5809 (0.0529) 0.5202 (0.0497)
Algarve 0.5045 (0.0632) 0.4957 (0.0617) 0.4587 (0.0569)
Azores and Madeira -0.2287 (0.0686) -0.2279 (0.0639) -0.2015 (0.0569)
Unobserved heterogeneity:
∆ intercept (faster exiters) 2.1958 (0.0531) 1.8974 (0.0554) 1.3876 (0.1102)
Intercept (slower exiters) 0.3096 (0.208) -0.6002 (0.2035) -0.4711 (0.2232)
Proportion of faster exiters 0.7339 (0.0115) 0.7538 (0.0157) 0.8316 (0.0357)
Proportion of slower exiters 0.2661 (0.0115) 0.2462 (0.0157) 0.1684 (0.0357)
Log-likelihood -43331.3170 -43236.9730 -43748.0230
Nr of observations 406 626 406 626 406 626
† Time-varying covariates
‡ The replacement ratio is defined as ln(monthly UI) - ln(reference wage).
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expresses the negative duration dependence that is usually associated to longer jobless-
ness spells, that is, the longer the individual stays without a job, the less likely the
individual is to transit to employment.28 In almost all specifications, this coefficient is
revealed to be positive when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. Note that
this is a mechanic effect that is compensated by the change in the intercept. Finally
note that the baseline hazard is always positive for the restricted sample of individuals
that are observed to receive UA as these will have, by construction, longer joblessness
spells, and therefore exit to employment at a later stage.
To provide a clearer interpretation of the age effects, I plot the marginal effects in
the hazard rate, by age, for each of the five specifications that are estimated for the full
sample, taking unobserved heterogeneity into account.
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Figure 1.3 illustrates three main patterns: the age effect is, in most of the specific-
28According to Steiner (2001) the negative effect might be explained by human capital depreciation,
employer stigmatization, or sorting.
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ations, expected to decrease the hazard rate; the hazard rate to employment might
increase with age for the group of individuals between 40 and 45 years old; and, after
age 45, each additional year of age decreases the hazard rate dramatically. The first
and the last pattern are also verified for the individuals that benefited from UA but
the age effect during 40 to 45 years old is either negative or non-significant.
The remainder of the coefficient estimates are briefly described here.29 Higher val-
ues of replacement ratio decrease the hazard rate, as the opportunity cost of being
unemployed decreases. In terms of the career impact, tenure reduces the hazard rate,
while the previous number of jobs increases the hazard rate, as verified by Addison
and Portugal (2008b). However, unlike the results in the same study, the reasons of
unemployment seem to play an important role shaping the hazard rate. While end
of the fixed-term contract and plant closure/mass layoffs contribute positively to the
hazard rate, redundancy and mutual agreement have a negative impact on the hazard
rate. Males have, on average, higher hazard rates than females, and foreigners have, on
average, lower hazard rates than nationals, but both coefficients are non-significant for
individuals that received unemployment assistance. As expected, the current quarterly
unemployment rate has an important impact on the hazard rates. The regional dum-
mies shape the average hazard rates throughout the country, being the individuals in
the North and in the islands, the ones that take longer to transit to employment, and
the individuals in the Center the ones with higher hazard rates.
Finally, in terms of unobserved heterogeneity, the coefficient estimates reveal that
between 17% and 27% of the individuals have hazard rates that are close to zero – either
due to lack of acceptable offers or by avoiding the transition into inactivity (Addison and
Portugal, 2008a). This result is unexpectedly large for individuals that have benefited
29The industries that lead to larger decreases in the hazard rate are ”Financial Intermediation”,
”Real Estate and Renting”, ”Scientific and Technical Consulting Activities”, and ” Recreational, Cul-
tural and Sporting Activities”. The coefficients for the industry dummies are available upon request.
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from unemployment assistance (34%). These numbers lie in the range of results reported
in the literature that also assumed two mass points for the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity in the estimation (Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) reported 41%,
Bover et al. (2002) reported 4%, Schmitz and Steiner (2007) reported 27.4%, Addison
and Portugal (2008a) reported 45%, and Geerdsen et al. (2018) reported 12%).
1.7.2 Evidence on a short-term extended UA benefit program
In this section I analyse the impact of the program that extended the potential
duration of unemployment assistance in Portugal between January 2009 and July 2010.
The short-term nature of the policy measure enables the construction of two control
groups: one that captures the pre-reform period, with a lower unemployment rate, and
another for the post-reform period, with a higher unemployment rate, when compared
with the treatment period. This helps to disentangle the impact of the reform from
the increasing trend in unemployment rate. To study the impact of this measure I only
consider individuals that received the subsequent UA. In this subsection, I estimate two
different specifications.
The first specification identifies the change in the hazard rates to employment when
individuals are receiving UA and are eligible to extra UA potential duration (1095 indi-
viduals), given by α1; or receiving UA but non-eligible to extra UA potential duration
(2528 individuals), given by α2; or receiving the extra potential duration (508 indi-
viduals), given by α3, in comparison with individuals that have already exhausted the
benefits.30
30Remember that an individual is eligible to the extension by exhausting the unemployment assist-
ance potential duration between January 2009 and July 2010.
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h(t|x′itβ) = 1− exp[−exp(α1 × 1UARecipientNonEligibleit+
α2 × 1UARecipientEligibleit+
α3 × 1ExtraUARecipientit + x′itβ + ln(t))] (1.19)
The second specification follows the same identification as specification 1.16 in the
previous subsection, by analogously measuring the effect of the limited duration of
unemployment assistance and the extra unemployment assistance.
h(t|x′itβ) = 1− exp[−exp(α1 × TimetoExhaustUAit+
α2 × TimetoExhaustExtraUAit + x′itβ + ln(t))] (1.20)
As in the previous subsection, when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account,
the coefficient on recipiency of the extra potential duration of UA becomes larger and
statistically significant. This evidence supports the importance of accounting for un-
observed heterogeneity when individuals have long unemployment spells, as it is the
case for subsequent UA beneficiaries. Table 1.13 shows that approximately 40% of the
individuals have a substantially lower hazard rate to employment, and that individuals
that received the extra potential duration of UA had an hazard rate that was 30% lower
than that for individuals that have exhausted their UA benefits.
In the second specification, which includes the time to exhaust variables, the coeffi-
cient estimate for unemployment assistance is still large and significant, as in previous
subsection, but the coefficient for the extra unemployment assistance is not statistically
significant. This means that even though recipiency of the extra benefit is estimated
to decrease the hazard rate into employment, the number of months (6) of the po-




Table 1.13: Estimated c-log-log regression, with unobserved heterogeneity – the impact




Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Eligibility to Extra UA†
Non-eligible UA Beneficiary -0.5922 (0.0983)
Eligible UA Beneficiary -0.7178 (0.137)
1 Recipiency of Extra UA† -0.3532 (0.1418)
Time to Exhaust UB (in months) †
Unemployment Assistance -0.0546 (0.0205)
Extra Unemployment Assistance -0.0345 (0.0319)
Ln(Joblessness Duration) † 0.4270 (0.0675) 0.5112 (0.0919)
Age spline (in years)
min(age,30) -0.0577 (0.0164) -0.0601 (0.0163)
(age-30) ×1 (age ∈ [30,40[) + 10 ×1 (age ≥ 40) -0.0671 (0.0149) -0.0664 (0.0147)
(age-40) ×1 (age ∈ [40,45[) + 5 ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.0702 (0.0375) -0.0671 (0.0375)
(age-45) ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.1070 (0.0186) -0.1052 (0.0184)
Ln(Replacement Ratio) ‡ -0.6418 (0.1113) -0.6414 (0.108)
Past Career Information:
Tenure (in years) -0.0114 (0.0099) -0.0114 (0.0097)
Number of jobs 0.1090 (0.0362) 0.1108 (0.0343)
1 Industry Yes Yes
1 Reason of Unemployment
end of fixed-term contract 0.0534 (0.1381) 0.0240 (0.1290)
redundancy -0.1322 (0.1400) -0.116 (0.1320)
mutual agreement -0.1559 (0.1570) -0.1374 (0.1496)
plant closure or mass layoff 0.3130 (0.1722) 0.3162 (0.1639)
Other Controls:
1 Gender (Male=1) -0.0285 (0.0824) -0.0262 (0.0785)
1 Nationality (Foreign=1) 0.1397 (0.1173) 0.1299 (0.1132)
Quarterly Unemployment Rate † -0.2203 (0.0181) -0.2153 (0.0174)
1 Region of Residence Yes Yes
Unobserved heterogeneity:
∆ intercept (faster exiters) 2.5633 (0.1309) 2.5326 (0.1668)
Intercept (slower exiters) -4.1577 (0.2054) -4.4893 (0.7238)
Proportion of faster exiters 0.5911 (0.0299) 0.6296 (0.0275)
Proportion of slower exiters 0.4089 (0.0299) 0.3704 (0.0275)
Log-likelihood -6601.8425 -6620.7192
Nr of observations 63 142 63 142
† Time-varying covariates




In this chapter I use a rich administrative dataset from the Portuguese Social Se-
curity records between 2005 and 2012. The data includes very detailed information on
the career history of the unemployed individuals and precise information on the poten-
tial duration of both unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance benefits.
Throughout this chapter, I show that a longer potential duration of unemployment
benefits dramatically decreases the hazard rate into employment.
Firstly, a descriptive analysis shows evidence that the transition rate into employ-
ment spikes at the point of benefit exhaustion, being the spike lower for unemployment
assistance exhaustion than for that of unemployment insurance.
Secondly, I explore different specifications in the estimation of complementary log-
log hazard models, with two mass points of unobserved heterogeneity. I analyse both
the impact of the recipiency and the potential duration of unemployment benefits.
The identification is based on the variation across time, age, and working experience
that define the rules of the potential duration of unemployment benefits. I explicitly
explore the policy change of 2007 which exogenously changed the potential duration
of unemployment benefits. The results reveal that UI recipiency decreases the hazard
rate of employment by 73%, and that an increase of one month in potential duration
of unemployment insurance leads to an average decrease of 9% in the hazard rate.
Comparing these results with an extensive and careful literature review provided in
the beginning of this chapter, I conclude that both effects are larger than what was pre-
viously found (up to 50%, and up to 8%, respectively). The unobserved heterogeneity
estimates indicate that about 20% of the individuals in the sample have a substantially
lower hazard rate to employment. This result is lower than what has been reported in
the literature (around 40%).
Finally, in order to evaluate the impact of an unexpected benefit duration extension
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I use a reform that was applied in 2009 and 2010. According to this policy, all the
individuals which had/or would have exhausted the unemployment assistance benefit in
2009 were entitled to an additional 6 months, regardless of their age, career or any kind
of means test. Eligibility seems to decrease the hazard rates of UA beneficiaries but
the estimate is not statistically significant. However, once unobserved heterogeneity
is taken into account, the recipiency of the extra potential duration is estimated to
decrease the hazard rate to employment in 30%, when compared to individuals that
have exhausted all the UA benefits they were entitled to.
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A1 Unemployment Benefits in Portugal
A1.1 Funding and Entitlement Requirements
Following the European standards, the unemployment benefits’ system in Portugal
is composed of two subsystems: unemployment insurance (UI) and unemployment as-
sistance (UA). The former is funded by contributions from workers and employers, while
the latter is funded by general government revenues. An individual is entitled to receive
the UA in two cases: either it does not have the necessary requirements to get access
to the UI (initial UA beneficiaries), or it has exhausted the potential duration of UI
(subsequent UA beneficiaries). In both situations the individual is means tested – the
aggregate income of the household should not overcome the 80% of IAS. 31
In order to be entitled to either of the two unemployment benefits subsystems, an
individual must have been fired as an employee. 32 The discern rule between UI and
initial UA is the number of monthly contributions to the Social Security during the two
years before the date of unemployment. The contributions requirement to be eligible for
UI was eighteen months between January 2005 (beginning of the period in analysis) and
31IAS - Indexantes de Apoios Sociais - is a minimum monthly guaranteed amount of money that
has evolved in the following way: 374.70 e(2005); 385.90 e(2006); 397.86 e(2007); 407.41 e(2008);
419.22 e(henceforth)
32Note that voluntary dismissals, unless fair, are not entitled to any type of unemployment insurance.
Additionally, until the last major change in in April 2012, self-employed workers were not entitled to
UI
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January 2007, fifteen months between January 2007 and January 2010, twelve months
between January 2010 and July 2010 and fifteen months again until March 2012 (ending
of the period in analysis). The contributions requirement to be eligible for initial UA
was six months only, throughout the entire period.
A1.2 Monetary Amount
The UI benefit amount is defined according to the past remunerations (including at
most one Holidays’ subsidy and one Christmas’s subsidy) received during the first 12
of the 14 months previous to the date of unemployment.33
Table 1.14: Benefit amount rules - Unemployment Insurance
net wage
< IAS
net wage ≥ IAS
ceiling





After July 2010 75% net wage
Notes: by gross wage is meant the sum of the base wage with, if so, one Holidays and one Christmas
subsidy. The net wage is calculated as the gross wage minus contributions to Social Security and
income taxes.
Due to the lighter contributions requirement, the remunerations’ period shrinks to
the first 6 during the 8 months previous to the date of unemployment, in the case of
initial UA. Although the period of subsidized unemployment contributes for the calculus
of the old-age pensions, the unemployment benefits are exempted from income taxes. 34
The definition of the UI amount (once again, in place during the period of analysis) is
33In Portugal the annual remunerations are defined in 14 months because in June and December an
employee receives two monthly salaries. In June,the regular salary is complemented by the ”Holidays’
subsidy”, and in December the regular salary is complemented by the ”Christmas’s subsidy”.
34Under a crisis environment, the Portuguese Government has implemented a 6% tax in the unem-
ployment benefits in 2013, which has been refused by the Constitutional Court and given back to all
the beneficiaries
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summarized in Table 1.14. If the average net wage during the first 12 of the 14 months
previous to the date of unemployment is lower than the IAS in place .
The UA amount is solely determined by the household composition. If the unem-
ployed lives alone, then it receives the IAS. If not, then it receives 80% of that amount.
In case these amounts are higher than the previous net wage of the unemployed, that
amount replaces the previously mentioned values. During the extensions provided in
2009 and 2010 the daily amount received in this program was 8.38e , i.e., 60% of the
IAS, plus 1.4e per each child until the maximum of 13.97e daily benefit which corres-
ponds to the IAS.
A1.3 Training
Both potential durations and benefit amounts paid by Social Security may change
due to training or occupational programs, during the period of UI/UA. Besides actively
looking for a job, the subsidized unemployed is obliged to do training provided by IEFP
(Instituto de Emprego e Formação Profissional) which helps not only the re-integration
into the job market but also the pursuing of higher degree studies. During the training,
the IEFP provides food and travel allowance. To guarantee that the individual does
not earn less than the initial benefit amount (as an incentive to do training), Social
Security provides the difference between the initially set up benefit amount and the
allowances provided by the IEFP. During the period of training, the potential duration
of the unemployed is frozen. At the end of that period, in order to know for how much
longer the unemployed is still entitled to receive the unemployment benefit, the Social
Security sums all the money given in compensation and divides by the initially set daily
benefit amount: subtracting the final result to the potential duration of the individual
before starting training yields the number of days, if any, for which the individual is
still entitled to receive the initially set benefit amount. Regarding the occupational
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program, only the daily amount (potential duration remains unchanged) is different if
the occupation is remunerated, i.e., the unemployed may receive more than the amount
that was set at the beginning of the insurance/assistance period.
A2 Sample Exclusion Note
The individuals that receive training from the training centres in Social Security are
eligible to receive the unemployment benefits for a longer period than what was initially
defined. During the training period, they only receive part of the unemployment benefits
in order to complement the transports and food allowances that are provided in training.
Dividing the smaller benefit amount by the period of training at the end of it yields the
actual number of days receiving the unemployment benefits, which is smaller than the
actual time period, thus extending the potential duration of unemployment benefits.
Those in occupational programs receive an extra amount on top of the unemployment
benefits. According to the job search theory, a higher benefit yields a higher reservation
wage and thus a smaller probability of leaving unemployment. On the other hand,
the occupational program works as a signal to the employer, hence yielding a larger
probability of leaving unemployment. In order to avoid bias on the estimates, I opt to
exclude these individuals. Finally, as for the parenthood benefits I verify that those
interrupting the unemployment benefit to receive this alternative insurance have used
84% of the potential duration of unemployment benefits, contrasting with the average
of 57% when considering the whole initial sample. Moreover, 40% of those are actually
right-censored spells, i.e., no transition from the unemployment benefit to employment
is observed.
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A2 Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits
in Pre- and Post- 2007 Reform
Table 1.15: Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits at age< 30, by experience













Potential Duration (in months)




<2007 – – 12 – 6 –
≥2007








≥ 20 8 2
≥2007 ≥2007
≤24 – 9 -3 4.5 -1.5
>24
<5 12 0 6 0
[5,10[ 13 1 6.5 0.5
[10,15[ 14 2 7 1
[15,20[ 15 3 7.5 1.5
≥ 20 16 4 8 2
[30,40[
<2007
<2007 – – 12 – 9 0
≥2007








≥ 20 11 2
≥2007 ≥2007
≤24 – 9 -3 6 -3
]24,48] – 12 0 6 -3
>48
<5 12 0 9 0
[5,10[ 13 1 9.5 0.5
[10,15[ 14 2 10 1
[15,20[ 15 3 10.5 1.5
≥ 20 16 4 11 2
Note: Age at entry in Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Unemployment Assistance (UA) are defined according to
the thresholds in the law. The number of months of contributions to Social Security (SS months) might not corres-
pond to number of months with labour market experience as, for example, receiving disability benefits also counts for
contribution purposes. ∆2007 stands for the change in the potential duration of the unemployment benefit that comes
from the fact that the individual claimed that benefit after January 2007.
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Table 1.16: Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits at age ]30, 40], by experience













Potential Duration (in months)




<2007 – – 18 – 9 –
≥2007








≥ 20 11 2
≥2007 ≥2007
≤48 – 12 -6 6 -3
>48
<5 18 0 9 0
[5,10[ 19 1 9.5 0.5
[10,15[ 20 2 10 1
[15,20[ 21 3 10.5 1.5
≥ 20 22 4 11 2
[40,45[
<2007
<2007 – – 18 – 9 –
≥2007








≥ 20 14 2
≥2007 ≥2007
≤48 – 12 -6 9 -3
]48,60] – 18 0 9 -3
>60
<5 18 0 12 0
[5,10[ 19 1 12.5 0.5
[10,15[ 20 2 13 1
[15,20[ 21 3 13.5 1.5
≥ 20 22 4 14 2
Note: Age at entry in Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Unemployment Assistance (UA) are defined according to
the thresholds in the law. The number of months of contributions to Social Security (SS months) might not corres-
pond to number of months with labour market experience as, for example, receiving disability benefits also counts for
contribution purposes. ∆2007 stands for the change in the potential duration of the unemployment benefit that comes
from the fact that the individual claimed that benefit after January 2007.
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Table 1.17: Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits at age ]40, 45], by experience













Potential Duration (in months)




<2007 – – 24 – 12 –
≥2007








≥ 20 14 2
≥2007 ≥2007
≤60 – 18 -6 9 -3
>60
<5 24 0 12 0
[5,10[ 25 1 12.5 0.5
[10,15[ 26 2 13 1
[15,20[ 27 3 13.5 1.5
























≤60 – 18 -6 12 -3
]60,72] – 24 0 12 0
>72
<5 24 0 15
0
[5,10[ 25 1 16
[10,15[ 26 2 17
[15,20[ 27 3 18
≥ 20 28 4 19
Note: Age at entry in Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Unemployment Assistance (UA) are defined according to
the thresholds in the law. The number of months of contributions to Social Security (SS months) might not corres-
pond to number of months with labour market experience as, for example, receiving disability benefits also counts for
contribution purposes. ∆2007 stands for the change in the potential duration of the unemployment benefit that comes
from the fact that the individual claimed that benefit after January 2007.
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Table 1.18: Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits at age≥ 45, by experience













Potential Duration (in months)











≥ 20 38 19
≥2007









≥ 20 38 19
≥2007 ≥2007









≥ 20 38 19
Note: Age at entry in Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Unemployment Assistance (UA) are defined according to
the thresholds in the law. The number of months of contributions to Social Security (SS months) might not corres-
pond to number of months with labour market experience as, for example, receiving disability benefits also counts for
contribution purposes. ∆2007 stands for the change in the potential duration of the unemployment benefit that comes
from the fact that the individual claimed that benefit after January 2007.
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A3 Additional Descriptive Statistics of Subsequent
UA Beneficiaries
Table 1.19: Descriptive statistics of subsequent UA beneficiaries (continuation)
Mean Std Min Max
Reason of unemployment
end of fixed-term contract 0.41
redundancy 0.33
mutual agreement 0.16

















2012 (until March) 0.03








Azores and Madeira 0.06
Re-employed (any job) 1 702 (1 584 as dependent employees)
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A3 Empirical Results Without Unobserved Hetero-
geneity
Table 1.20: Estimated c-log-log regression – the impact of potential duration of unem-
ployment insurance benefits on the hazard rate to employment
Variables
(1) (2)
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
UI Potential Duration (in months) -0.0819 (0.0030)
∆2007 UI Potential Duration (in months) -0.1037 (0.0030)
Ln(Joblessness Duration) † -0.0424 (0.0096) -0.0445 (0.0096)
Age spline (in years)
min(age,30) 0.0061 (0.0044) -0.0249 (0.0041)
(age-30) ×1 (age ∈ [30,40[) + 10 ×1 (age ≥ 40) 0.0073 (0.0043) -0.0372 (0.0041)
(age-40) ×1 (age ∈ [40,45[) + 5 ×1 (age ≥ 45) 0.1523 (0.0113) -0.0277 (0.0098)
(age-45) ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.1022 (0.0048) -0.1334 (0.0050)
Ln(Replacement Ratio) ‡ -0.4498 (0.0555) -0.4446 (0.0553)
Past Career Information:
Tenure (in years) -0.0136 (0.0027) -0.0166 (0.0027)
Number of jobs 0.1165 (0.0056) 0.1167 (0.0056)
1 Industry 1 Reason of Unemployment
end of fixed-term contract 0.0563 (0.0329) 0.0400 (0.0329)
redundancy -0.1288 (0.0362) -0.1377 (0.0362)
mutual agreement -0.2789 (0.0426) -0.2852 (0.0426)
plant closure or mass layoff 0.1047 (0.0458) 0.1051 (0.0458)
Other Controls:
1 Gender (Male=1) 0.1868 (0.0209) 0.1859 (0.0209)
1 Nationality (Foreign=1) -0.0586 (0.0287) -0.0686 (0.0288)
Quarterly Unemployment Rate † -0.2654 (0.0058) -0.2676 (0.0058)
1 Region of Residence
North -0.0973 (0.0264) -0.0991 (0.0264)
Center 0.2139 (0.0302) 0.2170 (0.0302)
Alentejo 0.4284 (0.0414) 0.4176 (0.0413)
Algarve 0.3551 (0.0489) 0.3408 (0.0489)
Azores and Madeira -0.2271 (0.0506) -0.2216 (0.0506)
Intercept 0.5600 (0.1501) 0.3261 (0.1475)
Log-likelihood -43581.9280 -43635.5839
Nr of observations 406 626 406 626
† Time-varying covariates ‡ The replacement ratio is defined as ln(monthly UI) - ln(reference wage).
Note: column (2) only includes observations of individuals that also received unemployment assistance.
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Table 1.21: Estimated c-log-log regression – the impact of changes in the rules of UB
potential duration on the hazard rate to employment
Variables
(3) (4)
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
UI Potential Duration (in months) -0.0625 (0.0132)
UA Potential Duration (in months) -0.0557 (0.0239)
∆2007 UI Potential Duration (in months) -0.0611 (0.0302)
∆2007 UA Potential Duration (in months) -0.0227 (0.0567)
Ln(Joblessness Duration) † 1.4672 (0.0499) 1.4538 (0.0499)
Age spline (in years)
min(age,30) -0.0453 (0.0111) -0.0800 (0.0098)
(age-30) ×1 (age ∈ [30,40[) + 10 ×1 (age ≥ 40) -0.0283 (0.0122) -0.0819 (0.0105)
(age-40) ×1 (age ∈ [40,45[) + 5 ×1 (age ≥ 45) 0.0250 (0.0395) -0.1820 (0.0345)
(age-45) ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.1116 (0.0225) -0.1409 (0.0235)
Ln(Replacement Ratio) ‡ -1.1698 (0.1574) -1.1962 (0.1580)
Past Career Information:
Tenure (in years) -0.0002 (0.0072) -0.0054 (0.0075)
Number of jobs 0.1655 (0.0242) 0.1657 (0.0244)
1 Industry Yes Yes
1 Reason of Unemployment
end of fixed-term contract -0.0601 (0.0844) -0.0666 (0.0845)
redundancy -0.0692 (0.0909) -0.0843 (0.0910)
mutual agreement -0.3040 (0.1044) -0.2973 (0.1043)
plant closure or mass layoff 0.2495 (0.1152) 0.2456 (0.1155)
Other Controls:
1 Gender (Male=1) 0.1095 (0.0560) 0.1038 (0.0561)
1 Nationality (Foreign=1) 0.1596 (0.0788) 0.1584 (0.0791)
Quarterly Unemployment Rate † -0.2405 (0.0146) -0.2388 (0.0147)
1 Region of Residence
North -0.1342 (0.0699) -0.1417 (0.0700)
Center -0.1943 (0.0930) -0.1889 (0.0928)
Alentejo 0.1387 (0.1448) 0.1042 (0.1447)
Algarve -0.1153 (0.1898) -0.1342 (0.1898)
Azores and Madeira -0.2503 (0.1227) -0.2324 (0.1227)
Intercept -4.0066 (0.4429) -4.2205 (0.4390)
Log-likelihood -7573.0759 -7596.5625
Nr of observations 141 183 141 183
† Time-varying covariates ‡ The replacement ratio is defined as ln(monthly UI) - ln(reference wage).
Note: column (2) only includes observations of individuals that also received unemployment assistance.
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Table 1.22: Estimated c-log-log regression – the time-varying impact of unemployment
benefits on the hazard rate to employment
Variables
(5) (6) (7)
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
1 Recipiency †
Unemployment Insurance -0.6338 (0.0334)
Unemployment Assistance -0.6973 (0.0457)
UB Initial Potential Duration (in months) †
Unemployment Insurance -0.0403 (0.0014)
Unemployment Assistance -0.0838 (0.0046)
Time to Exhaust UB (in months) †
Unemployment Insurance -0.0276 (0.0024)
Unemployment Assistance -0.0883 (0.0073)
Ln(Joblessness Duration) † -0.1851 (0.0124) -0.1875 (0.011) -0.1894 (0.0163)
Age spline (in years)
min(age,30) -0.0229 (0.0042) -0.0099 (0.0042) -0.0176 (0.0042)
(age-30) ×1 (age ∈ [30,40[) + 10 ×1 (age ≥ 40) -0.0288 (0.0041) -0.0124 (0.0041) -0.0233 (0.0042)
(age-40) ×1 (age ∈ [40,45[) + 5 ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.0001 (0.0099) 0.0795 (0.0103) 0.0339 (0.0105)
(age-45) ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.1309 (0.005) -0.1230 (0.0049) -0.1286 (0.0050)
Ln(Replacement Ratio) ‡ -0.4667 (0.0555) -0.4690 (0.0553) -0.4328 (0.0557)
Past Career Information:
Tenure (in years) -0.0208 (0.0027) -0.0172 (0.0027) -0.0203 (0.0027)
Number of jobs 0.1254 (0.0056) 0.1250 (0.0055) 0.1200 (0.0056)
1 Industry Yes Yes Yes
1 Reason of Unemployment
end of fixed-term contract 0.1028 (0.0328) 0.0993 (0.0328) 0.0934 (0.0328)
redundancy -0.0845 (0.0362) -0.0818 (0.0362) -0.0947 (0.0362)
mutual agreement -0.2639 (0.0426) -0.2601 (0.0426) -0.2671 (0.0426)
plant closure or mass layoff 0.1418 (0.0459) 0.1600 (0.0459) 0.1297 (0.0459)
Other Controls:
1 Gender (Male=1) 0.2002 (0.0208) 0.1983 (0.0208) 0.1974 (0.0208)
1 Nationality (Foreign=1) -0.0097 (0.0286) -0.0333 (0.0286) -0.0146 (0.0286)
Quarterly Unemployment Rate † -0.2923 (0.0059) -0.2921 (0.0059) -0.2792 (0.0058)
1 Region of Residence
North -0.1010 (0.0264) -0.0950 (0.0264) -0.0970 (0.0264)
Center 0.2223 (0.0302) 0.2154 (0.0302) 0.2269 (0.0302)
Alentejo 0.4124 (0.0413) 0.4157 (0.0413) 0.4135 (0.0413)
Algarve 0.3580 (0.0489) 0.3564 (0.0489) 0.3631 (0.0489)
Azores and Madeira -0.2142 (0.0506) -0.2148 (0.0506) -0.2048 (0.0506)
Intercept 1.2323 (0.1520) 0.8005 (0.1492) 0.7258 (0.1489)
Log-likelihood -43734.2790 -43523.9778 -43821.3340
Nr of observations 406 626 406 626 406 626
† Time-varying covariates
‡ The replacement ratio is defined as ln(monthly UI) - ln(reference wage).
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Table 1.23: Estimated c-log-log regression – the impact of unemployment assistance
eligibility, recipiency, and potential duration on the hazard rate to employment
Variables
(8) (9)
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Eligibility to Extra UA†
Non-eligible UA Beneficiary -0.8057 (0.0967)
Eligible UA Beneficiary -0.9296 (0.1328)
1 Recipiency of Extra UA† -0.1270 (0.1342)
Time to Exhaust UB (in months) †
Unemployment Assistance -0.1772 (0.0166)
Extra Unemployment Assistance -0.0257 (0.0307)
Ln(Joblessness Duration) † -0.1956 (0.0450) -0.2960 (0.0476)
Age spline (in years)
min(age,30) -0.029 (0.0113) -0.0231 (0.0114)
(age-30) ×1 (age ∈ [30,40[) + 10 ×1 (age ≥ 40) -0.0420 (0.0105) -0.0315 (0.0106)
(age-40) ×1 (age ∈ [40,45[) + 5 ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.0229 (0.0276) 0.0120 (0.0278)
(age-45) ×1 (age ≥ 45) -0.0937 (0.0158) -0.0823 (0.0157)
Ln(Replacement Ratio) ‡ -0.3532 (0.0789) -0.3677 (0.0790)
Past Career Information:
Tenure (in years) -0.0014 (0.0073) 0.0012 (0.0073)
Number of jobs 0.1357 (0.0251) 0.1259 (0.0251)
1 Industry Yes Yes
1 Reason of Unemployment
end of fixed-term contract -0.0291 (0.0903) -0.0444 (0.0903)
redundancy -0.0714 (0.0967) -0.0843 (0.0967)
mutual agreement -0.1932 (0.1091) -0.1955 (0.1092)
plant closure or mass layoff 0.2273 (0.1199) 0.2187 (0.1198)
Other Controls:
1 Gender (Male=1) 0.0859 (0.0580) 0.0783 (0.0579)
1 Nationality (Foreign=1) 0.1027 (0.0800) 0.0758 (0.0799)
Quarterly Unemployment Rate † -0.1847 (0.0141) -0.1742 (0.0142)
1 Region of Residence Yes Yes
Intercept -1.3217 (0.5373) -1.4801 (0.5355)
Log-likelihood -6688.1420 -6664.1371
Nr of observations 63 142 63 142
† Time-varying covariates







Theory predicts that unemployment duration can affect re-employment wages through
three main channels: skill depreciation, job searching, and stigmatization. First, the
longer the unemployment spell, the longer the individual is prevented from accumu-
lating work experience, thus deteriorating both general and job-specific human capital
(Becker, 1962). Second, in an opposite direction, job search models predict that a longer
spell of unemployment allows individuals to search for a better match, generating posit-
ive wage returns from unemployment (Mortensen, 1988). Altonji and Shakotko (1987)
argued that job shopping is one of the main contributors for wage growth over a ca-
reer. Finally, a stigma effect might arise in labour markets with imperfect information
(Vishwanath, 1989; Belzil, 1995). As the employer cannot distinguish whether a longer
spell of unemployment represents low productivity or a low rate of job offer arrivals,
the wage offered might be reduced, at least during the screening period in the new job,
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as part of a ”ranking” hiring strategy that gives preference to individuals with shorter
unemployment duration (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994).
While the theoretical literature seems to agree on the existence of an impact of
unemployment duration on re-employment wages, the empirical literature so far has
not reached a consensus. The main difficulty is the simultaneity issue present in the
estimation. As reservation wages are not usually observed, it is hard to distinguish
whether the unemployed individual accepted the new job at a certain point in time
because that was when the offered wage was above the reservation wage that was set in
the beginning of the job search, or whether the unemployment duration up until that
moment lead the individual to decrease the threshold rule to be re-employed faster.
To overcome this endogeneity problem, Addison and Portugal (1989) recurred to
instrumental variables (IV) estimation. In the first stage, the authors used previous job
duration and reason for unemployment as potential sources of exogenous variation to
explain unemployment duration. The authors estimated this step using both complete
and incomplete spells to improve prediction, keeping the estimation sample as repres-
entative of the unemployed population. Results from the second stage indicated that a
10% increase in unemployment duration lowered accepted wages by about 1% for the
United States between 1979 and 1984.
Other studies resorted to regression discontinuity designs, relying on the institu-
tional settings of unemployment insurance. They do not evaluate directly at the im-
pact of unemployment duration on re-employment wages but rather at the channel of
unemployment insurance, which is assumed to affect re-employment wages through the
primary effect on unemployment duration. Using such methodology the direction of
the results is unclear.Lalive (2007) and Card et al. (2007a) found no significant impact
on wages. Both studies used at Austrian data. The former explored the discontinuity
in benefit duration at the age of 50 whereas the latter explored the discontinuity in
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severance pay at 36 months of tenure. Nekoei and Weber (2017) were the only ones to
find a positive effect. A nine-week extension in the potential duration of unemployment
benefits in Austria, was expected to increase unemployment duration by 2 days, but
predicted to increase re-employment wages by 0.5%. Centeno and Novo (2009) and
Schmieder et al. (2016) have reported statistically significant negative impacts. The
two studies explored age discontinues as sources of quasi-experimental variation in un-
employment duration and achieved quite similar results. For each additional month of
unemployment duration, the former study reported an effect of 1% using Portuguese
data between 1999 and 2002, and the latter study reported a reduction in wage offers
of 0.8% in Germany between 1975 and 2008.
In this chapter, I adopt an empirical approach that has not been used before, in the
literature of unemployment duration and re-employment wages. I employ a control func-
tion approach, which is essentially an instrumental variables estimation (Wooldridge,
2015). This approach has two main advantages in the context of the research question
in this chapter. First, to estimate the first stage in a non-linear fashion (accelerated
time failure model) and to use both complete and incomplete spells of unemployment
duration. Second, by plugging the residuals from the first stage into the re-employment
wage equation, to test and control for endogeneity.
This chapter also distinguishes from the previous literature in the fact that, the
source of exogenous variation I use, affects the beneficiaries in a non-monotonic fashion.
Most of the previous studies recurred to either extensions or shortenings in the entitled
duration. I use a reform, implemented in Portugal in January 2007, which changed the
potential unemployment benefits’ duration in different directions. Around 41% of the
individuals got longer potential duration of unemployment benefits, 23% got shorter
potential duration of unemployment benefits, and approximately 36% of them have not
faced any change in the potential duration of unemployment benefits.
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Exploring the exogenous variation in the reform, I construct three alternative in-
strumental variables: the potential duration of unemployment duration; the age dis-
continuities in the potential duration of unemployment duration; and the changes in
the potential duration of unemployment duration that were generated by the reform.
Among the three different alternatives, the last instrument is arguably more convincing.
In comparison with the first one, it is less affected by other factors such as age and la-
bour market experience which might also directly impact on re-employment wages. In
comparison with the second one, it uses a larger number of observations, thus providing
more precision in the results.
The main result of this chapter is: one additional month in unemployment dura-
tion leads to a decrease of approximately 0.5% in re-employment wages. Even though
the magnitude is smaller, the result is in line with Addison and Portugal (1989) and
Schmieder et al. (2016).
Finally, I test for both self-selection into treatment (longer unemployment duration)
and self-selection into re-employment. First, I include in the outcome equation the in-
teraction between the residuals and the treatment variable (unemployment duration)
to test for self-selection into treatment. Second, I employ the traditional Heckit two-
step approach accounting, in the selection equation, for the period during which the
individual is observed to be unemployed. Third, I recur to an augmented inverse prob-
ability of censoring weighted estimation where the weights are the inverse probability
of the individual to be censored at the end of the sample, March of 2012. According to
these three tests, there is no indication that self-selection is a serious problem.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the institutional frame-
work. Section 2.3 presents the data. Section 2.4 explains the empirical methodology.
Section 2.5 describes each of the three instruments. Section 2.6 presents the main




This section describes the rules of the potential duration of unemployment benefits
insurance (UI) system in Portugal during the period of the analysis, i.e., January 2005
to March 2012. Particular emphasis is given to the changes originated by the reform
of 2007. The description of the remaining rules (funding, entitlement requirements,
monetary amounts and training) is presented in the Appendix of Chapter 1.
The potential duration of unemployment benefits in Portugal currently depends on
both age and career history, but this was not always the case. Before January 2007,
only the individuals that were 45 years old or older could be entitled to extra potential
duration, according to the number of years of Social Security contributions.1 After the
major reform in 2007, the rules for all individuals included both age and career history.
The differences in entitlements are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Potential Duration Rules of UI (all values in months except age)
Before Jan 2007 After Jan 2007
Age at Potential Extra Potential Social Security Potential Extra Potential










≥45 30 2 ≤72 24 -
>72 30 2
† for each 5 years of working experience in the 20 years preceding the date of unemployment
‡ Social Security contributions since last spell of unemployment include both the recipiency of
wages as well as other benefits such as parental leave and disability insurance.
1The new law was published in November of 2006, but the changes in potential duration of unem-
ployment benefits have only taken place after January of 2007. Further changes took place in the end
of 2006 and are briefly described at the end of this section.
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Before the reform, the potential duration of unemployment benefits for individuals
younger than 45 years old was solely determined by their age. Individuals younger
than 30 years old were entitled to 12 months, individuals between 30 and 40 years old
were entitled to 18 months, and individuals between 40 and 45 years old were entitled
to 24 months of unemployment benefits. Individuals with 45 years old or more were
entitled to 30 months but could extend this potential duration for additional 2, 4, 6, or
8 months, in case they have worked for at least 5, 10, 15 or 20 years, respectively.
After the reform, for individuals of all ages, the longer careers were awarded with
an increased potential duration, while the shorter careers were entitled to a shorter
potential duration of unemployment benefit. Some individuals, however, were entitled
to the same potential duration as defined by the previous rules. An individual younger
than 30 years old was entitled to: 9 months if she had 24 months or less of contribu-
tions to the Social Security; 12 months if she had between 24 months and 5 years of
contributions; 13, 14, 15, or 16 months if she had, respectively, at least 5, 10, 15, or
20 years of contributions. An individual aged between 30 and 40 years old was entitled
to: 12 months if she had 48 months or less of contributions to the Social Security; 18
months if she had between 48 months and 5 years of contributions; 19, 20, 21, or 22
months if she had, respectively, at least 5, 10, 15, or 20 years of contributions. An
individual aged between 40 and 45 years old was entitled to: 18 months if she had 60
months or less of contributions to the Social Security; 24 months if she had between 60
months and 5 years of contributions; 25, 26, 27, or 28 months if she had, respectively,
at least 5, 10, 15, or 20 years of contributions. Finally, the individuals with 45 years
old or more were entitled to the same potential duration as before with the exception of
those with 72 months or less of contributions to the Social Security - these individuals
were entitled to 24 months rather than to 30 months as in the previous rules.
In addition to the change in potential duration of unemployment benefits, two ad-
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ditional measures were implemented in the unemployment benefits system. First, the
required working period to guarantee eligibility to the unemployment benefit has de-
creased from 18 to 15 months.2 Second, early retirement became more easily accessible
to some of the unemployed.3 These changes could potentially affect the results but the
number of individuals affected by them is negligible.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Portuguese Social Security Data
The database I use is a 1% representative sample from the panel of unemployment
beneficiaries inflows registered in the Portuguese Social Security between January 2005
and March 2012.4 The observations are recorded on a daily basis for 39 972 unemploy-
ment beneficiaries. It includes basic demographic information, career history, and all
the necessary details about the unemployment benefits.
At the individual level, there is information on gender, date of birth, and district
of residence. In terms of career history, the database goes back to the first registered
job of the oldest individual (1941). Even though monthly earnings (split into base
wage, regular, and non-regular benefits) are only available between 2005 and 2012, the
database includes information on whether the individual is a dependent employee or
self-employed, some details about the firm where the individual is employed (region and
industry) and the starting/ending date of each job, for all paid jobs the individual ever
2The required working period is counted during the 24 months preceding the date of unemployment.
3The legal age for early retirement has increased from 60 to 62 years old for all the individuals
aged at least 57 at the date of unemployment and with at least 15 years of contributions. For all the
individuals aged at least 55 at the date of unemployment and with at least 22 (instead of 30) years
of contributions, the legal age has decreased from 58 to 57 years old. Note that the individuals under
the first conditions may opt for the second scheme as long as they have 22 (and not only 15) years of
contributions.




The unemployment information comprises the start and ending dates of the unem-
ployment spells (or potential ending date, in case of uncompleted spells), the amount
and type of benefit, and the participation on any type of training or occupational pro-
gram. Finally, there is also information on other types of exit besides re-employment,
such as illness, disability, maternity, income support and old-age pension.
2.3.2 Sample Construction
The original sample contains 39 972 unemployment beneficiaries. In this chapter, I
focus the analysis on the individuals that were covered by the unemployment insurance
(UI) system described in Section 2.2. Therefore, I exclude the beneficiaries of unemploy-
ment initial assistance that have, by definition, less attachment to the labour market (8
862 individuals). I further exclude from the analysis all the individuals whose potential
duration was extended due to training, parenthood, disease, or disability benefits as
these events might raise endogeneity issues. Such decision resulted in the exclusion of
19% of the 29 760 individuals selected in the first step. For the same reason, I also
exclude the individuals that have entered into early retirement because of the change in
the rule that also occurred since January 2007. Finally, I also exclude all the individuals
for which there is lack of information on any of the explanatory variables used in the
regressions. Such options lead to a sample comprised by 18 543 individuals. Descriptive
statistics are briefly described in the next subsection.
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2, presents the descriptive statistics for the constructed sample, which in-
cludes both individuals that were re-employed and individuals with censored unemploy-
ment duration, because they did not find a job before the last observed date in the data.
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The average benefit duration of unemployment insurance benefit is around 12 months.
However, the average individual remains jobless for approximately 18 months. In the
empirical analysis, I opt to use the jobless duration rather than the benefit duration as
the time for which the individual receives no benefit may also contribute to the loss of
skills, and therefore may also impact the re-employment wage.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics - Full Sample
Mean Std.D. Min Median Max
Benefit Duration (UI) (in months) 12.34 10.63 1 9.5 38
Jobless Duration (in months) 17.56 17.21 1 11 83
Level of benefits (e/month) 508.31 210.85 43.50 419.10 1257.60
Previous wage (e/month) 784.42 570.78 43.50 612.92 14208.65
Tenure (in years) 5.43 6.40 0.08 2.83 47.92
Reason of unemployment
end of fixed-term contract 0.40
redundancy 0.25
mutual agreement 0.17
plant closure or mass lay-off 0.11
others 0.07








2012 (until March) 0.05
Age at unemployment (in years) 38.42 11.51 17 37 69
Male 0.49






Azores and Madeira 0.04
Re-employed (any job) 9 027 (8 423 as dependent employees)
Social Benefit, disabled, dead 446




The average monthly benefit is approximately 65% of the average previous monthly
gross wage, which corresponds to the rule applied to most beneficiaries. However,
the replacement ratio in the data actually ranges between 10% and 100%. A low
replacement ratio is associated with high previous earnings, as the maximum level of
benefits defined during the period of the analysis was 1257.60e. A high replacement
ratio is associated with low previous earnings, as during the period of the analysis, the
minimum benefit was set to be the individual’s net wage if 65% of the monthly gross
wage was lower than 419.22e.5
On average, each individual has worked for 5 years and 6 months in the job she had
previous to the unemployment spell. However, the sample also includes workers with
little experience (less than a year), as well as workers with almost 50 years of tenure.
Almost half of the sample lost their job because the fixed-term contract they had
was not (or could not be) renewed. After that, redundancy (i.e., the employer claimed
the job no longer existed or the individual was not suited for the job anymore) and
mutual agreement are the most representative ones with 25% and 17%, respectively.
Only 11% of the individuals lost their job due to plant closure or mass lay-off.
The distribution of individuals by year of start of the unemployment spell is roughly
uniform between 2007 and 2010. The peak in 2011 illustrates the catastrophic job
destruction, as described by Carneiro et al. (2014). The smaller number of individuals
in 2005 is mostly related with the lack of complete information on all variables of
interest. As the database ends in March of 2012, the number of individuals starting the
spell in that year is also smaller.
The average age at the start of the unemployment spell is around 40 years old.
However, the distribution is wide enough to guarantee that it is possible to evaluate
5Note that the previous wage is defined here the reference value used by the Social Security to
calculate the benefit value. This value can vary between 12 and 14 monthly wages summed over the
first 12 of the 14 months preceding the date of unemployment.
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the discontinuities in the potential duration around the thresholds of 30, 40, and 45
years old. In terms of gender, the sample is evenly distributed. Lastly, the distribution
of unemployed individuals in the sample is proportional to the regional distribution of
the active population in Portugal.
To get an idea of the characteristics that might contribute to a faster exit to re-
employment, Table 2.3 presents some descriptive statistics for the individuals that found
a job until March 2012.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics - Re-employed Sample
Mean Std.D. Min Median Max
Benefit Duration (UI) (in months) 7.94 7.34 1 5.77 38
Jobless Duration (in months) 11.83 11.77 2 7 75
Level of benefits (e/month) 483.48 193.43 65.10 413.7 1257.60
Previous wage (e/month) 746.01 512.67 116.99 607.18 10463.61
re-employment wage (e/ month) 575.23 359.75 10.57 495.23 5602.57
Age at re-employment (in years) 34.36 9.49 17 33 66
Male 0.49 0.50 0 0 1
Sample 8 423
In comparison with the whole sample, the re-employed individuals have substantially
smaller duration of both unemployment protection and joblessness. They also receive,
on average, a lower level of unemployment benefits, which might be correlated with the
fact that they are younger, on average. Finally, the difference between the distribution
of re-employment wages and the distribution of previous wages provides suggestive




The impact of the unemployment duration on the re-employment wage is given by
the parameter α1, in the following wage equation (in log form):
Ln(PostWi) = α0 + α1Ln(UDi) + x
′
iβ + ui (2.1)
where PostWi is the re-employment wage of individual i, and UDi is the duration of the
unemployment spell until re-employment. The vector of control variables, xi, includes
pre-unemployment wage, gender, age, tenure, reasons of unemployment, previous in-
dustry, region, and the starting quarter of the unemployment spell. The error term, ui,
is assumed to be normally distributed.
When estimating the equation 2.1, one should have into account two potential issues:
simultaneity bias and selection bias.
The first is related to the possibility that unemployment duration is rather determ-
ined by (instead of being a determinant of) the wage. According to job search theory
(Mortensen, 1977), individuals should reject all the wage offers until the accepted wage
equals the reservation wage.6 Therefore, low reservation wages (and their associated
accepted wages) might imply shorter unemployment duration spells.
The second issue is related to the possibility that there is selection in the sample
of individuals for which the accepted wage is observed. The selection may either be
positive if high-skilled individuals (earning higher earnings) are employed faster, and
therefore are more likely to be observed. The selection may also be negative in case
the accepted wage is so low that the individual has many offers to choose from, and
therefore, higher likelihood to be re-employed at a faster pace, and be observed.
6Addison et al. (2013) have shown that reservation wages are not stationary along the course of
the unemployment or jobless spell but also that the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to
elapsed unemployment duration is small.
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The next two subsections present different alternative specifications to estimate the
main outcome equation, which account for these two potential issues.
2.4.1 Accounting for Simultaneity Bias
To get around the potential simultaneity bias, I use a control function approach,
which is inherently an instrumental variables estimation (Wooldridge, 2015). In both
methods the estimation is done in two stages, with the first stage providing exogenous
estimates for the endogenous variable (Ln(UDi)) in the second stage.
The fundamental difference is the way the estimates from the first stage enter in
the second stage (also called as main outcome equation). In the standard instrumental
variables approach the fitted values of the first stage substitute for the endogenous
variable in the second stage. In the control function approach, the generalized residuals
obtained in the first stage (ν̂i) are plugged in the second stage, without removing the
endogenous variable from there, as it is displayed below:
Ln(PostWi) = α0 + α1Ln(UDi) + α2ν̂i + x
′
iβ + ui (2.2)
In terms of bias correction the two methods are equivalent, as the exogenously predicted
outcome for the endogenous variable equals the difference between the estimated re-
sidual and the endogenous variable itself. In this set-up, α1 measures the exogenous
impact of unemployment duration on re-employment wages and α2 indicates both the
direction and significance of endogeneity, like an Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). The
remaining variables and coefficients of equation 2.2 are defined as in 2.1.7
The main advantage of the control function approach is that the first stage can
7Even after this correction, there is another concern related with the validity of the usual standard
errors. Since the two stages are estimated in separate steps, I follow Wooldridge (2015) and bootstrap
the sample in 1000 repetitions for all the estimations.
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be estimated with an accelerated failure time model, which accounts for the censoring
in some of the unemployment spells present in the data.8 By doing so, I am using
information on both complete and incomplete unemployment spells, thus improving
the estimation of the unemployment duration.9 As I assume normality of the error
term in the main outcome equation (following the standard in the literature), I have
chosen a parametric estimation in the first stage, namely a lognormal distribution to
estimate an accelerate failure time hazard model (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2011), where
the covariates are multiplicative on time, as expressed in the following equation:
Ln(ti exp(−z′iδ)) = νi (2.3)
where ti is the elapsed unemployment duration, z
′
i is a vector of covariates for individual
i that include the instrumental variable, and νi = σui is a normally distributed general-
ised error term (ui is an error term and σ is a scale factor). Note that, even though this
step is estimated in a non-linear fashion, the generalized residuals are still obtained in
a linear way and can therefore be directly plugged in the second stage equation (2.2).
2.4.2 Accounting for Selection Bias
Even after addressing the simultaneity bias, one might be concerned with selection
bias, which may arise in two ways – selection into the treatment and/or selection into re-
employment. Selection into the treatment occurs if there are unobserved characteristics
that lead individuals with longer duration spells to have larger impact (α1) on re-
employment wages. Selection into the re-employment occurs if the individuals that
got a job, and for which the re-employment wage is observed, do not have the same
8A spell is censored on the last date the individual is observed in the database if the individual
remains jobless by then.
9Incomplete spells are defined to be such that the end-date of the spell is not observed in the data.
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(unobserved) characteristics of the individuals who remain unemployed.
To overcome the first type of selection, I follow Wooldridge (2015) and include an
interaction term between the residuals of the first stage and the treatment variable
(unemployment duration) in the second stage. Therefore, the main outcome equation
to be estimated is:
Ln(PostWi) = α0 + α1Ln(UDi) + α2ν̂i + α3ν̂i × Ln(UDi) + x′iβ + ui (2.4)
If selection into treatment exists, then α3 must be significant. In case the coefficient
has the same sign as the estimated α1, then individuals with longer duration have a
larger impact of the unemployment duration on the re-employment wage.
To overcome the selection into employment I present two alternatives based on
the same tool. As the sample is truncated at March of 2012 but the start of the
unemployment spell might be anywhere between January 2005 and the sample end
date, one should have in mind that the probability of observing a complete spell is not
the same for all individuals.
First, I employ the traditional two-step approach proposed by Heckman (1976).
The instrument I use to estimate the selection equation into employment (Ei) is the
(log) duration of the time window (Ln(Ti)) in which the individual can be observed.
Conditional on the covariates defined before, xi, this variable should only affect the
re-employment wage via the (expected positive) impact on the probability of observing
the individual to get a job, given by γ1 in equation 2.5
Pr(E = 1|xi) = Φ(γ0 + γ1Ln(Ti) + x′iβ) = Φ(z′iγ) (2.5)
In this set-up, the expected value of the (log) re-employment wage, conditional on the
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individual getting a job and on the values of xi, is:
E(Ln(PostWi)|Ei = 1, xi) = α0 + α1Ln(UDi) + α2ν̂i + x′iβ + E(ui|Ei = 1)
= α0 + α1Ln(UDi) + α2ν̂i + x
′
iβ + αλλ(−z′iγ)






where λ is the inverse mills ratio evaluated at z′iγ, i.e., and αλ, to be estimated, is ρuεσu,
i.e., the product between the correlation between the error of the outcome equation,
ui, and the error of the selection equation, εi, and the standard deviation of the error
of the outcome equation (σu). Therefore, the sign of the αλ indicates the sign of the
correlation between the unobservables in the selection equation and the unobservables
in the outcome equation.
Alternatively, I adopt the augmented inverse probability of censoring weighed es-
timation suggested by Rotnitzky et al. (1998). The idea is basically the same that is
employed in the construction of sample surveys, i.e., to weight each contribution by
the inverse probability of being observed. In this case I weight each observation by
the probability of re-employment, i.e., by the probability that the complete duration
of the unemployment spell is shorter than the total window for which I observe the
individual, either unemployed or employed. As I do not observe the complete duration
of the unemployment spell for some individuals (because their unemployment spells are
censored), I use instead predicted unemployment duration (ÛD) from the first stage













where σ̂ is the standard deviation parameter of each lognormal estimation in the first
stage. Finally, I apply the inverse of this probability as weights in the re-employment
wage equation, which is estimated by weighted least squares.
2.5 Identification
Here, I present three alternative instruments that are used to obtain an exogenous
estimate of the unemployment duration in equation 2.3.
2.5.1 First Instrumental Variable:
Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits
There is a vast literature reporting a strong (positive) relation between the poten-
tial duration of unemployment benefit and the joblessness duration.10 Methodologies
vary between the use of cross sectional variation – exploring age, work experience and
regional differences – and the use of time series variation – exploring policy changes
that affected the potential duration of unemployment benefits.11 The sample used in
this study includes both sources of variation. The former is obtained trough definition
of potential duration of unemployment benefits, which is defined as a function of age
and labour market experience. The latter is obtained through the 2007 policy change,
which affected the relationship between the potential duration and its determinants.
To provide a better understanding of the actual change in the distribution of the
potential duration of unemployment benefits, Figure 2.1 presents the distributions be-
fore and after the law change for the different age groups, according to the entitlement
regulation.
10See Chapter 1 of for an extensive literature review. Recent evidence is provided by (Schmieder
et al., 2012; Farber and Valletta, 2015; Le Barbanchon, 2016)
11See section 2.2 for a detailed description on the policy change.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of individuals by age group and potential duration of unemploy-
ment benefit, before and after the 2007 reform
In the top left panel, all the unemployed beneficiaries below 30 years old were entitled
to 12 months of potential duration of unemployment benefit before 2007, and after the
change in the rules, the distribution has spread between 9 and 16 months. Given the
age of this group, it is not surprising that the individuals entitled to 9 months, because
of few social security contributions, represents the largest share (35,4%). However,
within this group, there is also a considerable proportion (47.2%) that was awarded
with longer potential duration of unemployment benefits due to their previous work
experience.
In the top right and the bottom left panels two patterns stand out. The percentage
of beneficiaries entitled to the same or less potential duration as before 2007 decreases,
relative to the first panel, and the percentage of individuals entitled to longer extensions
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increases with age. This reflects that labour market experience among individuals aged
between 40 and 45 is larger than for those between 30 and 40. In both groups, around
70% of the beneficiaries were entitled to a longer potential duration in comparison to
what they would have been offered if unemployed before January 2007.
Contrary to the previous age groups the last panel presents no major changes in
what concerns the potential duration attributed before and after the law change. Before
January 2007 this group was already entitled to 2 potential months of extension for each
5 years of work. However, the law change introduced a penalty to this age group. As a
result, 14% of the individuals were only entitled to 24 instead of 30 months of potential
duration of unemployment benefit, because the number of Social Security contributions
between the previous and current spell of unemployment was less than 6 years.
2.5.2 Second Instrumental Variable:
Age Discontinuity in Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefit
As the figure in the previous subsection suggests, the age discontinuities are also
an important source of exogenous cross-sectional variation in the potential duration of
unemployment insurance. As argued in Addison and Portugal (2008a), one additional
year of age, keeping everything else constant, does not make two individuals sufficiently
different in terms of observed characteristics evaluated by the employer. Therefore, for
two individuals with a one year age difference, but similar in all other dimensions, if
the one that is entitled to a longer potential duration of unemployment benefits has a
longer spell of unemployment, then the two spells must be related.
To illustrate these discontinuities in the potential duration of unemployment benefits
for the individuals in the sample, I plot the average potential duration by age.12
12Note that, within the same age group, individuals might still be entitled to different potential
duration of unemployment benefits as this also varies with work experience – see Table 2.1
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The discontinuities in the average potential duration between individuals of dif-
ferent consecutive age groups are substantial (between 5 and 8 months). To validate
this instrument, I also test for the continuity of density on the number of individuals
around each threshold, and whether sorting might be associated with pre-unemployment
wages. Both figures,2.4 and 2.5 in the Appendix of this chapter, demonstrate no ma-
jor concerns in both tests – in terms of continuity of the number of individuals and
pre-unemployment wages around the age thresholds.
When using this instrument, I use only individuals whose age is around the threshold.
The idea is to define a binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the individual is 30,
40 or 45 years old, and 0 if the individual is one year younger (29, 39 or 44 years old,
respectively) at the date of unemployment. For the individuals, unemployed before
January 2007, that are 29, 39 or 44 years old, one additional year of age increases the
potential duration by six months. However, for the individuals unemployed after Janu-
ary 2007, one additional year of age may actually lead to no change in the potential
duration of the unemployment benefit. This happens for three groups of individuals:
i) 29 years old unemployed with work experience between 24 and 48 months; ii) 39
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years old unemployed with work experience between 48 and 60 months; iii) 44 years old
unemployed with work experience between 60 and 72 months. In all other cases, the
individual could be entitled to at most 10 additional months of unemployment benefits,
if the unemployment spell started after January 2007.
2.5.3 Third Instrumental Variable:
Change in Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefit
Here, I use the change in the potential duration of unemployment benefit generated
by the law of 2007. This policy did not change the age thresholds but rather the size
of their discontinuities for different individuals, according to their work experience.
For each individual, I define change as the difference, in months, between the current
potential duration of unemployment benefit and the one she would be entitled to,
according to the rules in place before January 2007. Therefore, change is equal to 0 for
all the individuals that entered the system before that month. For all the unemployed
that entered the system after the reform, change may either assume positive, negative
or a null value, according to their previous work experience. Table 2.4 shows that









Notes: Changes are displayed in months for all individuals in the sample that became unemployed
after January 2007. The third column displays the percentage of individuals affected by each
change.
approximately 36% of the individuals, who became unemployed after January 2007,
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were not affected by the new rules. Additionally, about 23% were entitled to a shorter
potential duration, as they have not reached the minimum period of contributions
necessary, to be entitled to at least the same potential duration as before. Finally,
roughly 41% has actually benefited from the institutional change applied due to their
longer job histories.
The main goal of this alternative instrument is to set a clear cut between age and
potential duration effects.13 For the sake of example, take an individual that is eligible
to 13 months. Using the definition in the first instrumental variable, the value of
the instrument (13) automatically indicates the individual is 30 years old. Using the
change definition, the instrument will assume the value “+1”, which is the same value
in case the individual would be entitled 19 or 25 months of potential duration, as well,
therefore leaving uncertain to which age category the individual belongs. Therefore,
the correlation between change and age should be much smaller than that of the first
instrument (potential duration of unemployment benefits).
This is a convenient instrument because the individuals that benefited from the new
rules have actually had longer spells of unemployment in comparison with those not
affected by the reform.
Table 2.5: Average duration of unemployment benefits, by age group and difference
between 2007 and 1999 potential duration of unemployment benefit rules
Age group Negative change No change in rules Positive change
<30 9.64 13.71 13.87
[30,40[ 10.79 15.17 16.73
[40,45[ 13.22 16.53 18.13
Notes: Average duration is displayed in months and age displayed in years.
Table 2.5 shows that, for all age groups, the actual duration of unemployment
13The correlation between potential duration of unemployment benefits and age is 0.90 whereas
that for this instrumental variable is -0.03. The correlation off both instrumental variables with work
experience is 0.52 and 0.18, respectively.
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benefits has followed the direction of the change in the rules. Individuals that have
benefited from 1 to 4 additional months of unemployment have had an actual average
duration that was 0.16 to 1.6 months longer, when compared to their age counterparts
that were not entitled to any change. On the other hand, individuals with a penalty of -3
to -6 in potential duration of unemployment benefits have had an actual unemployment
duration that was 3.31 to 4.38 months shorter, when compared to their age group
counterparts.
2.6 Results
In the next subsection I present the OLS estimates for the re-employment wage
equation and provide a brief discussion of the results. For robustness, I also estimate
the equation on wage loss/gain, by restricting the coefficient on the previous wage
equal to 1. By doing so, instead of having the log wage as the outcome variable in
the main equation, I have the difference between the post- and the pre-log wages. In
the remaining subsections, where I always use the re-employment wage as the outcome
variable, I show the results of the control function approach, for each of the three
instruments described in Section 2.5. First stages of the control function approach
are provided in Table 2.15 in the Appendix of this chapter. Subsection 2.6.3 presents
the estimates that also control for the different types of selectivity (as described in
subsection 2.4.2). Estimates for the probit estimates are presented in Table 2.16 in the
Appendix of this chapter.
2.6.1 OLS results




Table 2.6: Re-employment wage equations
Full Sample Restricted Sample
Outcome: Ln(PostW) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Duration) -0.059∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗∗
Ln(Previous Wage) 0.567∗∗∗ [1] 0.599∗∗∗ [1]
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.036)∗∗∗
Constant 2.915∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 2.519∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.105)∗∗∗ (0.073)∗∗∗ (0.358)∗∗∗ (0.293)∗∗∗
R2 0.278∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
N 8 423 1017
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. The equations also
include a dummy for gender, age dummies, a quadratic function of tenure, dummies for the
reason of unemployment, seven year dummies and three quarter dummies, according to the
date of re-employment, industry dummies, and region dummies. The second equation restricts
the coefficient on the log of previous wage to be equal to unity, which is equivalent to estimate
the effect of log duration on the difference of log wages.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level ∗∗ Significant at 5% level ∗ Significant at 10% level
The first two columns include all individuals for which the post-unemployment wages
is observed, whereas the last two columns are restricted to 29, 30, 39, 40, 44, or 45
years old individuals, for later comparison with the second instrument estimation. The
coefficient estimate of column (1) shows that an increase of 10% in the joblessness
duration leads to a decrease of around 0.6% in the post-unemployment wage. The
negative effect is in line with the theories of skill depreciation and stigma, described
in Section 2.1. The result does not change significantly when the pre-unemployment
wage is restricted to 1 (columns 2 and 4), but is slightly larger, in absolute value, in
the restricted sample.
2.6.2 Control Function Approach Results
Table 2.7 presents the control function approach results for the two variables of
main interest in the outcome equation, i.e., the logarithm of joblessness duration
92
Chapter 2
(Ln(Duration)) and the residual of the first stage (ν̂i). Each column is associated
with a different instrumental variable, defined in Section 2.5.14
Table 2.7: Re-employment wage equations using three different instrumental variables







Outcome: Ln(PostW) (1) (2) (3)





R2 0.267 0.311 0.267
N 8 423 1 017 8 423
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets below the coefficient estimates. The equations
also include the log of previous wage, a dummy for gender, age dummies, a quadratic function of tenure,
dummies for the reason of unemployment, seven year dummies and three quarter dummies, according
to the date of re-employment, industry dummies, and region dummies.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level ∗∗ Significant at 5% level ∗ Significant at 10% level
The results in columns (1) and (3) show that, if the unemployment duration increases
by 10%, the re-employment wage is expected to decrease by 0.5%.15 The larger estimate
presented in column (2) should not be subject to direct comparisons with the other
two columns, as the sample is substantially restricted. In fact, applying the first and
third instruments in the restricted sample yields coefficients of -0.92% and -0.82%,
respectively. The relative difference between the control function estimates and the
OLS estimates is reflected in the sign of the coefficient associated to the generalized
residual. When the coefficient of ν̂i positive, the coefficient of main interest becomes
closer to zero, thus attenuating the effect found before. When the coefficient of ν̂i is
negative, the negative effect of Ln(Duration) on wages is even larger. The significance
in the first and third instruments suggest there is evidence of endogeneity in that sample.
14The results for the first stage estimates using each of the three alternative instruments are presented
in Appendix, in Table 2.15.
15Using the mean of joblessness duration in the sample, this means that each additional month
implies an average decrease of 0.4% in re-employment wage
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2.6.3 Control Function Results - accounting for self-selection
As discussed in Subsection 2.4.2, two types of self-selection might be present: into
treatment, and in the observability of the outcome. To test for self-selection into treat-
ment, each outcome equation includes the interaction between the logarithm of jobless-
ness duration and the residual of the first stage. The first stage associated with each
instrument is left unchanged relative to the previous Subsection. Table 2.8 presents the
results associated with each instrument, accounting for this type of selection.
Table 2.8: Re-employment wage equations accounting for both endogeneity and self-
selection into treatment







Outcome: Ln(PostW) (1) (2) (3)
Ln(Duration) -0.048∗∗∗ -0.071 -0.052∗∗∗
[0.013] [0.053] [0.013]
ν̂i 0.056 -0.390 0.075
[0.063] [0.310] [0.090]
ν̂i× Ln(Duration) -0.035∗∗ 0.107∗ -0.037∗
[0.017] [0.064] [0.022]
R2 0.268 0.310 0.267
N 8 423 1 017 8 423
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets below the coefficient estimates. The equations
also include the log of previous wage, a dummy for gender, age dummies, a quadratic function of tenure,
dummies for the reason of unemployment, seven year dummies and three quarter dummies, according
to the date of re-employment, industry dummies, and region dummies.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level ∗∗ Significant at 5% level ∗ Significant at 10% level
The sign of the coefficient on the interaction term indicates the direction of the
impact of selection on the effect of unemployment duration on re-employment wages.
The estimates indicate evidence of negative selection into treatment in columns (1)
and (3), which suggests that individuals with unobserved characteristics that lead to
longer unemployment duration have a larger losses in the re-employment wage. In
accordance, the coefficient associated to Ln(Duration) goes down, relative to Table 2.7.
On the other hand, in column (2), where the interaction coefficient is positive, the
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coefficient associated to Ln(Duration) increases, thus attenuating the effect, relative to
Table 2.7.
To test for self-selection into re-employment, I estimate two alternative models, as
explained in Subsection 2.4.2. The first model is the conventional Heckit selection
model (referenced as Heckit in the following tables), where the time window for which
each individual can be observed is used as exclusion restriction. This instrument relies
on the fact that the database ends exogenously at March 2012. Therefore, individuals
that are firstly observed on a date that is close to the end of the database should be, on
average, less likely to be observed in re-employment. The selection equation estimates
are presented in the Appendix of this chapter, in Table 2.16, and the estimates for the
main outcome equation are presented in Table 2.9.
The second model corresponds to the inverse probability (of censoring) weighted
equation (referenced as IPW in the following tables). The weights are the inverse of
the probability of censoring, which is computed from the first stage estimates that are
kept unchanged. The estimates for the main outcome equation are also presented in
Table 2.9.
Table 2.9: Re-employment wage equations accounting for endogeneity and self-selection into employ-
ment (Heckit two-step approach and augmented inverse probability of censoring weighted estimation)
Instrument: Potential Duration Age Discontinuities ∆ Potential Duration
Outcome: Ln(PostW) Heckit IPW Heckit IPW Heckit IPW
Ln(Duration) -0.045∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
[0.011] [0.015] [0.045] [0.055] [0.013] [0.016]
ν̂i -0.077
∗∗∗ -0.046 0.069 0.034 -0.071∗∗∗ -0.044
[0.028] [0.034] [0.099] [0.120] [0.028] [0.037]
λ̂ -0.060 -0.166 -0.050
[0.041] [0.130] [0.043]
N 8 423 1 017 8 423
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets below the coefficient estimates. The equations also include
the log of previous wage, a dummy for gender, age dummies, a quadratic function of tenure, dummies for the reason
of unemployment, seven year dummies and three quarter dummies, according to the date of re-employment, industry
dummies, and region dummies.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level ∗∗ Significant at 5% level ∗ Significant at 10% level
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Accounting for selection, on top of endogeneity, does not change substantially the
estimates on the coefficient of Ln(Duration), relative to Table 2.7. In line with that, the
coefficient on the inverse mill ratio (λ) is non significant in all three Heckit equations.
In parallel, the IPW estimates on the first stage residual became non-significant.
Finally, in Table 2.10, the estimates account for both self-selection into unemploy-
ment duration and into re-employment. The sign and significance of the coefficient
estimates of ν̂i and its interaction with the logarithm of unemployment duration are
the same as in Table 2.8, with the exception of the non-significance of the later in
the second instrument, i.e., even accounting for self-selection into re-employment, the
results associated with the first and third instrument suggest that individuals with un-
observed characteristics that lead to longer unemployment duration have a larger losses
in the re-employment wage.
Table 2.10: Re-employment wage equations accounting for endogeneity,sef-selection into
treatment, and self-selection into the observability of the outcome (Heckit two-step approach
and augmented inverse probability of censoring weighted estimation)
Instrument Potential Duration Age Discontinuities ∆ Potential Duration
Outcome: Ln(PostW) Heckit IPW Heckit IPW Heckit IPW
Ln(Duration) -0.045∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.057 -0.023 -0.050∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗
[0.013] [0.015] [0.064] [0.051] [0.012] [0.016]
ν̂i 0.041 0.008 -0.502 -0.473 0.066 0.041
[0.062] [0.087] [0.425] [0.337] [0.071] [0.093]
ν̂i× Ln(Duration) -0.032∗ -0.015 0.129 0.109 -0.035∗∗ -0.021
[0.017] [0.022] [0.129] [0.077] [0.017] [0.023]
λ̂ -0.051 -0.100 -0.044
[0.043] [0.174] [0.048]
N 8 423 1 017 8 423
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets below the coefficient estimates. The equations
also include the log of previous wage, a dummy for gender, age dummies, a quadratic function of tenure,
dummies for the reason of unemployment, seven year dummies and three quarter dummies, according to
the date of re-employment, industry dummies, and region dummies.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level ∗∗ Significant at 5% level ∗ Significant at 10% level
Like in Table 2.9, the alternative estimation methods (Heckit and IPW) do not
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significantly change the estimates on the impact of unemployment duration on re-
employment wages for the first and third instruments. However, with the age discon-
tinuity instrument, controlling for both types of selection yields a coefficient estimate
that is remarkably closer to the one obtained in the other two instruments.
2.7 Robustness Analysis
For purposes of robustness, I assess the sensitivity of the results along four dimen-
sions: period of the analysis, pre-unemployment wage quartiles, transition to a different
industry, and the definition of re-employment wages. Firstly, I check whether the effect
of joblessness duration on re-employment wage varies across time in two ways: 1) by
excluding the economic crisis and 2), by narrowing it to the period around of the policy
change in potential duration of unemployment benefits. Secondly, I test for the robust-
ness of the results with respect to different pre-unemployment wage quartiles. Thirdly,
I test for heterogeneous effects in individuals that have been re-employed in a different
industry. Finally, I analyse the impact of joblessness duration in the re-employment
wage earned one, three, and five years after the date of re-employment.
For the sake of brevity, all the estimates presented in this section use the third in-
strumental variable, i.e., the change in the potential duration of unemployment benefits
generated by the policy change in 2007. This is my preferred estimate, both for the
methodological reasons presented in Subsection 2.5.3, and for the stability of the results
presented in the previous section.
2.7.1 Period of the Analysis
A major concern regarding the main estimates could be the fact that the period
in analysis includes the most recent economic crisis in Portugal, which generated cata-
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strophic job destruction (Carneiro et al., 2014). 16
To test whether the wage losses are explained by the increase in dismissals after
2009, I perform the same analysis for the individuals dismissed during the period 2005-
2008, thus excluding the most critical period of the economic crisis. Additionally, to
ensure that the effect of joblessness duration on re-employment wage is being identified
by the reform, I also conduct the same exercise for the individuals in 2006-2007. The
results for both tests are shown in Table 2.11.









N 6 478 3 992
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets below the coefficient estimates.
The equations also include the log of previous wage, a dummy for gender, age dummies,
a quadratic function of tenure, dummies for the reason of unemployment, seven year
dummies and three quarter dummies, according to the date of re-employment, industry
dummies, and region dummies.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level ∗∗ Significant at 5% level ∗ Significant at 10% level
The estimates presented in the first column of Table 2.11 do not significantly differ
from those reported in Table 2.7. Hence, I conclude the inclusion of the years 2009-2012
(March) are not driving the results. When I concentrate the period of the analysis to
the years before and after the implementation of the reform, the effect of unemployment
duration on wages is even larger than the one presented in Table 2.7. This suggests that,
if something, the main results may be interpreted as a lower bound, which reassures
the validity of the third instrumental variable.
16According to Couch and Placzek (2010) and Couch et al. (2011), earnings losses of displaced
workers are larger during recessionary times.
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2.7.2 Distribution of Pre-unemployment Wages
In this subsection I investigate if there is a particular portion of the pre-unemployment
wage distribution for which the effect of unemployment duration on re-employment
wages is larger. To do so, I interact the duration effect with each quartile of the
pre-unemployment wage distribution. Table 2.12 shows that the impact of jobless-
ness duration on the re-employment wage gets wider along the pre-unemployment wage
distribution, that is, unemployed individuals with larger pre-unemployment wages get
larger wages losses in re-employment.





Ln(Duration) ×1 (506e< Previous Wage ≤ 613 e) -0.006
[0.015]
Ln(Duration) ×1 (613e< Previous Wage ≤ 841 e) -0.051∗∗∗
[0.014]





1 (506 e< Previous Wage ≤ 613 e) 0.081∗∗∗
[0.031]
1 (613 e< Previous Wage ≤ 841 e) 0.268∗∗∗
[0.028]




Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets below the coefficient estimates. The equation
also includes the log of previous wage, a dummy for gender, age dummies, a quadratic function of
tenure, dummies for the reason of unemployment, seven year dummies and three quarter dummies,
according to the date of re-employment, industry dummies, and region dummies.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level ∗∗ Significant at 5% level ∗ Significant at 10% level
This result may be explained by two characteristics of the labour market in Portugal.
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The existence of a national minimum wage explains the non-negative sign observed for
the first quartile. The fact that this interaction is not significant is consistent with
Centeno and Novo (2014), which found that low-wage workers tend to react less to be-
nefit extensions. On the other hand, the evidence for nominal wage rigidity in Portugal
(Blanchard, 2007; Portugal, 2006; Raposo et al., 2019) supports the fact that workers
with higher pre-unemployment wages face larger wage losses after being unemployed.
As workers are fired with wages above their productivity, the wage loss after displace-
ment is higher than expected.17 A similar result was found by Burda and Mertens
(2001) for Germany.
2.7.3 Job Change Between Industries
As argued in the theoretical literature, part of the decrease in wages after unem-
ployment might be related to the loss of human capital, and in particular, to the loss of
industry specific human capital (Neal, 1995). In the re-employed sample used in here,
63% of the individuals are observed to move to a different industry. To test whether
this is driving the main results, I test whether the effect of Ln(duration) changes for
those whose re-employment job is in a different industry, by interacting this variable
with a dummy which is equal to one if the individual transited to another industry.
The results are presented in Table 2.13.
The estimates suggest lower re-employment wages for individuals that move to an-
other industry after the unemployment episode but no statistically different losses due
to longer spells of unemployment. Given that the change in industry may be endo-
genous, I follow the suggestion of Addison and Portugal (1989) and test whether this
difference varied by tenure in the previous firm (as a proxy for tenure in the previous
industry) and no statistically difference is found.
17See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for a theoretical explanation.
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Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets below the coefficient es-
timates. The equation also includes the log of previous wage, a dummy for gender,
age dummies, a quadratic function of tenure, dummies for the reason of unemploy-
ment, seven year dummies and three quarter dummies, according to the date of
re-employment, industry dummies, and region dummies.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level ∗∗ Significant at 5% level ∗ Significant at 10% level
2.7.4 Wage Loss Persistence
Finally, I also estimate the same specification for wages along the first 5 years in
re-employment. By doing so, I want to test the persistence of the negative impact of
joblessness duration on re-employment wages.
Figure 2.3 shows that the negative effect of unemployment duration on wages is
persistent until, at least, the fourth year after re-employment. In the fifth year the es-
timate is still negative, but the drop in observations due to the relatively short database
time window implies much larger confidence intervals.
One of the possible explanations for this persistence could be the relatively short
tenure in the first re-employment job. In case the recently re-employed fall into unem-
ployment again or transit to another job, any returns to job-specific tenure are lost. In
fact, I observe that roughly 45% of the re-employed face a new unemployment spell in
the first six years after re-employment. Moreover, after one year of re-employment only
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of individuals by age group and potential duration of unemploy-
ment benefit, before and after the 2007 reform
 0                  1                  2                  3                  4                  5          
years after re-employment
37% of the workers remain in the same company that hired them after unemployment.
However, I find no evidence for the relationship between unemployment duration and
re-employment tenure, which is consistent with the results found by Nekoei and Weber
(2017).
2.8 Conclusions
A broad range of methodologies have been applied to estimate the causal effect of
unemployment duration on re-employment wages. Without information on the reser-
vation wage (which is the case when using administrative data), one cannot directly
identify whether the re-employment wage is being determined by the unemployment
duration (through stigma or skill depreciation), or the re-employment wage is actually
determining the unemployment duration. This study adds two main contributions to
this literature.
First, I take advantage of an institutional reform that changed the potential duration
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of unemployment benefits, in January of 2007, in Portugal, to adopt two alternative
instruments to predict the unemployment duration. While the age discontinuity in
entitlement to different potential duration of unemployment benefits has already been
explored in the literature, little is known about a policy change that created heterogen-
eous effects in the entitlement.
The first alternative instrument is the potential duration of unemployment benefits.
While this variable yields a strong positive effect on the joblessness duration, it is
strongly correlated with age and work experience. I overcome this problem by using
the change in the potential duration of unemployment benefits between the the pre-
and post- reform period (second alternative instrument). Whereas this kind of policies
usually rely on a general increase (or a general decrease) of the potential duration of
the beneficiaries, this policy contains a unique feature. Around 41% of the individuals
have benefited from longer potential duration of unemployment benefits, 23% of the
individuals were entitled to smaller potential duration of unemployment benefits, and
approximately 36% of the individuals were not affected by the reform. I also perform
the same analysis using the age discontinuities present in the rules of unemployment
benefits for purposes of comparison with other studies.
The second main contribution is methodological and related to the estimation pro-
cedure, which incorporates three main features: 1) the use of control function approach,
which accounts for endogeneity in the outcome equation, with a non-linear first stage
2) the consideration of the information on the incomplete spells of unemployment in
the first stage of the estimation, which allows me to get more accurate estimates on the
predicted duration 3) the use of the probability of re-employment to account for selectiv-
ity in the results, which is employed in the inverse probability of censoring weighted
estimation suggested by Rotnitzky et al. (1998).
The main estimates reveal that each additional month of unemployment duration
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leads to a statistically significant decrease of approximately 0.5% in re-employment
wages. The estimates are robust to the different instruments in use, and also when self-
selection, in both unemployment duration and in the re-employment wages, is accounted
for.
The main result is in line with Addison and Portugal (1989) and Schmieder et al.
(2016), even though at a smaller scale. Such difference may be associated with the
decline in the responsiveness of real wages to unemployment changes over the last
decade (Robalo Marques et al., 2010).
The contributions of this chapter are not restricted to the estimate of the causal
effect of unemployment duration on re-employment wages. Actually, they suggest im-
portant policy implications. As pointed in Nekoei and Weber (2017), a positive effect
of unemployment duration in re-employment wages would suggest that unemployment
insurance subsidizes search and not just leisure, which is not the case here. Instead,
the negative impact of unemployment duration on re-employment wages seems suggests
that additional job search assistance programs may be justified in Portugal (Raposo
et al., 2019).
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Table 2.14: Descriptive Statistics - Re-employed Sample
Mean Std.D. Min Median Max
Benefit Duration (UI) (in months) 7.94 7.34 1 5.77 38
Jobless Duration (in months) 11.83 11.77 2 7 75
Level of benefits (e/month) 483.48 193.43 65.10 413.7 1257.60
Previous wage (e/month) 746.01 512.67 116.99 607.18 10463.61
re-employment wage (e/ month) 575.23 359.75 10.57 495.23 5602.57
Age at re-employment (in years) 34.36 9.49 17 33 66
Male 0.49 0.50 0 0 1
Sample 8 423
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B2.1 Instruments validity
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B2.2 First Stage Estimates
Table 2.15: Accelerated Failure Time Unemployment Duration Equations
Strategy
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Ln(Potential Duration) 1.719∗∗∗ (.067)
Old .170∗∗ (.084)
Difference in Potential Rules .089∗∗∗ (.0002)
Ln(Previous Wage) -.130∗∗∗ (.030) -.019 (.032) -.116∗∗∗ (.029)
Male -.244∗∗∗ (.026) -.229∗∗∗ (.027) -.261∗∗∗ (.025)
Age (groups)
[30,40[ -.399∗∗∗ (.040) .284∗∗∗ (.004)
[40,45[ -.608∗∗∗ (.063) .592∗∗∗ (.004)
≥45 -.393∗∗∗ (.077) 1.449∗∗∗ (.004)
Age (discontinuities)
29 or 30 -.427∗∗∗ (.052)
39 or 40 -.100 (.063)
44 or 45 .015 (.073)
Reasons of unemployment
expiration/extinction -.126∗∗ (.053) -.255∗∗∗ (.057) -.155∗∗∗ (.054)
employer initiative .222∗∗∗ (.055) .198∗∗∗ (.059) .198∗∗∗ (.056)
termination agreement .425∗∗∗ (.061) .472∗∗∗ (.065) .421∗∗∗ (.062)
Tenure .047∗∗∗ (.006) .095∗∗∗ (.006) .049∗∗∗ (.006)
Tenure2 -.0006 (.000) -.0010 (.0002) -.0006 (.0002)
Unemployment Rate .260∗∗∗ (.009) .327∗∗∗ (.009) .266∗∗∗ (.009)







N 18 543 2 088 18 543
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis next to the estimates. The equations also include industry and
region dummies
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level ∗∗ Significant at 5% level ∗ Significant at 10% level
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B2.3 Selection Equations from Heckman Two-Step Estima-
tion
Table 2.16: Selection Equations from Heckman Two-step Estimation
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3)
ln(T ) .017∗∗∗ [.001] .012∗∗∗ [.003] .017∗∗∗ [.001]
ln(Potential Duration) -.999∗∗∗ [.059] -.594∗∗∗ [.150] -.999∗∗∗ [.061]
ln(Previous Wage) .052∗∗ [.025] .066 [.077] .052∗∗ [.024]
Male .173∗∗∗ [.024] .126∗ [.076] .173∗∗∗ [.027]
Age (groups)
[30,40[ .088∗∗ [.038] .088∗∗ [.033]
[40,45[ .136∗∗ [.052] .136∗∗ [.054]








expiration/extinction .198∗∗∗ [.053] .102 [.162] .198∗∗∗ [.059]
employer initiative -.051 [.051] -.176 [.147] -.051 [.064]
termination agreement -.174∗∗∗ [.053] -.108 [.163] -.174∗∗∗ [.064]
Tenure -.035∗∗∗ [.005] -.039∗∗ [.018] -.035∗∗∗ [.005]
Tenure2 .000∗∗ [.000] .002∗∗ [.001] .000∗∗ [.000]
Unemployment Rate -.247∗∗∗ [.013] -.288∗∗∗ [.040] -.247∗∗∗ [.014]
Constant 4.127∗∗∗ [.294] 3.643∗∗∗ [.810] 4.127∗∗∗ [.263]
F-Stat 455.077 67.268 1006.740
N 18 543 2 088 18 543
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis next to the estimates. The equations also include
industry and region dummies.




Job Security and Fertility Decisions
3.1 Introduction
Technology change and globalization have motivated the flexibility of labour markets
during the last decades. New forms of employment have been created, such as casual
work, task-based contracts, and fixed-term contracts. These jobs are characterised by a
higher degree of insecurity as the worker is not insured against lay-off at the end of the
contract. Temporary employment is more common among young workers, until they
learn about the worker-firm match quality, and women, who are more likely to move
to non-market employment than men (Lazear and Rosen, 1990; Booth et al., 2002b).
Therefore, job security must be taken into account when young women make investment
decisions, especially when they are irreversible, such as fertility choices (Becker, 1960).
The primary research question of this chapter is: How does job security affect fertil-
ity decisions? Theoretically, there are three fundamental channels through which one
might expect job insecurity could reduce fertility. First, if re-employment is more diffi-
cult, working on a contract with higher probability of dismissal means higher volatility
in expected future earnings, which are crucial to support childcare costs over the life-
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cycle. Second, in case of wage differentials that compensate temporary labour for the
lack of job security, women working on temporary contracts have a higher opportunity
cost when substituting work for child-rearing. Finally, in case temporary arrangements
are mainly used as screening devices prior to more secure jobs, women might delay
their fertility decisions while they keep working on fixed-term contracts to accumulate
tenure until promotion.
The empirical challenge is to distinguish whether a woman is working on a temporary
job because she does not plan to give birth or whether she does not give birth because
she holds a highly insecure job. To disentangle the two effects, I build and estimate
a structural life-cycle model where women choose both fertility and labour supply,
conditional on job security. The degree of job security corresponds to two different types
of job contracts. Fixed-term contracts have a limited duration, a maximum number of
renewals, and high probability of firing. Permanent contracts are open-ended but have
a low probability of dismissal. This type of duality characterises the labour market
in many European countries, where young women on fixed-term contracts account for
almost half of the young female employees.1
The use of fixed-term contracts has increased significantly in many European coun-
tries to tackle the high unemployment rates in the end of the 1970s. In a contrasting
policy direction, the employment protection of permanent contracts was reinforced to
avoid job destruction (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002). Both measures resulted in an
excessive use of fixed-term contracts as the conversion rate into permanent contracts
never exceeds 50% (Boeri et al., 2011). In this chapter I am going to focus on a par-
ticular country. Portugal is an interesting case as it has the lowest rate of contract
conversion (12%) among European countries and it has been classified as the strictest
1According to the Eurostat statistics, on average, 53% of the young (15-24 years old) women in the
Euro area held temporary contracts in 2018. Slovenia ranked highest with 81.1% and high rates were
also observed outside the Euro area in countries such as Croatia, with 67.8%.
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country in terms of employment protection for permanent contracts.2 In the context
of the research question in this chapter, Portugal is also a relevant example as it only
provides 6 weeks of mandatory paid maternity leave.3 Optional benefits paid by Social
Security are available but, in 2017, only 9% of the mothers opted for the extended
maternity leave, according to the Social Security statistics.4 In line with this, Portugal
has the second highest employment rate among mothers with at least one child between
0 and 2 years old among OECD counties (73.2%).5
Considering the institutional background, I abstract from maternity leave policies
and focus on the link between job security and fertility decisions. Using survival ana-
lysis, I provide preliminary evidence that fixed-term contracts are an important determ-
inant of the delay of fertility choice. This effect is especially important for the first birth
decision whereas the income/time trade-off (Becker, 1965) seems to be more relevant
for the second birth decision. However, one should keep in mind the simultaneity issue,
between fertility decisions and the type of contract accepted, and be cautious not to
interpret these results as causal. Ideally, one would need to have exogenous variation
on factors that affect women working on fixed-term contracts but does not affect the
fertility decision directly. The case of Portugal allows me to study such variation.
In this chapter I explore a 2003 policy reform that increased the potential accu-
mulated duration of fixed-term contracts within the same firm from 3 to 6 years. The
reform induced a higher probability of staying in the same firm on a fixed-term con-
tract, but the conversion rate into permanent contracts did not change significantly
2Classification attributed according to the OECD indicator, published in various Employment Out-
look reports. See OECD (2018) for the latest reference.
3Average duration of mandatory paid maternity leave among OECD countries is 19 weeks. Australia
also provide only 6 weeks of paid maternity leave, but women are compensated with additional 6 weeks
of pre-birth leave. Most of the states in United States have no mandatory paid maternity leave.
4Optional benefits are available in two-tiers. The initial maternity leave benefit is 4 months and,
since 2010, the extended maternity leave benefit allows women not to work for an additional 3 months.
5The country leading this ranking is Netherlands, with 73.5%, and the average among OECD
countries is 53.9%. Note however that a big part of the remaining percentage is out of the labour force
whereas inactivity rates in Portugal are lower than the average among OECD countries.
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between the pre- and post-reform periods. Therefore, this reform extended the period
of job insecurity. In a reduced-form setting, I show that women on a contract under the
new legislation had a lower probability of giving birth. However, this negative effect
was attenuated for women working on fixed-term contracts with longer duration, as
these have higher probability of conversion into permanent contracts. For validation
purposes, I estimate the life-cycle model with pre-reform data and use the post-reform
labour market conditions to simulate the implications of the reform. The model is
able to reproduce the reduced-form results, confirming the conversion into a permanent
contract to be an important channel affecting fertility decisions.
To explore the other two channels, I examine the application of two policy reforms
that have been discussed in the public debate: a single contract with long probation
period, and contract-specific tax rates. For the channel on future earnings expectations
I implement a single contract where fixed-term workers are automatically converted
into a permanent contract in case there is no dismissal during the probation period.
This reform eliminates the dismissal spike at the end of the accumulated duration of
fixed-term contracts and doubles the conversion rate. The model predicts an increase
of the fertility rate by shifting births to periods where expected future earnings were
less volatile (end of fixed-term contract and permanent contracts), and by decreasing
the number of childless mothers. This result reinforces the reduced-form evidence that
job security is especially important for the decision to have a first child. Note however
that such reform would bring additional costs to the firms, which in turn could adjust
the labour demand. For this purpose, I consider three alternative scenarios where there
is a decrease of the permanent contract firing costs, a decrease in the wage seniority
bonus, or a decrease on the hiring probability. In general, I conclude that the positive
effect on fertility could be attenuated by each of these three adjustments, but large
modifications would be required in order to bring it down to zero.
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To test the wage differential channel I introduce contract-specific tax rates. Taxing
fixed-term contract wages would have a nearly null effect on fertility rate, but would
generate a shift from fewer children conceived during fixed-term contracts towards more
children conceived during non-employment. This result sheds light on the hypothesis
that women working on fixed-term contracts are less prone to give birth as the opportun-
ity cost of child-rearing is higher when this type of contracts pay better to compensate
for the lack of job security. For completeness, I also test the implementation of a credit
on permanent contract wages together with the tax in fixed-term contract wages. The
results show a considerable increase in fertility that is essentially generated by a com-
positional change of the number of children in the household. This policy reform does
not change the number of mothers in the economy but rather increases the number of
mothers with two children, thus indicating that more income helps to compensate for
the lack of time at home in order to raise multiple children.
Literature Review This chapter contributes to four distinct parts of the literat-
ure. The major contribution of this chapter is that it adds to the scarce literature that
relates job security and fertility decisions. Adsera (2004) was the first, to the best of
my knowledge, to establish a relationship between unstable contracts and low fertility
in Southern Europe. In a two-period theoretical model the author shows that larger un-
certainty in income, from either unemployment or marginal employment arrangements,
transforms the fertility decision into a risky and costly choice.6 In a reduced-form set-
ting De la Rica and Iza (2005) found that fixed-term contracts for women in Spain delay
the motherhood decision although the same seems not to be relevant for men. Auer
and Danzer (2016) found an identical result for Germany, but both studies claim the
results cannot be interpreted as causal as they lack exogenous variation on fixed-term
6Outside the context of job security, but also accounting for idiosyncratic uninsurable earnings risk,
Sommer (2016) concluded that increases in earnings risk are associated with reduction on the number
of children and the delay of fertility decisions.
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contracts. This chapter adds to this literature by exploiting exogenous variation in the
rules of fixed-term contracts, by simulating additional policy reforms, and by using a
country that has not been studied in this context before.
Second, this chapter contributes to the literature using structural life-cycle models,
which estimate the impact of different job characteristics on both fertility and labour
supply decisions. Moffitt (1984) was the first to estimate a dynamic model of discrete
choice where both fertility and wage profiles are endogenous over the life-cycle. The
results revealed that shifts in the level of the lifetime wage profile are associated with
both lifetime profiles of fertility rates and female employment rates. Building on this
outcome, Blackburn et al. (1993) introduced investment in human capital and showed
that this investment is proportionally related to the age of first birth. Francesconi
(2002) contributed to the literature by distinguishing between part-time and full-time
employment. When comparing lifetime utilities between recent mothers in part-time
jobs with those that interrupted their career, the author found no substantial differences.
More recently new features of the labour market have been introduced in this lit-
erature. Edwards (2014) explored the impact of flexitime in the reduction of career
interruptions related to fertility. The author found that flexible hours schedule is more
valuable to women with children and even more so to women with infant children.
Adda et al. (2017) incorporated occupational choices in the model and allowed skill
atrophy to be occupation specific. The authors concluded that women in abstract
occupations face higher atrophy rates, thus higher opportunity costs of not working.
Therefore, women in these occupations tend to have children at a later stage than wo-
men in routine occupations. In a structural model, only Guner et al. (2018) and my
work have included different types of job contract in a life-cycle analysis of fertility and
labour supply choices. Our papers differ in many ways, the main difference being that
I account for the duration and renewals of fixed-term contracts in the model. This
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allows me, not only to approximate the model to reality, but also to study the impact
of different policies that affected these two rules over time.
Third, and more generally, this chapter also contributes to the literature that studies
the impact of family policies on fertility and labour supply. Gauthier (2007) and Oliv-
etti and Petrongolo (2017) provided an extensive literature review on parental leave,
subsidised childcare, and in-work benefits. In a cross-country comparison, Ruhm (1998)
and Thévenon and Luci (2012) concluded that paid parental leave can increase female
employment in 3 to 4 percent, but the result was not always positive to every country.
Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) and Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) found a negative ef-
fect in maternal labour market attachment in the short-run, but a rather small impact
in the medium run. The latter study has also built a structural model to simulate the
combination of parental leave and subsidised childcare and concluded that this policy
could actually increase maternal labour market attachment in the medium-run. Sheran
(2007) also emphasised the reduction of childcare costs as generating positive impacts
on both employment and fertility. Finally, Erosa et al. (2010) and Haan and Wrohlich
(2011) studied the impact of tax-credits on labour income and concluded that this in-
strument was also beneficial for both outcomes. This chapter provides an additional
policy instrument, job security, that although not directly targeting family, it generates
positive effects on both fertility and maternal employment.
Finally, this work is also related to the recent literature on the study of simulated
policy changes to the dual system present in Europe. Pérez and Osuna (2014) ana-
lysed the introduction of a single-contract in Spain by eliminating the duality between
fixed-term and permanent contracts and concluded that this policy would be more ef-
fective in reducing unemployment and job destruction than the decrease in severance
payments. Cahuc et al. (2016) contrasted the decrease in severance payments in open-
ended contracts with the taxation of temporary jobs in France and concluded that the
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second reform would generate opposite effects, by decreasing employment and reducing
job creation. Sestito and Viviano (2016) evaluated the reforms of the Jobs Act in Italy
that provided a subsidy on permanent hiring and a decrease in firing costs. The au-
thors found that both measures shifted employment towards more permanent contracts
and raised overall employment rates. Dolado et al. (2018) simulated a unified system
of employment protection legislation in Spain and concluded that the welfare effects
would be heterogeneous across different types of workers, being the older workers the
ones with largest losses. This chapter adds to this literature by discussing both the
introduction of a single-contract with and without adjustments on the labour demand,
and also the taxation of fixed-term contracts, in Portugal.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides an over-
view of the job contracts legislation and describes the incidence of fixed-term contracts
in Portugal. Section 3.3 presents the data used in both reduced-form analysis and in
the model estimation. Section 3.4 provides some preliminary evidence with a survival
analysis, and evaluates the policy reform that affected the rules of fixed-term contracts
in Portugal, after 2003. Section 3.5 describes the life-cycle dynamic discrete choice
structural model. Section 3.6 is devoted to the estimation and identification issues.
Section 3.7 presents the results, which include the parameters estimates, the fit of the
model and an experiment for the model validation. Section 3.8 is dedicated to the
policy counterfactuals. Finally, Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background
3.2.1 Legislation of Fixed-term Contracts in Portugal
The regulation of employment contracts in Portugal dates back to 1937, but it was
only in 1976 that fixed-term contracts (FTCs) became legislated. As explicit regulation
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on dismissals was implemented in that same year, this type of contract, with low firing
costs, became an attractive screening device to the firms. Back then, there was no
limit on the maximum number of renewals for the FTC. However, the period for which
the worker could be employed for the same firm was limited to three years. Figure 3.1
summarises the legislation of FTC in terms of renewals and cumulative duration since
1976.7

















Back in the 1980s, when the maximum number of renewals was unlimited, the FTC
could either be a succession of short-term contracts or a three years single contract.
Once the probation period was exhausted, the employer was obliged to convert the
contract into a permanent contract (PC) in order to keep the worker in the same firm.
Both renewals of FTC and conversions of FTC onto PC were automatic unless the
employer explicitly communicated otherwise within a minimum of eight days before
the end of the contract.
In 1989, after the integration of Portugal in the Economic European Community,
the maximum number of renewals of FTC was capped at two, without changing the
7The timeline finishes in 2012 as the legislation that was introduced after it is not straightforward




maximum duration of three years in the same firm. The period for the communication
of non-renewal was extended to 15 days in cases of contracts with less than six months
of duration and to 30 days in case of longer contracts. Short severance payments were
also introduced in a ratio of two days for each month of FTC.
Before 2001, the replacement of a worker in a FTC job position required three
months of interval between the firing date of the former worker and the hiring date
of the new one. After 2001 the waiting period increased to six months; the severance
payments have increased to three days for each month of the contract; and the minimum
number of days for the communication of non-renewal decreased to five days only.
In 2003 the maximum number of renewals did not change, but the maximum dura-
tion of a FTC within the same firm was extended for up to six years, with the remark
that the last renewal should have a duration between one and three years. More re-
cently, in 2009, the maximum number of renewals was increased to three times while
the maximum duration with renewals has reversed to three years, like in pre-2003.
3.2.2 Fixed-term Contracts Over Time, Gender, and Age
Portugal and Varejão (2009) showed that, in the context of the Portuguese dual
labour market, firms look at the fixed-term contracts as an attractive device to screen
workers with low firing costs. For that reason, the share of employees with FTC has
always been relatively large (22% in 2017), especially when compared to other European
countries (average 14.3% in 2017). This disparity is even larger for younger workers. In
2017, almost two-thirds of employees between 15 and 24 years old, in Portugal, had a
fixed-term contract whereas the European average was only 44%. Figure 3.2 illustrates
these trends by gender and age group during the last two decades.
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According to Weiss and Gronau (1981), during the early stage of their careers,
women are still deciding between market and home production. Therefore, women are
more likely to defer investment in specific human capital. Under these conditions firms
are ”gender blind” at the hiring stage, but men are more likely to receive a promotion
offer as their specific human capital grows faster (Lazear and Rosen, 1990). In other
words, men with longer duration of fixed-term contract jobs may be perceived to have
lower ability than women in the same position (Booth et al., 2002b).
3.3 Data
In this section I describe the two main sources of data used in this chapter. Most
of the analyses rely on data from European Community Household Panel, presented
in the first subsection, but in order to get more accurate estimates in terms of labour
market transitions between different job contracts, I have also used the Portuguese
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Labour Force Survey, presented in the second subsection. This section includes details
on sample construction as well mas a brief discussion on some descriptive statistics. In
Appendix C2, I provide a succinct description of two auxiliary datasets occasionally
used throughout the chapter: the National Household Budget Survey and the National
Fertility and Family Survey.
3.3.1 European Community Household Panel
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a longitudinal harmonised
survey, coordinated by Eurostat. The panel includes data from 15 countries in the
European Union and, for most countries, consists of 8 waves, between 1994 and 2001.8
For the purpose of this study, I use the panel for Portugal between 1994 and 1999.9
The choice of this database is related to the reasonable amount of information both
at the individual and household level for such a long period. The ECHP provides
information on a broad set of questions related to demographics, income, social life,
housing conditions, health, education, and employment. The Portuguese Labour Force
Survey also includes both information on fixed-term contracts and fertility, but only
follows each household for a period of six quarters.
Even though the information contained in the ECHP is relatively broad to answer
the main research question of this chapter, I complement it with the data from the La-
bour Force Survey conducted in Portugal during the same period. This survey provides
clearer information on the duration and renewals of fixed-term contracts and includes
a larger sample. This additional information should improve the modelling of labour
market transitions of women along the life-cycle.
8The 15 countries are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, and the United Kingdom
9I have excluded the years 2000 and 2001 as there was a change in definition of fixed-term contracts.
ECHP has a follow up for more recent years, the European Union Survey on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC), but this has no explicit information on the duration of the fixed-term contracts.
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3.3.2 Labour Force Survey
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) in Portugal (“Inquérito ao Emprego”) is a CPS-
type household survey conducted by the Statistics Portugal (INE - Instituto Nacional de
Estat́ıstica). Conducted on a quarterly basis, it asks information about approximately
45,000 individuals, in 15,000 households. Individuals aged 10 years old or less do not
answer the survey, but are included in the database with information on demographics.
Each survey respondent answers to around 150 questions about their participation in
the labour market. The survey questions are divided into six broad topics including
main activity, secondary activity, education and training, experience, job search, and
labour market status in the previous year. In all sections, the survey follows the defini-
tions of Eurostat making the labour market indicators comparable with other European
countries.
In each quarter, one sixth of the sample is rotated out. Therefore, I can only
compute transitions between labour market states for five sixths of the workers in the
sample. However, measurement error is not a serious issue in this survey (Blanchard and
Portugal, 2001). Inconsistencies in the observed labour-market transitions are negligible
due to the low attrition rate and also to relatively low frequency of movements across
labour market states.
To be consistent with the years selected in the ECHP data I have restricted the
data in LFS to the same period. However, due to changes in the survey I cannot follow
transitions that occurred between the last quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998.
3.3.3 Construction of Samples and Descriptive Statistics
In both datasets I focus my analysis on women aged between 23 and 50 years old.
As both of them are constructed on a rotation basis, I have two unbalanced panels.
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In the sample from ECHP I have 2,283 women and in the sample from LFS I have
34,988 women. Due to the restrictions I impose relative to the period and age, in both
samples I have roughly about 50% of the women being observed in all periods. For all
women I collect information on age, marital status, household composition, education,
employment status, employment history, type of contract, and wages, of the woman
and the husband, if available.
Some definitions should be mentioned for clarity. In this chapter, a woman is em-
ployed if she holds a full-time job (either with fixed-term or permanent contract) with
a certain firm that pays a given wage. I exclude part-time jobs as their proportion
in Portuguese female employment is historically low, especially when compared with
other countries.10 For the purpose of this study, I also exclude self-employment, fam-
ily business and contracts with undetermined ending date. All the employment-type
restrictions accounted for about 24% of the employed female in the sample before re-
strictions.11 Education is, throughout the chapter, classified into two categories only:
non-university and university, therefore, women with unknown education were also ex-
cluded (1.4%).
Table 3.13, in the Appendix of this chapter, presents the main variables from the
ECHP sample. This sample includes a relatively low percentage of women with univer-
sity degree due to the period I am studying.12 Slightly above 30% of the observations
are non-workers and most of the employees hold a permanent contract. In terms of
fixed-term contracts, most of them have duration of one year and zero renewals. This
combination is reflected in the average tenure for all types of contracts – 20% of the
10Average part-time proportion of jobs held by female workers during 1994 to 1999 period was 14.3%,
which is similar to the average rate over a longer period of time, whereas the average female part-time
proportion in European countries is 26% and in the OECD countries is 24.5%.
11I follow Blundell et al. (2016a) and exclude women in all years starting from the one where the
transition to one of the excluded categories is observed.
12According to the Portuguese Census the share of women above 15 years old with a university
degree was 3.6% in 1991, 9.3% in 2001, and 16.9% in 2011.
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workers have one year (or less) of tenure. In 2000’s euros the average monthly wage is
about 477, the minimum is 218.39 (minimum wage in 1994), and the maximum wage
observed is about five times the mean wage. More than 70% of the observations are
women with a partner and 34% are non-mothers. Regarding the number of children,
about half of the observations are women with two children.
Table 3.14, in the Appendix of this chapter, presents the main indicators that de-
scribe the female labour market in both samples. The two samples are fairly similar
when it comes to the percentage of women holding a university degree, the percentage
of non-workers (including inactive and unemployed), the average unemployment dur-
ation, the percentage of fixed term contracts and average tenure. Larger differences
are found in the classification of fixed-term contracts. The duration of the contract in
ECHP is split into 4 classes (“less than 6 months”, “6 months to 1 year”, “1 year to
under 2 years” and “2 years or more”) whereas it is defined in number of months in
the LFS database. This difference between the two datasets implies some differences in
the labour market flows, presented in Table 3.15. Transitions to non-employment and
short fixed-term contracts are fairly similar, but major differences occur in transitions
to longer fixed-term contracts and to permanent contracts. However, the difference
becomes negligible when the last two categories are summed up.
3.4 Preliminary Evidence
In this section I present preliminary evidence on the relationship between job secur-
ity (fixed-term vs permanent contracts) and fertility in Portugal, during 1994-1999.
Following De la Rica and Iza (2005), I run a survival analysis on the time to first
and second birth. The authors used a proportional hazards model but did not account
for the increasing childlessness in the last decades, especially in Southern European
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countries (Frejka, 2008). In this analysis, I use the discrete version of the proportional
hazards model (complementary log-log) with two mass-point unobserved heterogeneity,
which accounts for the fact that some women take much longer to give birth – denoted
as the later birth group – and eventually, because the fertile period is limited, some
of them do not give birth at all – either because they are biologically or behaviourally
sterile, as justified in Heckman and Walker (1990).13
The following hazard model is estimated for first and second births:
h(t|x′itβ) =

1− exp[−exp(γ11FTCit + γ21PCit + x′itβ + γ3 ln(t))],
if i is a later birth woman
1− exp[−exp(mebw + γ11FTCit + γ21PCit + x′itβ + γ3 ln(t))],
if i is a earlier birth woman
(3.1)
where t indexes the years in which woman i is observed, 1FTCit is a dummy that takes
the value 1 if the woman holds a fixed-term contract job, and 0 otherwise, 1PCit is a
dummy that takes the value 1 if the woman holds a permanent-contract job, and 0 oth-
erwise – being the base group the women not working (either inactive or unemployed)
–, xit is a set of controls that includes age, education, labour market experience, marital
status, partner’s income, and year and regional dummies, ln(t) captures the pattern of
the duration dependence, and mebw > 0 distinguishes the two hazard rates in a discon-
tinuous fashion. In this context likelihood contribution of each individual i becomes:
13See Varga (2014) for another application on fertility research with the two mass-point unobserved




















where π ∈ (0, 1) is the proportion of women that are later birth, hk(t|x′itβ), k=lbw,ebw
is the respective branch of (3.1), and δi indicates whether the spell is censored or not,
i.e., whether the last month when individual i is observed, ti is not equal to the month
when the individual i gives birth.14
The estimation sample is restricted to women, with a partner (either formally mar-
ried or not), between 23 years old, when most of the women already finished schooling,
and 40 years old, by when most of the women realized their completed fertility.15
Table 3.1 presents the results for the complementary log-log regressions, with and
without two-point unobserved heterogeneity.
Two results stand out from column (1) of Table 3.1. First, the effect of having a
fixed-term contract on the probability of giving first birth is substantially large and
negative. Second, it is not clear whether, for first birth decision, women prefer to have
a permanent contract and a more stable source of income, or whether they prefer not
to work (base group) and dedicate more time to child-rearing.
To understand which aspect drives this relationship, I use an event study. In Fig-
ure 3.3, I plot the (first) birth rate of women in two different situations: those that
have transitioned from a fixed-term contract to a permanent contract, and those that
transitioned from a fixed-term contract to non-work.
While the transition to a permanent contract has a positive impact on first birth
14See Allison (1982) and Jenkins (1995) for the construction of the complementary-log-log likelihood
contribution.
15Note that restricting the women to have a partner and to be older than 23 years old mechanically
decreases the number of women at risk of first birth. On the other hand, the fact that I do not restrict
the age of first child mechanically increases the number of women at risk of second birth.
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Table 3.1: Estimates from complementary log-log regressions on first and second births,
with and without two-point unobserved heterogeneity
Variable First Birth Second Birth
1 Permanent Contract (PC) -0.105 -0.393 -0.666*** -1.895***
(0.238) (0.288) (0.252) (0.514)
1 Fixed-term Contract (FTC) -0.822*** -1.144*** -1.159** -2.441***
(0.313) (0.348) (0.554) (0.719)
χ2 PC – FTC 7.620 7.350 0.850 0.840
p-value 0.006 0.007 0.356 0.360
Constant -18.806 -35.425 -8.648 -14.350
mebw 15.026 5.049
Prop. later birth women 0.195 0.588
Nr observations 972 1 925
Notes: all regressions control for duration dependence (log form), age of the woman, university degree
of the woman, husband’s income, years of marriage, working experience of the woman, time effects,
and regional effects. The second regression also controls for the age of the first child. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
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decision, the loss of income in the second type of transition seems to overcome the
increase in time for child-rearing.16
To explain what drives low fertility rates, one should also look at higher order births.
I restrict my analysis to two births only as the number of mothers of three or more
children is rather low in Portugal. In fact, this is also reflected in the proportion of
women in later birth group, which is much larger for second than first births.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.1 two main results stand out. For second birth,
the fact that the woman is working has a negative and statistically significant impact,
and this is not statistically dependent on the type of contract as the coefficient on the
permanent contract is not statistically different from that for the fixed-term contract.
Two main results from this analysis should be kept in mind when modelling women’s
preferences. First, the different impact of job insecurity relative to the birth order.
Second, the non-negligible proportion of women assigned to the later birth group.
As De la Rica and Iza (2005) reported, the survival analysis is important to get
some evidence on the relationship between job security and fertility, but there is also a
potential issue of simultaneity. Therefore, in the next subsection I explore exogenous
variation in fixed-term contracts and look at its effect on fertility choices.
3.4.1 Reform on the Potential Cumulative Duration of FTC
As explained in Section 3.2, in August 2003, the Portuguese government approved
a law that changed the maximum duration rule of fixed-term contracts. Under the new
scenario, in place since December 2003, a firm could keep an employee on a FTC for
up to six years, while the cap on two renewals remained the same. In Figure 3.4, I plot
the transitions from FTC to four different states: permanent contract within the same
16These results are in line with Del Bono et al. (2012) that show a drop on fertility rate after job
loss, which comes mainly from difficulty women face in re-establishing their careers.
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firm, FTC within the same firm, FTC in a different firm, and non-employment.17
The top left panel of Figure 3.4 illustrates a decrease in the probability of conversion
into permanent contracts after the reform. However, firms did not adjust immediately
on this dimension as some workers that were converted in 2004 started the fixed-term
contract before the reform and, therefore, the contracts of those workers were still
constrained by the pre-reform rules. The top left panel sheds light on the most sig-
nificant change. The probability of staying in the same firm on a fixed-term contract
increased after the reform. This effect is also reflected in the two panels at the bottom.
Transitions across firms decreased in the short-run and transitions to non-employment
decreased slightly. In conclusion, it seems that employment levels improved slightly,
but job security decreased. Therefore, the effect on fertility is not clear.












2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year of transition











2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year of transition












2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year of transition













2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year of transition
From FTC to non−employment
17For presentation purposes I exclude transitions to permanent contracts in other firms as these
represent 1% or less for all the years in this analysis.
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To study the impact of this reform I use the LFS sample. As explained in Section 3.3,
this dataset is more accurate in terms of the job contracts’ characteristics. Moreover,
this dataset provides consistent definition of fixed-term contracts during the pre- (2001-
2003) and post-reform (2004-2007) periods.18 In Table 3.2, I provide the descriptive
statistics of mothers’ characteristics before and after the reform.19 In this comparison
I have only considered women, with a partner, who were employed on a FTC in their
first year of the contract.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of labour market characteristics before and after the
reform
Variable Pre Post Raw difference w. Time Trend
Age 30.917 31.517 .6 * .145
(.351) (.669)
1 University degree .115 .121 .006 .047
(.027) (.049)
Years since 1st job 13.104 14.311 1.208 ** .809
(.539) (.988)
Number of previous jobs 2.787 3.441 .654 * .092
(.336) (.852)
Contract duration (months) 7.99 7.519 -.471 -.249
(.385) (.609)
1 White collar .572 .631 .059 .055
(.036) (.071)
Log(wage) 5.958 6.109 .135 *** .009
(.032) (.066)
Nr observations 825 1 298
Sample size 478 747
Population size 151 657 240 692
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics of married women employed with a FTC in their
first year of the contract. Pre includes women for which the contract started before the reform and
Post includes women for which the contract started after the reform was implemented. Column (3)
reports differences in means between both groups, and column (4) the differences between pre- and
post- averages ,controlling for a linear time trend. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, ***
Significant at 1%
18The year 2000 was excluded from the analysis due to a difference in fixed-term contracts definition.
As this change could potentially affect the years of 2001, I have also performed this exercise with a
shorter period around the reform, 2002-2005. Because the results did not change I kept this version to
provide more information on the medium-run effects.
19For a similar analysis see Lalive et al. (2014)
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In the third column of Table 3.2 there are some statistically significant raw differ-
ences between the pre and post sample. Naturally in the post sample I find older women
as I observe some women both during pre- and post-reform periods. As a consequence,
the career is also longer for the women observed in the post-reform. Not surprisingly,
the wages are also higher as I am not taking into account inflation and productivity
growth in the raw-differences. To account for these patterns, I test these differences
controlling for a linear time trend in the last column. As no difference is statistically
significant, I conclude that none of these characteristics has changed discontinuously at
the same time as the reform.
In this exercise I run two regressions:
GiveBirthit+1 = α0 + α11afterit + x
′
itβ + u1it
GiveBirthit+1 = α0 + α11afterit + α2Durationit + α31afterit ×Durationit + x′itβ + u2it
The first one tests if women, with FTC starting after the reform was implemented (after
December 2003), were less likely to give birth in the following year, controlling for the
characteristics described above. The second regression tests whether the duration of
the first contract in the firm affected the impact of the reform. Results are presented
in Table 3.3.
The negative coefficient on the dummy, which equals one if the FTC started after
the reform, indicates the reform has negatively affected the probability of giving birth in
the following year. The positive and statistically significant coefficient in the interaction
term means that a longer FTC in the post-reform actually attenuates the decrease in the
birth probability. This result might be explained by the fact that I have only included
women in their first year of a contract in the sample as these might then give birth
and still have time to come back to work and recover any career cost they might have
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Table 3.3: Regressions for the effect of the 2003 reform on birth likelihood
Dep Variable: Give birth next year (1) (2)
1 Contract after reform -.086 * -.143 *
(.047) (.076)
Contract duration (months) -.002
(.004)
1 Contract after reform × Contract duration (months) .008 *
(.005)
Age .010 ** .010 **
(.005) (.005)
Log(husband wage) -.009 -.012
(.036) (.037)
1 One child -.019 -.037
(.036) (.032)
1 University degree .018 .041
(.024) (.033)
Years since 1st job -.004 -.005
(.003) (.003)
Number of previous jobs .003*** .012**
(.001) (.005)




Year FE Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes
F-stat 2.03*** 24.64***
Observations 2123
Notes: The sample includes all married women in the first year of a FTC between 2001 and 2007.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%,
*** Significant at 1%
had. The magnitude of the effect of the reform goes in line with the result of Milligan
(2005) on the impact of an increase of 1000$ in childcare benefits in Canada, which is
reassuring in terms of the size of the impact of this reform on fertility decisions.
Regarding the remaining coefficients, older women (during their fertile period) with
fixed term contracts are more likely to give birth as they have less time to postpone
their fertility decision. The number of previous jobs also reveals a positive and statist-
ically significant effect, which might be related to smaller losses for experienced women
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interrupting their career to give birth. Finally, I want to stress that the non-significance
of the husband wage might be explained by the large contribution of women’s wage to
the household income in Portugal (40%). This importance is also revealed in the larger
magnitude (even though not significant) of the coefficient on the woman’s wage.
From this analysis I conclude that both the type and duration of a fixed term
contract are relevant to the fertility decision. Therefore, I incorporate both features in
the dynamic discrete choice structural model that is presented in the next section.
3.5 Model
I develop a structural model to describe the dynamic decisions of women on fertility
and labour force participation over the life-cycle. Fertility choices are taken condition-
ally on the existence of a partner (including both formal marriage and cohabitation),
which may change over the life-cycle with certain marriage and divorce probabilities.
Labour supply decisions are taken conditionally on job offers, which arrive with a
certain probability. Jobs differ both in wages and contract duration (one year fixed-
term, two year fixed-term, or permanent). Note that I assume the workers do not choose
the type of contract nor the duration. The reasons for this option are twofold. Firstly, I
find in the LFS data that 74% of the women working on a fixed-term contract would have
liked to have a permanent contract instead, but could not find one. Secondly, Portugal
and Varejão (2004) show that, for Portugal, fixed-term contract workers receive, on
average, lower returns to both experience and tenure, thus meaning workers are not
compensated over time for the higher risk of job loss associated.
Following Van der Klaauw (1996), Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), and Hotz and Miller
(1988) I assume that women can only work full-time. The percentage of part-time work-
ers in Portugal is small in comparison to other countries, as highlighted in the Section
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3.3. According to André (1991) this phenomenon is due to the residential proximity of
relatives, which are essential to support employed women and to the sizeable contribu-
tion of women’s labour income to household income in Portugal. Below, I describe the
main components of my model.
3.5.1 Timing and Decisions
Time is discrete, and a period lasts for a year in order to match the data frequency.
The decision horizon for each woman starts at age 23, after school, and terminates at
age 50, when the number of old-age pensioners increases substantially in the data. Note
however that fertility decisions can only be taken until the age of 40, the age at which
I assume a woman is no longer fecund.20
In every period, a woman has to decide both on fertility (nit) and work (pit). Fertility
choices are only conditioned on the existence of a partner (hit). I assume complete and
costless control over the ability to give birth at each age, like Wolpin (1984), Moffitt
(1984), Happel et al. (1984), and Cigno and Ermisch (1989). However, I impose a
restriction of a maximum of two children (kit) who must be born in separate years as I
exclude the possibility of twins in my model.21 Working choices are conditional on the
offers received and lay-off outcomes at the beginning of the period.
20The starting age follows the same reasoning as Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011). Alternatively one
could follow Van der Klaauw (1996), which starts the model in the first year of school-leaving. I chose
23 as starting age because according to Portuguese data there is a big drop in school attendance after
22. Moreover, according to the Fertility Survey only 5% of women in Portugal gave birth to the first
child before 23 years old. Regarding the age which terminates the fertile period I follow Francesconi
(2002). Also, according to Fertility Survey only 5% of the women in Portugal had the first child after
40 years old.
21According to Instituto Nacional de Estat́ıstica the number of households with more than two
children was 6.5% and the less than 2% of births were twins.
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3.5.2 Job Contracts and Wages
Jobs are characterised by monthly net wages and contract duration, which can be
fixed or permanent. Both wages and contracts’ rules follow the labour market charac-
teristics in Portugal during the period of 1994 to 1999. To match the data frequency
and the distribution of fixed-term contracts duration I allow fixed-term contracts to
have the duration of one or two years.22 Fixed-term contracts can be renewed twice,
as long as the maximum duration with renewals, does not exceed three consecutive
years. To control for the maximum number of renewals I also include years of tenure
in both contracts rather than years of experience, as experience is not contract-specific
and creates extra computational burden to the model. Once the maximum duration
for fixed-term contracts is exhausted, the worker is either promoted to a permanent
position or laid off. The promotion rate is lower than the renewal rate of fixed-term
contracts in order to incorporate the fact the permanent contracts have higher firing
costs associated, when compared to fixed-term contracts.
In order to match these labour market dynamics I allow the following combination
of contracts: one-year contracts can be renewed twice if replaced with similar contracts,
or once if replaced with a two-year contract; two-year contracts can be renewed once if
replaced with a one-year contract; in case the worker achieves the maximum number
of renewals and keeps working in the following year, the fixed-term contract is replaced
with a permanent one. Note however that a worker has always the chance to receive a
permanent job offer, and therefore does not necessarily have to wait for the end of the
maximum fixed-term duration.23 I also allow for hirings into positions with permanent
contracts to match the cases where the probation period/fixed-term contract is less
22According to the law, the fixed-term contracts are even allowed to have duration of three years,
but I have excluded them from the model as their existence is rather low in the market.
23According to Portugal and Varejão (2010), promotions to permanent positions are more likely to




Women’s wages follow a functional form that is contract-specific (FTC, fixed-term
contract, or PC, permanent contract):24




2 Si23 + α
FTC
3 1(Dit = 2) + α
FTC
4 Rit + η
FTC
it (3.3)




2 Si23 + α
PC









where Si23 is equal to 1 in case the woman had a university degree at 23 years old,
zero otherwise; ti is the age, which proxies for labour market experience and in this
model has values between 1 and 18; 1(Dit = 2) is a dummy that takes the value of one
if the fixed-term contract has the duration of two years; Xit accounts for the number
of years of tenure, which can be equal to 1, 2 or 3, where 3 actually means 3 or more
years of tenure; Rit is the number of renewals, which can be 0, 1 or 2; finally, η
PC
it and
ηFTCit capture random variations in wages, which are independent of the decision taken.
Exponentiation of the r.h.s. or log of the l.h.s. ensures non-negative wages.
Note that both specifications depend on schooling, but differ in the other determ-
inants. It is expected that the average wage for fixed-term contracts to be higher to
compensate for the absence of employment protection and for schooling returns to be
larger for permanent contracts, as these should represent a better match between the
worker skills and the firm needs (Dias da Silva and Turrini, 2015). To match the fea-
tures of the data, fixed-term contract wages do not depend on tenure, but rather on
their duration and number of renewals. Both coefficients associated to these variables
should be positive as both of them can be interpreted as investments in human capital
at the firm. In a sense, longer duration contracts and more renewals also capture the
positive effect of tenure, which is included in permanent contracts, as a sign of the
quality of the match between the worker and the firm (Booth et al., 2002b). Age also
24See Francesconi (2002) for a similar approach.
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enters the permanent contracts’ specification as a way to capture that, over time, the
appeal for the outside option is decreasing (Pinheiro and Visschers, 2015).
The random components of wages are i.i.d technology shocks with zero mean, finite
variance, and a nonzero contemporaneous covariance between them. These assumptions
are consistent with the fact that the data used for estimation does not cover a long
period (6 years), and that during this period the variation of wages was flat.25 In
subsection 3.6.1 I discuss the estimation procedure for wages.
3.5.3 Job Offer and Dismissal Probabilities
At most one job offer arrives each period with a certain probability. Even though
I do not allow for search-on-the-job I do allow for job offer arrivals in the same period
the woman is dismissed.26 In case the woman was working in the previous period, the
probability of getting a job offer is given by πWo , which depends on education, age, type
of contract held before, tenure, and renewals. In case the woman was not working in
previous period, the probability is defined by πNWo , which depends on unemployment
duration (UD), education, and age. In Figure 3.5, I provide a diagram that represents
the possible transitions in the labour market modelled here, each of them with a different
probability.
Unemployed women can potentially get any type job contract offer. Women that
have been dismissed at the end of last period are not penalised. However the arrival
rate decreases with the duration of unemployment (1, 2, or 3, or more years). Women
working on fixed-term contracts can always be promoted as long as the duration of the
contract has elapsed. Transitions from a one-year contract to a permanent contract
will be less frequent than transitions from a two-year contract to a permanent contract
25See Blundell et al. (2016b) for a similar approach.
26Contrary to Llull and Miller (2016) and Edwards (2014) I do not allow women to receive job offers
while employed, but I do differentiate between whether they were dismissed in the same year or not.
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Figure 3.5: Possible labour market transitions, by layoff, contract duration, and renew-
als
FTC - Fixed-term Contract
dx - duration x years 1,2
rx - x renewals 0,1,2
PC - Permanent Contract
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(Gagliarducci, 2005). Job offers of fixed-term contracts with a duration of one year may
also arrive if the number of renewals has not reached the maximum. Once the woman
knows in which final point of the tree she is, then she decides whether to participate in
the labour market.
Conditionally on being employed, the worker is dismissed with a given probability,
which depends on the schooling level at age 23 (Si,23 = 1 in case of a University degree),
on tenure (Xi,t) (weighted by the number of renewals (Ri,t) in case of a fixed-term
contract as for permanent contracts Ri,t=0), and also on the duration of the contract
(Dit). All the coefficients are expected to be negative as a complement to their positive
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For simplicity, I assume that this probability is also the probability of non-renewal.
Therefore, if at the end of a fixed-term contract the worker was not dismissed, this
means that the firm neither offered her a renewal of the fixed-term contract nor a
permanent contract.
3.5.4 Partner
In this model I do not distinguish between formal marriage and cohabitation, hence
marriage means getting a partner with whom the woman will potentially have chil-
dren.27 I define the probability of marriage as a function of the age of the woman and





πm = θm0 + θ
m






3 1(Di,t ∈ [1, 2]) + θm4 1(Di,t = 3)
Contrary to other models, such as Adda et al. (2017), marriage does not depend on
schooling. As this is a permanent characteristic in this model and few women have a
high university degree in the data, there is not enough variation to include schooling
as a determinant of marriage.
The probability of divorce (leaving a partner) is defined as a function of the number
of children (kit) only and it is assumed to be zero in the year of birth (when the
youngest child reaches one year old (ait = 1)). As for couples without children this
probability is constant to reflect the lack of statistical significant evidence I found for
correlation between divorce and age of the woman. This probability is thus expressed
27I analyse both married and cohabiting couples because, according to Portuguese census data,




in the following way:
P (divorce) =
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3.5.5 Utility Function
The decision to participate in the labour market depends on the contract duration,
but the disutility from work does not, except when the woman has children. Therefore,
I simplify notation hereafter by defining pi,t to be equal to one when the woman works
and zero otherwise, regardless of the time of contract. Note that the utility will depend
on the choice of labour supply, but not directly on the choice of fertility, as children
are only born in the period after the decision. However, different idiosyncratic shocks
arrive according to each of the four possible decisions. The utility of woman i at period
t takes the following form:
Uit = cit + γ1pi,tcit + γ2ki,tcit + (γ3 + ζ
p
i )pi,t + (γ4 + ζ
n
i )kit + γ5k
2
it
+ γ6(D1i,t +D2it)× kit + γ7D3i,t × kit
+ γ8(D1i,t +D2it)× 1(ai,t = 1) + γ9D3i,t × 1(ai,t = 1)





Consumption is denoted by cit, which represents the level of a composite good for
which the price was normalised to 1. Following the female labour supply literature
(Van der Klaauw, 1996; Francesconi, 2002; Keane and Wolpin, 2010; Eckstein and
Lifshitz, 2011), consumption enters linearly in the utility function and there are no
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assets, thus neither borrowing nor saving are allowed in the model. Following Edwards
(2014), I allow for income effects through the interaction of consumption with the
choice of labour supply (γ1) and with the number of children (γ2). The first interaction
accounts for the consumption-leisure substitution effect and the intuition for the second
interaction is the fact that consumption choices might be influenced by the presence
of children in the household (e.g. different film choices at the cinema). The disutility
from work does not depend on the type of contract, but differs with taste (ζpi ).
28 I also
introduce heterogeneity (ζni ) in the utility derived from the number of children (γ4).
See the next subsection for a description of the unobserved heterogeneity process.
In the second row, I allow for utility from children to vary with the type of job
contract in order to represent the preliminary evidence I found in Section 3.4. In a
fixed-term contract, it is expected the woman to derive a lower utility from children,
as she is unsure about whether she will be working in the near future and be able to
bear the costs of children. In the third row I allow interactions between each type of
job contract and the fact that the woman has a one-year-old child (infant), which may
require greater investments both in terms of time and money, than in other periods of
children’s lives. I also allow the utility from children to vary with this feature in order
to control for the birth spacing that is observed in the data. γ10 is restricted to be
negative in order to capture the additional difficulties that a second child may bring.29
Finally, εjit are choice-specific random preference shocks, which follow a type I extreme






with mean τγ and variance τ 2π2/6 .
28There is no utility level associated with not working because I assume this as the baseline in my
model.
29In the National Fertility Survey, 60% of the mothers of one child reported the “additional problems




In terms of unobserved heterogeneity, I follow Heckman and Singer (1984), and allow
women to belong to one of 4 different types, as reported in Table 4. At age 23, when
individuals start to be modelled, each woman draws a random permanent preference
for work-fertility from a multinomial distribution, which depends on tenure, presence
of a partner, and number of children. HW stands for high taste for children and high
Table 4: Unobserved permanent heterogeneity
work non-work
high fertility HW HU
low fertility LW LU
taste for work, HU for high children for fertility, but low taste for work, LW for low
taste for children, but high taste for work, and LU for low taste for both children and
work. In the first two cases ζki is positive and when the taste for work is high ζ
p
i is also
positive; otherwise they are both zero. These parameters act as taste shifters towards
working and fertility choices.
3.5.6 Budget Constraint
The household budget constraint depends on the guaranteed minimum income
(GMI), the husbands’ income (y), the woman’s wage (w), the unemployment bene-
fits (ub), and the children’s costs (CC). It takes the following form:
cHi,t = GMI(hi,t, pi,t, ki,t) + yi,thi,t +wi,tpi,t + ubi,t(1− pi,t, Xi,t)−CC(pi,t, hi,t, ki,t, ai,t) (3.9)
Household consumption is defined as cHi,t = ci,t × (1 + 0.5 × hi,t + 0.3 × ki,t). That
is, the woman’s consumption (ci,t) scaled by the “number of adult equivalent” given by
the “OECD modified scale”, that is, 1 plus 0.5 for a second adult plus 0.3 for each child
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in the household (Hagenaars et al., 1994).30
As the model does not allow for either borrowing or saving, the income of the
household does not depend on assets. In order to ensure non-negative consumption
and to take into account the welfare benefits available in Portugal, I also include the
guaranteed minimum income (GMI), which depends on the presence of a partner, the
labour supply choice and on the number of children. Once the woman has a partner
I assume he works full-time as, in the data, 93% of the partners of women in the
age range between 23 and 50 years old are working full-time. However, instead of
considering husband’s wage I consider husband’s wage I consider husband’s personal
income to account for the fact that 27% of the husbands are self-employed. To avoid
increasing the state space I also express husband’s income in terms of the woman’s








The woman is also entitled to unemployment benefits in case she was laid off in the
previous year, i.e., pit = 0 and Xit = 1. Note that in case the woman decided not to
work conditional on having received a job offer she is not entitled to unemployment
benefits. In terms of duration of the unemployment benefits I do not allow the woman
to receive them for more than a year, which is not a strong assumption considering the
rules in Portugal during the period in analysis – the maximum potential duration for
individuals between 23 and 30 years old was 12 months and for individuals between 30
and 40 years old was 18 months, regardless of previous working experience. For older
individuals, the potential duration of unemployment benefits could go up to 2 years
30Contrary to Adda et al. (2017) I will not estimate the weights of the OECD modified scale. Also,
according to Burniaux et al. (1998), sensitivity analyses suggest that while the composition of income
poverty is affected by the use of different equivalence scales, trends over time are much less affected.
31See Van der Klaauw (1996), Sheran (2007), or Adda et al. (2017) for similar specifications.
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and a half, but because they have to comply with the obligations to find a job, most of
the beneficiaries did not take more than one year of unemployment benefits.
Finally, I introduce a cost for childcare, CC, which depends on the labour supply
of the mother, the presence of the father in the household, the number of children, and
the age of the youngest child. In case the mother is not working the childcare costs are
lower as she has time to look after the child. However, the costs are not assumed to be
zero in order to capture the large utilization of formal childcare in Portugal, which is
not free.32 Therefore, the costs are larger if there are infants present in the household.
In case the husband is not present in the household the costs are reduced to account
for possible cash transfers from the father, whose income is not entering in the budget
constraint directly.
3.5.7 Dynamic Decision Problem
Each year the woman makes her decisions conditional on the following state space
Ωi,t =
(









which includes, work choice, fertility choice, children, husband, age of the youngest
child, university degree, duration of the contract, tenure, renewals of the contract,
shocks on preferences and wages, and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for work and
fertility.
The value function for woman i in period t is given by:
V jt (Ωit) = max
j∈J(Ωi,t)
U jit(Ωit) + βEt(Vt+1(Ωt+1)|j ∈ J,Ωt) (3.12)
32See the Education at a Glance reports produced by OECD. In the 2018 edition, Portugal was the




where β is a discount factor, and Et is the expectation operator conditional on in-
formation in period t.33 Note that J , the set of possible choices, may not be equal in
every period as it depends on the arrival of job offers, on the existence of a partner,
on the number of children (limited to a maximum of 2), and on the age of the woman
(no longer fertile from age 40 onwards). In Appendix C3, I present all the possible
conditional value functions.
Terminal Condition
By the age of 40, women make their last fertility decision in the model. However, as
noted by Adda et al. (2017) children have costs in the life-cycle career of the woman.
Therefore, I include 10 additional years of labour supply decisions in the model in order
to capture these costs before women start to retire. At the age of 50 I assume that the
future value is function of children still present in the household, and on the type of
the last job contract.
3.6 Estimation
The parameters of the model are recovered in two steps. First, I estimate the
equations that describe the evolution of the exogenous elements in the model. These
include the dynamics of marriage, divorce, lay-off, job offers, and the earnings for
wives and husbands. The discount factor and the costs of childcare are externally
set. Second, the remaining parameters related to the utility function are estimated
by a combination of the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) and Indirect Inference.
Details of estimation for the exogenous elements in the model can be found in Appendix
C4, except for wages and probabilities estimation for which the estimation is described
33β is set to 0.98, following Attanasio et al. (2008).
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in the next subsection.
3.6.1 Wages and Offer/Lay-off Probabilities
When estimating wages one should take into account selection for work as the wages
of workers might be higher than the potential wages of non-workers. In this chapter I
estimate wages of women using a Heckman (1979) selection correction approach. This
estimation is done in a two-step procedure where the first step is a probit for work
choice and the second-stage is the wage equation, which accounts for the correlation
between unobservables of work choice and unobservables of wages (Mills ratio). In the
probit, I include the variables in the model that do not directly determine wages, but are
important determinants for the labour supply decision. Results in Table 3.19 indicate
the number of children as an important variable to take into account when women
choose to work whereas being married seems to be less relevant. For both contracts,
the Mills ratio turned out to be close to zero and non significant.
The results on selection should be taken with a grain of salt as the variables chosen
as exclusion restrictions might not be the best determinants of work choice. For robust-
ness purposes I have also estimated the selection equations accounting for additional
variables that existed in the data, but do not enter the structural model. Personal non-
labour income includes private transfers and returns from investments whereas social
transfers include unemployment benefits, family-related allowances, sickness/invalidity
benefits, education-related allowances, social assistance and housing allowance. Social
transfers are quite important in the context of Portugal, which reduce poverty risk for
around half.34 Following the evidence in the literature showing that female participa-
tion rises when households move into home ownership, I have also included dummies for
rent-free housing, rented housing, and second-home ownership (Del Boca and Lusardi,
34For a similar approach with United States data, see Low et al. (2018)
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2003). Results corroborate the evidence in the literature and also emphasise the im-
portance of home allowances in Portugal. Even after including all these variables, there
is no evidence of selection into work.
Although there is no evidence for selection, both estimates of fixed-term contract
wages and permanent wages presented in Table 3.18 are the ones resulting from the
selection correction approach. For husband’s wage no correction is done as the model
assumes the husband always works and the average participation rate in the data is
93%. As justified in the model description, all wages refer to full-time work as part-time
is not particularly relevant in Portugal, especially during the estimation period. For
accuracy, the wages estimation is also restricted to wages above the minimum wage
defined by law in each year.
In terms of offer probabilities, each node of the tree presented in Figure 3.5 is
assigned a value that depends on the type of contract, contract duration, number of
renewals, unemployment duration, schooling and age.35 Lay-off probabilities instead
follow a functional form that depends on university degree, tenure, and type of contract.
Results are presented in Table 3.17. Note that job offers are not directly observed in
the data (estimation uses transitions observed in the Labour Force Survey), but lay-offs
can be distinguished from quits and therefore, only this type of job separation is used
in the last estimation.
3.6.2 Method of Simulated Moments and Indirect Inference
The estimation of the parameters in the utility function is done by combining MSM
and indirect inference.36 Firstly, assuming an initial set of parameters in order to calcu-
35For presentational purposes the results on offer probabilities’ estimates are omitted from this
chapter, but are available upon request.
36See Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Duffie and Singleton (1993) for MSM and Gourieroux et al.
(1993) for indirect inference
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late all the possible conditional value functions, I solve the model backwards (starting
at the age of 50). Secondly I simulate the choices of 2985 women (5 times the number of
women I have aged 23 years old following Blundell et al. (2016a)), over the life-cycle and
save them in a panel data format. Initial conditions are taken from the data. Decisions
are made at the end of each period conditional on both observables and outcomes from
random draws, which are known at the beginning of each period.
Using both datasets (real and simulated) I compute the moments that are described
in the next subsection as well as the coefficients with respect to the indirect inference
approach. Finally, using the method of Bound Optimization by Quadratic Approxim-




where θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated; M(θ) is the vector of moments
computed from the simulated data; MR is the vector of moments computed from the
real data; W is the weighting matrix, which contains sample variances of MR in the
diagonal and hence the moments with greater variance will be less important. The
sample variances were bootstrapped with 10000 iterations.37
3.6.3 Moments
The moments used for the utility function parameters are listed in Table 3.5.
The proportion of non-workers, FTC, and PC workers, by age group, identifies the
disutility from work; the proportion of non-mothers, mothers of one child, mothers of
two children, by age group, and the quantiles of age at first birth and second birth,
identify the utility from children; the proportions of women with a one-year-old child
37Under the regulatory conditions stated in Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Duffie and Singleton





Proportion of women with a one-year-old child in each contract 4
Transitions between each labour market status 16
Proportion of non-mothers by age group 3
Proportion of mothers of one child by age group 3
Proportion of mothers of two children by age group 3
Proportion of non-workers by age group 5
Proportion of workers in fixed-term contracts by age group 5
Proportion of workers in permanent contracts by age group 5
Proportion of married women with children by age group 5
Quantiles of age at first birth and second birth 10
OLS regression coefficients of household income net of childcare costs on age,
number of children and work 3
OLS regression coefficients of children (0/1) on age, 1(husband), and contract 4
OLS regression coefficients of children (1/2) on age, 1(husband), and contract 4
Note: the age groups are [23,30], ]30,35],]35,40],]40,45],]45,50]. When calculating the proportion of
mothers I do not consider the age groups outside the fertile age. OLS regressions also account for year
fixed effects.
who do not work, work on a FTC, or work on a PC identify the complementarity
between newborns and work; the coefficients on the OLS regression of household income
net of childcare costs on age, number of children, and work identify the complementarity
between consumption and work and the complementarity between consumption and
children; and finally the coefficients OLS regression of children (0/1) on age, and non-
work, FTC, PC, and the coefficients OLS regression of children (1/2) on age, and
non-work, FTC, PC, identify the complementarity between the type of contract and
children. Additional moments that relate outcome variables with endogenous decisions,
such as the transitions between each labour market status and the proportion of married
women with children by age group are also included in the estimation as they are crucial




In the first subsection I report and discuss the estimates of the parameters in the
utility function. Afterwards, I present the fit of the model, both in aggregate statistics
and in life-cycle graphs, which depict the main outcomes along the life-cycle.
3.7.1 Parameter Estimates
Parameter estimates for the utility function and respective standard errors are shown
in Table 3.6. Despite the fact that I assume a utility function that is linear in con-
sumption, there is evidence for complementarity between consumption, labour and the
number of children, as both parameters (γ1 and γ2) give a negative value.
Table 3.6: Utility function parameters:



















The contribution of children to the utility function indicates a quadratic shape (γ4
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and γ5), which sheds light on the larger proportion of single-child mothers relative to
two-child ones. Illustrating the usual spacing between the first and second births, γ10
is a relatively large negative value.
The interplay between labour supply and fertility decisions is reflected in γ6, γ7, γ8,
and γ9. The first two parameters have opposite signs reflecting the stronger preference
for children when the woman is permanently employed. As the job security is lower
in a fixed-term contract the woman is likely to face an income shock, which might
have (negative) implications in terms of children (monetary) investment, therefore, the
coefficient associated with children during the period of fixed-term employment (γ6)
is negative. Note however that the magnitude (in absolute terms) of the parameter
associated to children while the woman is permanently employed (γ7) is smaller than
that for fixed-term employment to highlight the fact that, while employed, the mothers
will have less time to spend with their children.
When I look at these interactions in the presence of an infant (i.e., the youngest
child is one-year-old), the coefficient associated to permanent employment (γ9) is no
longer positive, highlighting the importance of time investment in children in the first
year of life. However, to compensate for the lack of time while employed, the mothers
might choose formal childcare. Such costs become relatively more expensive if the
mother becomes unemployed in the following years as the income necessary to keep
such monetary investment might decrease (with a larger probability) in case she holds
a fixed-term contract (γ8).
38
Finally, in terms of unobserved heterogeneity, the types that have relatively stronger
preference towards working have less disutility from labour force participation (ζp) and
the types that are more prone to have children enjoy it more (ζn) over the life-cycle.
The proportions for each type are presented at the end of the table. From these I
38Remember from subsection 3.5.6 that there is a high take-up of formal childcare in Portugal.
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observe that the groups with relatively more taste for children (HW and HU) are less
than 40% of the sample and the groups with relatively more taste for work (HW and
LW) represent more than half of it. As expected the most representative group is the
one with lower taste for children and higher taste for work (LW, with 35.59%).
3.7.2 Model Fit
In Table 3.7, I list the proportions of women according to different characteristics,
both in actual and simulated data.In the third column I provide the p-value resulting
from the t-test that compares the means between the data and the model.
Table 3.7: Comparison of means between actual and simulated data
Actual Simulated t-test p-value χ2 p-value
Non-employment Rate .3323 .3282 .27
.000
Employment FTC 1 year .0544 .0425 .05
Employment FTC 2 year .0170 .0151 .18
Employment PC .5964 .6141 .07
Fertility Rate .0370 .0354 .27
.000
Fert. Rate, non-employment .2450 .3186 .07
Fert. Rate, FTC .1125 .0555 .08
Fert. Rate, PC .6425 .6259 .31
% Women with no children .3470 .2940 .02
.000
% Mothers of 1 child .3127 .3825 .01
% Mothers of 2 child .3404 .3235 .07
% Working mothers .6555 .6486 .21
This model achieves reasonably good fit in terms of the labour market indicators.
Figure 3.6 shows the fit on labour supply along the life-cycle. Employment in permanent
contracts is the one that presents a better fit, which is consistent with the the fact that
this group has the closest match in terms of fertility rate (Table 3.7).
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On average, the model predicts fertility rate reasonably well. Figure 3.7 illustrates
the fit of motherhood along the life-cycle. Despite some local disparities, especially
between 23 and 25 years old, the model is able to capture the general concavity of this
indicator.39




To validate the model, estimated with data between 1994 and 1999, I extend the
maximum duration of successive FTC in the same firm to 6 years, as in the reform of
2003. In this exercise, I take out the restrictions on renewals that previously limited the
FTC cumulative duration to 3 years. For example, in the baseline, a 2-year contract
would only be renewed into a 1-year contract or it would be converted into a permanent
contract, if such an offer arrived. In this simulation, I allow the 2-year contract to be
renewed twice with the same duration before it is eventually converted into a permanent
contract.
As I change the structure of the labour market, but only model the labour supply I
should also adapt the probabilities for each transition in the labour market. To achieve
this, I re-estimate the same functional forms of the probabilities using LFS data between
2004 and 2008 in order to capture the legislation in place at the time, which was precisely
the one set in this experiment. I could use data up until 2009, when legislation changed
again, but I decided not to do so in order to avoid the contaminating the results by the
crisis in Portugal at that time, even though I control for general trends by including
dummies for both cohorts and years in all the regressions. Table 3.8 presents the results
of the first experiment compared to the baseline of the model and also to the actual
data from the Labour Force Survey.
As expected, and in line with Güell and Rodŕıguez Mora (2010), I observe a lower
employment rate (a fall of almost 10%) when the prevalence of fixed-term contracts is
higher. Such an effect is also observed in the significant decrease of contract conversions.
The higher degree of job uncertainty should have repercussions in terms of fertility.
Indeed, I observe lower fertility rate, and a higher proportion of childless women. Such
quality of the children and children investment decisions (Becker and Tomes, 1976; Chiswick, 1986;
Del Boca et al., 2014; Carneiro and Ginja, 2016). Note however that the availability of data on early
child investment and child performance in Portugal is very limited
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Table 3.8: Model Validation
Baseline Prediction Actual Data
1994-1999 2004-2008 2004-2008
Employment (%) 67.18 60.81 59.28
Permanent contracts (%) 91.42 82.14 81.77
FTC converted into PC (%) 9.33 2.82 4.21
Fertility rate 1.23 1.17 1.18
Childless at the end of fertile period (%) 17.05 19.19 21.22
predictions go in line with the channel of promotion as an important determinant of the
fertility decision. To check whether this validation is also in line with the reduced-form
evidence presented in subsection 3.4.1, I have run the same regression using the baseline
version of the model as the pre-period and the simulated version of the model as the
post-period. Results on the coefficients of interest are presented in the graph 3.11 in
the Appendix of this chapter. As I have achieved a reasonable model validation, in
the next section I set up two experiments for policies that have been discussed in the
literature of job security.
3.8 Policy Experiments
In this section I predict the impact of two counterfactuals on labour supply and
fertility decisions: (1) A single contract with a 3-year probation period; (2) A higher
tax rate on fixed-term contracts compensated by a decrease on the tax on permanent
contracts.40
40All policy experiments are implemented permanently from t = 1 with no prior announcement. All




To evaluate the outcome of the first policy experiment I simulate two other extreme
scenarios: one without permanent contracts and another without fixed-term contracts.
As the fertility mechanism under study is the level of job security, the outcomes of these
two scenarios should work as bounds to the impact of the new policy experiment.
To eliminate all the permanent contracts, I force the ones in the simulated data, to
be defined as 2-year fixed-term contracts instead. In terms of probabilities I keep the
same estimates and sum the probability of a permanent contract to that of a 2-year
fixed-term contract for consistency. As I do not adjust the rest of the labour market
characteristics (restrictions on the number of renewals, lay-off probabilities and wages)
one should expect the unemployment rate to increase as the duration of fixed-term
contracts is exhausted and the rate of job offer arrivals is not adjusted.
To complement the previous counterfactual I eliminate all the fixed-term contracts
by converting them into permanent ones since the period t=1. Once again, I do not
adjust the rest of the labour market characteristics as these are assumed to be exogenous
in the model. Therefore, in a situation with extremely low job insecurity one should
expect the employment rate to go up.
Table 3.9: Job security bounds: average levels and deviations from baseline on fertility
Baseline FTC Only (∆) PC Only (∆)
Fertility rate 1.23 0.84 (-32 %) 1.38 (12 %)
Childless women at age 41 (%) 17.25 25.03 (45 %) 14.4 (-17 %)
After computing the bounds for the extreme cases of job security, I simulate the
single contract with a probation period of three years. During this period, I assume
employers have the right to terminate the contract as if it was a fixed-term contract
(which can be interpreted as a reduction in the severance payments for the short ten-
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ure dismissals), but following the probation period, employers are required to employ
the workers permanently. Such a design is in line with what was adopted in Italy in
2015.41 Under these conditions it is expected job security to be low in the first years
of the single contract (fixed-term contract part), but also a higher conversion into the
permanent position of the single contracts. Given the two counteracting forces, ex-ante,
the direction of fertility change under this scenario is not clear. The results are sum-
marised in Table 3.10, which exhibits the average effects of the counterfactual on eight
main statistics.
Table 3.10: Single Contract experiment: average levels and deviations from baseline
Baseline Single C. (∆%)
Employment (%) 67.18 73.12 (8.8 %)
Permanent contracts (%) 91.42 94.6 (3.5 %)
FTC converted into PC (%) 9.33 28.58 (206 %)
Fertility rate 1.23 1.28 (4.1 %)
Childless women at age 41 (%) 17.25 15.82 (-8.3 %)
Kids conceived during FTC (%) 5.55 5.07 (-8.7 %)
Kids conceived during unemp. (%) 31.86 27.02 (-15.2 %)
This policy affects essentially the complementarity between employment and fertility
choices. The percentage of births during employment is predicted to increase from
68% to 73%.42 This result is mainly due to the increase in the percentage of births
during permanent contracts (8.5%) as the number of births during fixed-term contracts
has decreased. The overall effect on fertility rate is 4.1%. The magnitude of this
41See Lepage-Saucier et al. (2013) for a discussion of other alternatives.
42According to the OECD, in 1999, in Portugal, the employment rate for women between 25 and 54
years old, with at least one child between 0 and 2 years old, was 73.4% whereas that with no children
(between 0 and 14 years old) was 69.4%. Only Slovenia, Croatia and Denmark presented the same
difference whereas, for example, the United States presented a difference of 7.3 p.p. towards more
childless working women. Eurostat presents the same evidence for more recent years as well as for
women between 25 and 49 years old.
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result is remarkable as I compare with the results on childcare cost reduction in the
literature.Haan and Wrohlich (2011) found a 4.6% effect from a 20% increase in overall
childcare benefits in Germany, and Sheran (2007) found an 8.3% effect from a decrease
of 60% on childcare costs in the United States. For completeness, I have also simulated
these two policies and the effects on fertility rate are respectively 4.2% and 11%. This
means that improving the job security would be an effective way of increasing fertility
without relying on heavy costs of childcare subsidies.
According to my simulations, the rate of conversion is predicted to double under the
rules of the single contract. As a consequence, the employment rate also increases. As
this is a partial equilibrium model one could be concerned about the overshooting on
the employment rate, but even with a general equilibrium model Dolado et al. (2018)
predicted an increase in the total employment rate in the scenario of a single contract
for Spain, which is similar to Portugal in these features of the labour market. Under
such scenario, the higher fertility rate together with a higher female labour supply
would contrast with the policies of job protection that took place in Germany in the
80s and 90s and decreased the labour market attachment for mothers, especially in the
short-run (Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014).
For robustness, I test the sensitivity of the result to labour demand adjustments.43
As the increase in the share of permanent contracts would bring large costs to the firms,
I test the sensitivity of the result with respect to adjustments in the firing probabilities
on permanent contracts, on the new hiring probabilities on fixed-term contracts, and
on the seniority wage differential.
43This analysis is important as the feedback effects of the policy reform on labour demand could
potentially reverse the conclusions drawn above by the partial equilibrium experimental evaluation
(Lise et al., 2004)
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In the first test I change the ratio of firing probability of permanent contracts relative
to that of fixed-term contracts, as a proxy for the decrease in severance payment for
permanent contracts. As Figure 3.8 depicts, there would have to be a reduction of
around 3 times the actual ratio of firing probabilities for the positive effect on fertility
to disappear. Dolado et al. (2018) predict a decrease from 3.32 to 2.66, for Spain.
Another adjustment that firms might choose is to decrease the new hirings on fixed-
term contracts to compensate for the increase the labour force on permanent contracts
within each firm. Figure 3.9 shows there would have to be a reduction of 62% in the
rate of new FTC hiring to cancel out the positive effect on fertility. Dolado et al. (2018)
actually predict an increase on hiring of 0.045%, for Spain.
Finally, firms could adjust the seniority wage differential. As the conversion rate
between a fixed-term and a permanent contract increases, firms would, everything else
constant, employ the permanent workers for longer. In that case, firms might have an
incentive to decrease the wage seniority in the firm. According to Figure 3.10, there
would have to be a reduction of 41.5% in the seniority wage differential in order to
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cancel the positive effect of single contract on fertility rate. According to Dolado et al.
(2018), the average wage of workers aged 55 to 64 years old should decrease by 14%
while the average wage of workers between 25 and 54 years old should increase 2.6%,
which once again indicates that, even if there is a labour market adjustment, the impact
on fertility rate should still be non-negligible.
In conclusion: even though the effect of a single contract on fertility might vary
according to the different responses of the demand side of the labour market, there is
still a high chance the effect is still positive under labour market adjustments.
3.8.2 Contract-specific Tax Rates
As it was observed with the sensitivity tests to the previous policy, the wages also
play an important role in a dual labour market. In the data, fixed-term contracts
compensate for the job insecurity with higher wages whereas permanent contracts take
some time to catch up those levels as they start at a lower amount for the same tenure.
As a way to decrease the share of fixed-term contracts and increase the duration of job
spells, some European countries such as France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, introduced
supplements on the income taxes for fixed-term contracts. Even though the idea is the
same across countries, the rules vary a lot. In France, the most penalised contracts
were those shorter than a month (whereas the ones between one and three months were
less penalised); in Portugal, the penalization targeted those shorter than two weeks;
in Spain, those shorter than one week, and only Italy applied the same penalization
to all fixed-term contracts regardless of their duration. Moreover, in both France and
Italy the penalization was refunded in case the contract resulted in a conversion to a
permanent one whereas Portugal and Spain did not include that option.
In this subsection I simulate the impact of two different policies, one in which I
penalise the wages of fixed-term contracts by 5%, and another in which that penalization
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is compensated with a credit of 5% on the permanent contracts. Note that as I do not
model firms decisions I have two options to simulate this policy in the model: adjust
net wages accordingly, or adjust probabilities of hiring in the same direction. As it was
shown with the previous experiment, the decrease in the probability of hiring workers
on a fixed-term contract, compensated by the increase of hiring workers on a permanent
contract would increase fertility as the share of permanent contracts would increase.
Therefore, I opt to show the effects of an adjustment in net wages. Results are presented
in Table 3.11.








Employment (%) 67.18 66.9 (-0.4% ) 72.98 (8.6% )
PC/employment (%) 91.42 91.71 (0.3% ) 92.31 (1.0% )
FTC 1 year/employment (%) 6.33 6.07 (-4.1% ) 5.66 (-10.6% )
FTC 2 year/employment (%) 2.25 2.22 (-1.3% ) 2.02 (-10.2% )
Fertility Rate 1.23 1.229 (-0.1% ) 1.32 (7.3% )
Mothers of 1 child (%) 43.23 43.29 (0.1% ) 34.4 (-20.4% )
Mothers of 2 children (%) 39.73 39.73 (0.0% ) 48.56 (22.2% )
Conceived during FTC (%) 5.55 3.36 (-39.5%) 3.9 (-29.7% )
Conceived during unemp. (%) 31.86 33.9 (6.4% ) 23.25 (-27.0% )
Even though I do not use a general equilibrium model, the prediction of employment
decrease as a result of a higher income tax on fixed-term contracts is in line with Cahuc
et al. (2016). However, as I did not differentiate the tax by duration, I observe a decrease
in both types of fixed-term contracts included in the model. Because the effect of the
reduction in the proportion of fixed-term contracts was counteracted with the increase
in unemployment the overall impact on the fertility rate was nearly null.
On the contrary, if such a tax would be compensated by a credit on the wages for
permanent contracts the effect on fertility would be much larger than that predicted
by the single contract. This magnitude comes closer to the 11% impact found by
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Whittington et al. (1990) on a reform of the personal exemption for dependents in
income tax, in United States.
Note that the increase in fertility rate is driven by the increase in the percentage
of women with two children and by the decrease in the percentage of women with one
child, that is, the percentage of childless women at the end of the fertile period would
be exactly the same. This result corroborates what the evidence showed in the reduced-
form results: job security plays a larger role in the decision of having children, whereas
income seems to be more relevant to deciding how many children to have. This result
is in line with the fact that the percentage of children conceived during a permanent
contract is much larger under the last policy experiment than under the single contract
scenario.
3.8.3 Welfare Analysis
Despite the positive effect of both single contract and tax/credit policies on the
fertility rate, it is important to check if women were better off under the counterfactual
scenarios. In this subsection I evaluate the different policy experiments in terms of
percentage change in welfare and lifetime consumption. Welfare is defined as lifetime
utility and measured in consumption equivalent units. Lifetime income is the total
income earned by the household throughout the life-cycle.
The results on Table 3.12 show that both reforms yield a similar average impact in
terms of employment rate, but while the first brings a larger impact on the duration
of employment spells, the second has a larger impact on welfare. The last result is
driven not only by the larger impact on the fertility rate, but also by the larger effect
on lifetime income, as the utility function in the model is assumed to be linear.
In terms of the impact across the different groups of unobserved heterogeneity,
three results should be emphasised. First, the difference on the impact on employment
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∆ % in Employment Rate 8.85 4.76 3.90 10.71 13.46
∆ % in Employment Duration 19.41 2.39 10.32 23.68 33.78
∆ % in Fertility Rate 4.07 1.37 1.24 6.73 2.58
∆ % in Welfare 3.10 1.22 0.98 5.50 3.26
∆ % in Lifetime Income 6.30 3.61 2.77 8.00 9.17
B. Tax FTC / Credit PC
∆ % in Employment Rate 8.63 0.24 8.82 0.87 35.64
∆ % in Employment Duration 10.68 1.75 12.28 2.90 38.85
∆ % in Fertility Rate 7.26 -0.12 2.17 0.38 38.79
∆ % in Welfare 5.85 1.81 3.16 2.94 18.59
∆ % in Lifetime Income 11.04 6.10 9.77 6.90 24.67
duration comes mainly from the larger impacts on the groups with high taste for work
(low taste for leisure). Second, in both policy experiments, the result on fertility comes
essentially from the groups with low taste for fertility. Finally, the first policy caused
a larger impact on fertility rate on the group with high taste for work (low taste for
leisure), whereas the second policy change in fertility comes especially from the group
with low taste for work (high taste for leisure). This difference is also reflected in terms
of welfare but not in terms of lifetime income.
3.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, I study the impact of labour market duality on the fertility decision.
First, I provide reduced-form evidence that women working on fixed-term contracts
delay maternity until they find a permanent contract that boosts their job security.
This effect is particularly strong for the decision on having a first child. However, this
analysis cannot provide a causal relationship due to the presence of simultaneity in the
woman’s decisions on labour supply and fertility. By observing a childless woman on a
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fixed-term contract, it is not possible to identify whether the woman is solely focussing
on her career by choosing a contract type that has a higher degree of job insecurity, or
whether the woman is childless because she holds a job where the likelihood of being
fired is higher.
As a source of exogenous variation, I use a policy change that has modified the rules
of fixed-term contracts in Portugal in 2003. Under the new rules, a firm was entitled to
keep the worker in a fixed-term contract for six years, rather than three. As there was
no explicit change regarding the conversion into permanent contracts, this policy change
has basically extended the period for which the job security is low. Comparing women’s
decisions before and after the policy change I study the impact of this reform on the
likelihood of giving birth. The results indicate that women working on a fixed-term
contract that started after the reform, with lower prospects of permanent employment
had, on average, a lower probability of giving birth, keeping everything else constant.
However, the negative effect was reduced when the duration of the contract was longer,
as longer contracts tend to have a higher conversion rate.
Following the reduced-form evidence, I develop a dynamic structural model in which
women take their decisions, conditionally on the type of job contract they hold, if any.
The main goals of the model are twofold: to study the channels through which the
type of contract (fixed-term or permanent) or absence of job affect fertility decisions
along the life-cycle; and to simulate counterfactual scenarios of different job security.
The model is estimated with a combination of the method of simulated moments and
indirect inference, using data for Portugal between 1994 and 1999, and validated with
an out-of-sample prediction for the period between 2004 and 2008, after the reform.
Both policy counterfactuals come from adaptations of actual policy changes in Italy
in 2015. The first experiment simulates the creation of a single contract in which fixed-
term contracts are automatically converted into permanent contracts in case the woman
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is not fired during a probation period of three years. Results show that this policy could
increase fertility in Portugal by 4.1%. As this policy change could potentially bring
high costs to the firms, I perform three sensitivity analyses with respect to possible
adjustments in the labour market. In case firms decrease the ratio of firing probability
of permanent contract to that of fixed-term contract, as a way to incorporate a decrease
in severance payment for permanent contracts, the effect on fertility rate would still be
positive. In fact, a negative result would only arise in case the ratio was close to unity.
Another possible adjustment one could think of would be the reduction in the seniority
wage differential. According to the results, there would have to be a reduction of about
40% for the effect in fertility to disappear. Finally, firms would have to reduce new
FTC hiring rate by 62% to completely offset the positive effect on fertility rate.
As evidenced by the first policy counterfactual, wage dynamics are also important
determinants of the dual labour market. In an alternative policy experiment I simulate
the effect of taxing fixed-term contracts and the effect of compensating this taxation by
a credit on permanent contracts. According to the simulation results, this policy would
bring no effect to the percentage of childless women, but rather change the composition
of fertility in the households by increasing the number of mothers with two children,
as opposed to one. Hence, the results of the counterfactual analysis corroborate the
evidence found in the reduced-form results: job security plays a role in fertility decisions,
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C1 Descriptive Statistics: ECHP and LFS
Table 3.14: Comparisson between ECHP and LFS - Labour Market Indicators
ECHP LFS
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
University degree 0.105 0.307 0.106 0.308
Not working 0.325 0.469 0.343 0.475
Unemployment Duration 1.907 0.946 1.857 0.856
FTC (1 year) 0.081 0.274 0.073 0.261
FTC (2 years) 0.025 0.155 0.046 0.210
0 FTC Renewals 0.872 0.334 0.866 0.341
1 FTC Renewals 0.059 0.236 0.099 0.299
2 FTC Renewals 0.069 0.253 0.035 0.184
PC 0.894 0.308 0.880 0.325
Contract tenure 1 year 0.200 0.400 0.215 0.411
Contract tenure 2 years 0.064 0.245 0.075 0.263
Contract tenure 3+ years 0.735 0.441 0.710 0.454
N. individuals 2283 34988
N. panel observations 10277 125484
Note: read section 3.3.3 for explanation of main differences
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Table 3.13: Descriptive statistics of ECHP
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Age 35.479 8.174 23 50
University degree 0.105 0.307 0 1
Not working 0.325 0.469 0 1
Working
FTC (1 year) 0.081 0.274 0 1
FTC (2 years) 0.025 0.155 0 1
0 FTC Renewals 0.872 0.334 0 1
1 FTC Renewals 0.059 0.236 0 1
2 FTC Renewals 0.069 0.253 0 1
PC 0.894 0.308 0 1
Contract tenure 1 year 0.200 0.400 0 1
Contract tenure 2 years 0.064 0.245 0 1
Contract tenure 3+ years 0.735 0.441 0 1
Full-time Monthly Wage in 2000’s euros 476.745 269.561 246 2544
With partner 0.723 0.447 0 1
No children 0.338 0.473 0 1
Mothers
1 child 0.473 0.499 0 1
2 children 0.527 0.499 0 1
Years in sample 4.502 1.559 2 6
N. individuals 2283
N. panel observations 10277
Note: the minimum value observed for wages is the minimum wage in 1994 in 2000’s euros.
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Table 3.15: Comparisson between ECHP and LFS - Labour Market Flows
From/To Non-employment FTC (1 year) FTC (2 years) PC
ECHP
Non-employment 0.858 0.040 0.007 0.095
FTC (1 year) 0.145 0.501 0.063 0.290
FTC (2 years) 0.051 0.095 0.416 0.438
PC 0.049 0.015 0.005 0.932
ES
Non-employment 0.876 0.053 0.017 0.053
FTC (1 year) 0.171 0.551 0.119 0.159
FTC (2 years) 0.071 0.050 0.656 0.223
PC 0.032 0.010 0.005 0.954
Note: read section 3.3.3 for explanation of main differences
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C2 Auxiliary Data
To calibrate the childcare costs in the model, I used the National Household Budget
Survey of 1994/1995, 2000, and 2005/2006. The first two years calibrated the baseline
version of the model as well as the policy simulations whereas the latter was used in
the validation of the model. This cross sectional survey is collected every 5 years by
the National Statistics Institute, in Portugal. Each household is asked about their
expenditure, net revenues, and household composition. Unfortunately the survey does
not provide monetary information on assets but rather descriptive information on the
house and durables.
For each survey year I have selected the households based on the same criteria as for
the ECHP and LFS, presented in subsection3.3.3: households with at least one female
between 23 and 50 years old that is either employed under a fixed-term or permanent
contract, or not employed. To construct the measures of interest I used all the expenses
related to (both formal and informal) education of children.
To grasp some insights about women’s preferences I have used the National Fertility
and Family Survey for the years of 1997 and 2013. This cross sectional survey has no
fixed periodicity and was not collected in any other years. Even though my model is
designed according to the characteristics of the Portuguese Economy during the period
of 1994-1999, the second wave of this survey is particularly useful as it also contains
information on the type of the job contract.
The National Fertility and Family Survey gives information on household compos-
ition, education, labour market status, respondent’s parents, marital history, children
history, desired children, fertility disruptions, and general opinions about family.
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C3 Conditional Value Functions
According to the model presented in the paper, the number of choice possibilities
in each period depends on the existence of a partner and on the arrival of job of-
fers/renewals and not necessarily on the choice that was made in the previous period.44
Hence, for simplicity in this section, the conditional value functions related to fertility
choices will not incorporate the labour supply decision and vice-versa.45
In what follows V Nki,t denotes the value function associated to the decision of choosing
to giving the kth birth in the next period. Not choosing to have a new child is denoted
by N̄ . In case the woman gives birth, the state space will be denoted as Ωki,t.
In case the woman is not married, she will get a partner with probability µ, which
depends on the age of the woman and on the duration of the job contract the woman
holds in that period. In case she is married she will lose the partner with probability
ρ, which solely depends on the number of children.46
Value of being single
V m̄i,t (Ωit) = U
m̄












Value of having a partner
V mi,t (Ωit) = U
m












Value of choosing to have the first child












44Note that because each period is one year and the maternity leave in Portugal is no more than 4
months then I can allow for the woman to give birth and work in the same period.
45Note that conditional value functions related with fertility decisions are assumed to be zero once
the woman has two children and/or is older than 40 years old.
46I have tried different reduced form specifications for the probability of divorce and the years of
marriage turned out to be non-significant in all cases.
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Value of choosing to have the second child








In terms of labour supply conditional values functions I denote V
Pd,r
i,t denotes the
value function associated to the decision of working on a contract of duration d and
renewals r. Not working is denoted by P̄ . In case the woman is receiving unemployment
benefits, the state space will be denoted as Ωubi,t.
In case the woman decides to work she is fired with a probability δ, which depends
on the duration of the current contract, the tenure of the current contract and the
number of renewals. In every period, regardless of her employment status, each woman
receives at most one offer with duration D with probability λD, which depends on the
duration of the last contract in case she was just fired (if not this duration is set to
zero), the tenure of the current contract in case she was just fired or the number of
years in unemployment in case she was fired in a previous period, and her age.
Value of working on a fixed-term contract with d = 1, r = 0
V
P1,0
i,t (Ωit) = U
P1,0





































Note that when the renewal is to a 2-year contract, the firm cannot use more renewals
at the end of that contract
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Value of working on a fixed-term contract with d = 1, r = 1
V
P1,1
i,t (Ωit) = U
P1,1














































Value of working on a fixed-term contract with d = 1, r = 2
V
P1,0
i,t (Ωit) = U
P1,0
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Value of working on a fixed-term contract with d = 2, r = 0, x = 1
V
P2,0
i,t (Ωit) = U
P2,0














































Value of working on a fixed-term contract with d = 2, r = 0, x = 2
V
P2,0
i,t (Ωit) = U
P2,0
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Value of working on a fixed-term contract with d = 2, r = 1
V
P2,0
i,t (Ωit) = U
P1,0



































Value of working on a permanent job contract (d = 3)
V P3i,t (Ωit) = U
P3


































Externally set parameters: I set the discount factor β to 0.98 (see Blundell et al.
(2016a) and Attanasio et al. (2008)). I set the mean of the extreme value distribution
to 0 and the scale to 0.2. I also set the children’s cost to be the averages spent by
age of youngest child and number of children from the Family Expenditure Survey
of 1995. The probabilities for job offers are estimated from the Labour Force Survey
sample. Results are not presented here for presentational purposes, but are available
upon request.
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Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.18: Wages estimates:
FTC Wage PC Wage Husband’s Wage




1 Univ. Degree 0.491∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.050) (0.018)




Constant 5.725∗∗∗ 5.369∗∗∗ 6.045∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.076) (0.018)
N 415 4651 4029
All regressions refer to full time wages and control for time effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.19: Selection Equations Estimates:
FTC PC
Number of children -.193∗∗∗ -.211∗∗∗ -.077∗∗∗ -.086∗∗∗
(.053) (.054) (.022) (.022)
1 Married .161∗ .164∗ .037 -.018
(.087) (.09) (.038) (.039)
Personal non-labour income (000s e) -.145 -.033
(.167) (.033)
Social Transfers (000s e) -.001 -.042∗∗∗
(.012) (.005)
1 Rent-Free House .052 -.107∗∗
(.106) (.047)
1 Rented House .459∗∗∗ .132∗∗∗
(.078) (.036)
1 Second Home .073 .046
(.125) (.055)
Mills Ratio -.01 .013 -.016 -.023
(.039) (.036) (.095) (.047)
N 4021 8257
All regressions include the explanatory variables from the wage equations as well as age and
time effects. The instruments included in first and third columns are the ones included in
the structural model as well, whereas the instruments included in second and fourth columns
exist in the data but are not part of the model. The latter serve as robustness checks for
selection. The base group for house ownership is owners with no second-house. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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C5 Model Validation - Replicating the reduced-form results
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Jenkins, S. P. and Garćıa-Serrano, C. (2004). The Relationship between Unemployment
194
Bibliography
Benefits and Re-employment Probabilities: Evidence from Spain. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 66(2):239–260.
Jurajda, Š. and Tannery, F. J. (2003). Unemployment Durations and Extended Unem-
ployment Benefits in Local Labor Markets. ILR Review, 56(2):324–348.
Kalbfleisch, J. D. and Prentice, R. L. (2011). The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time
Data, volume 360.
Katz, L. F. and Meyer, B. D. (1990a). The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unem-
ployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment. Journal of Public Economics,
41(1):45–72.
Katz, L. F. and Meyer, B. D. (1990b). Unemployment Insurance, Recall Expectations,
and Unemployment Outcomes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(4):973–
1002.
Keane, M. P. and Wolpin, K. I. (2010). The Role of Labor and Marriage Markets,
Preference Heterogeneity, and the Welfare System in the Life Cycle Decisions of
Black, Hispanic, and White Women. International Economic Review, 51(3):851–892.
Lalive, R. (2007). Unemployment Benefits, Unemployment Duration, and Post-
Unemployment Jobs: A Regression Discontinuity Approach. The American Eco-
nomic Review, 97(2):108–112.
Lalive, R. (2008). How do Extended Benefits Affect Unemployment Duration? A
Regression Discontinuity Approach. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2):785–806.
Lalive, R., Schlosser, A., Steinhauer, A., and Zweimüller, J. (2014). Parental Leave and
Mothers’ Careers: The Relative Importance of Job Protection and Cash Benefits.
Review of Economic Studies, 81(1):219–265.
195
Bibliography
Lalive, R., Van Ours, J., and Zweimüller, J. (2006). How Changes in Financial In-
centives Affect the Duration of Unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies,
73(4):1009–1038.
Lalive, R. and Zweimüller, J. (2004). Benefit Entitlement and Unemployment Duration:
The Role of Policy Endogeneity. Journal of Public Economics, 88(12):2587–2616.
Lalive, R. and Zweimüller, J. (2009). How Does Parental Leave Affect Fertility and
Return to Work? Evidence from Two Natural Experiments. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 124(3):1363–1402.
Lancaster, T. (1979). Econometric methods for the duration of unemployment. Econo-
metrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 939–956.
Layard, R., Nickell, S., and Jackman, R. (1991). Macroeconomic Performance and the
Labour Market.
Lazear, E. P. and Rosen, S. (1990). Male-Female Wage Differentials in Job Ladders.
Journal of Labor Economics, 8(1):S106–S123.
Le Barbanchon, T. (2016). The Effect of the Potential Duration of Unemployment
Benefits on Unemployment Exits to Work and Match Quality in France. Labour
Economics, 42:16–29.
Lepage-Saucier, N., Schleich, J., and Wasmer, E. (2013). Moving Towards a Single
Labour Contract: Pros, Cons and Mixed Feelings.
Lindeboom, M. and Theeuwes, J. (1993). Search, Benefits and Entitlement. Economica,
60(239):327–346.
Lise, J., Seitz, S., and Smith, J. (2004). Equilibrium Policy Experiments and the
196
Bibliography
Evaluation of Social Programs. National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper 10283.
Ljungqvist, L. and Sargent, T. J. (2008). Two Questions About European Unemploy-
ment. Econometrica, 76(1):1–29.
Llull, J. and Miller, R. (2016). Internal Migration in Dual Labor Markets. Society for
Economic Dynamics.
Low, H., Meghir, C., Pistaferri, L., and Voena, A. (2018). Marriage, Labor Supply
and the Dynamics of the Social Safety Net. National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper No. 24356.
Lubyova, M. and Van Ours, J. (1997). Unemployment Dynamics and the Restructuring
of the Slovak Unemployment Benefit System. European Economic Review, 41(3-
5):925–934.
Meyer, B. D. (1990). Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells. Economet-
rica, 58(4):757–782.
Milligan, K. (2005). Subsidizing the Stork: New Evidence on Tax Incentives and Fer-
tility. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(3):539–555.
Moffitt, R. (1984). Profiles of Fertility, Labour Supply and Wages of Married Women:
A Complete Life-Cycle Model. The Review of Economic Studies, 51(2):263–278.
Moffitt, R. (1985). Unemployment Insurance and the Distribution of Unemployment
Spells. Journal of Econometrics, 28(1):85–101.
Moffitt, R. and Nicholson, W. (1982). The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Un-




Mortensen, D. T. (1977). Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions. ILR
Review, 30(4):505–517.
Mortensen, D. T. (1988). Matching: Finding a Partner for Life or Otherwise. American
Journal of Sociology, 94:S215–S240.
Narendranathan, W. and Stewart, M. B. (1993). How Does the Benefit Effect Vary as
Unemployment Spells Lengthen? Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8(4):361–381.
Neal, D. (1995). Industry-specific human capital: Evidence from displaced workers.
Journal of labor Economics, 13(4):653–677.
Nekoei, A. and Weber, A. (2017). Does Extending Unemployment Benefits Improve
Job Quality? The American Economic Review, 107(2):527–561.
Nickell, S. (1979). Estimating the Probability of Leaving Unemployment. Econometrica,
47(5):1249–1266.
Nickell, S. (1997). Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe Versus North
America. Journal of Economic perspectives, 11(3):55–74.
Nickell, S., Nunziata, L., and Ochel, W. (2005). Unemployment in the OECD Since
the 1960s. What Do We Know? The Economic Journal, 115(500):1–27.
Nickell, S. J. (1978). Fixed Costs, Employment and Labour Demand over the Cycle.
Economica, 45(180):329–345.
OECD (2018). OECD Employment Outlook 2018.
Olivetti, C. and Petrongolo, B. (2017). The Economic Consequences of Family Policies:




Pakes, A. and Pollard, D. (1989). Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization
Estimators. Econometrica, pages 1027–1057.
Pellizzari, M. (2006). Unemployment Duration and the Interactions between Unem-
ployment Insurance and Social Assistance. Labour Economics, 13(6):773–798.
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